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About the Lowell Center
The Lowell Center for Sustainable Production is a research center   
of the University of Massachusetts Lowell working to build healthy work 
environments, thriving communities, and viable businesses that support  
a more sustainable world. We do this by working collaboratively with  
citizens’ groups, workers, businesses, and government agencies.
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Going to work should not be 
a choice between feeding your 
family and protecting your 
health and safety.  
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M
oST PEoPLE WoRk. Many 
people do work that is highly hazard-
ous, such as mining, construction, 
and some manufacturing jobs.Many 
others work in service industries such 
as retail or house-keeping, which are not typically 
thought of as “hazardous” but can still cause seri-
ous injuries. More than four thousand workers 
in the United States died on the job in 2009 and 
more than 3.3 million workers were injured or 
made ill by their work.1,2  
 We also know that the reported injuries, illnesses 
and fatalities represent only a small fraction of 
the total work related illnesses and diseases in the 
United States because of serious under-reporting. 
For example, the 4,000 deaths/year counted above 
don’t include the nearly 10,000 asbestos-related 
deaths in the U.S. per year—a number about 
which we have a high degree of confidence even 
though it doesn’t come from the official work-
place fatality statistics.3 Failures to protect the 
health and safety of workers have tremendous 
costs for those who are harmed, their families 
and their communities. Ignoring the pain and 
suffering, the simple economic costs run to the 
tens of billions of dollars per year (workers 
compensation payments alone accounted for 
$57.6 billion in 2008).4,5
 Despite these sobering statistics, improving oc-
cupational safety and health has received little 
public or political attention in this country. While 
Upton Sinclair highlighted horrific working con-
ditions in the meatpacking industry in the early 
i n t roduC t i on
Healthy Workplaces Support  
Healthy Communities
1900s, and visionary scientists like alice Hamilton 
and Irving Selikoff identified occupational health 
hazards of lead and asbestos, we continue to expose 
workers to a wide range of dangerous, yet wholly 
preventable, hazards. Going to work should not be 
a choice between feeding one’s family and protect-
ing one’s health and safety.  
 This report, Lessons Learned: Solutions for Workplace 
Safety and Health documents case studies of systemic 
failures in protecting workers from injury and ill-
ness and outlines some paths forward that can 
more effectively protect workers, the communities 
in which they live, consumers, and the environ-
ment while stimulating innovation in safer forms 
of production.
A failed regulatory approach to worker health 
In 1970, Congress passed the occupational Safety 
and Health act (oSHact) to “assure so far as 
possible every working man and woman in the na-
tion safe and healthful working conditions.” The 
oSHact was enacted at a time of unprecedented 
passage of laws for protection of workers and the 
environment. It promised new protections for 
worker safety and health including a general duty 
on employers to “furnish to each of his employees 
employment and a place of employment which are 
free from recognized hazards that are causing or 
are likely to cause death or serious physical harm 
to his employees.” Particularly in its first decade, 
the occupational Safety and Health administra-
tion (oSHa) made important contributions to 
workplace health and safety, but from the Reagan 
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administration onwards, the agency and the policies 
it implements have been significantly weakened.  
 oSHa has suffered severe reductions of its 
funding and effectiveness in implementing and 
enforcing workplace health and safety. Early court 
decisions supported oSHa’s ability to implement 
strict prevention-oriented standards even when 
the scientific evidence about a particular hazard 
was limited. For example in a case challenging 
oSHa’s occupational standard for vinyl chloride 
(The Society of the Plastics Industry, Inc., v. oc-
cupational Safety and Health administration, 
1975), the Second Circuit Court noted: “the ulti-
mate facts here in dispute are on the frontiers of 
scientific knowledge and though the factual finger 
points, it does not conclude. Under the command 
of oSHa, it remains the duty of the Secretary to 
protect the working-man, and to act even in cir-
cumstances where existing methodology or re-
search is deficient.” The court further stated that 
regulations can establish standards that require 
technologies that may be only “looming on the 
horizon.”  
 The early recognition of limits in science but 
the need to act in a precautionary, preventive 
manner changed with the 1980 Supreme Court 
decision striking down oSHa’s proposed stan-
dard for benzene. The court noted that oSHa 
had not demonstrated significant risk with sub-
stantial evidence. The case ushered in a require-
ment for agencies to quantitatively demonstrate 
that a hazard represented a significant risk before 
establishing an occupational health standard, that 
the job of oSHa was not “absolute safety but the 
elimination of significant harm.”
 Today, few health and safety experts believe that 
oSHa’s rulemaking and enforcement activities 
are effectively living up to the goals of the original 
act. a short list of failures includes:
• Chronic under-reporting of occupational in-
jury and illness rates in national surveillance 
systems;
• an enforcement system based heavily on small 
penalties and inspections that never reach the 
vast majority of establishments covered by the 
oSHact;  
I N T roDUC T I o N :  Healthy Workplaces Support Healthy Communities
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the	current	rules	and	structure	of	occupational	safety	and	health		
work	against	preventive	and	precautionary	measures.
• a slow, reactive hazard-by-hazard rule-making 
system that has failed to adopt or update stan-
dards for preventing injuries from widespread 
ergonomic and chemical hazards including 
known carcinogens; accepts risks to workers 
that are magnitudes greater than are consid-
ered acceptable for the general population; 
and cannot  keep pace with rapid  technological 
change in the american workplace; and
• Constant legal challenges by industry that have 
resulted in oSHa rule-making requirements 
that place greater emphasis on reducing eco-
nomic impacts than on reducing illness and 
injury.  
The current rules and structure of occupational 
safety and health work against preventive and pre-
cautionary measures. These shortcomings cannot 
simply be explained by the gross under-funding of 
oSHa or problematic court decisions. For exam-
ple, the agency’s location in the Department of 
Labor has sometimes worked against comprehen-
sive approaches to chemical regulation which 
could benefit workers, the environment and con-
sumers with less burdensome rules for industry. 
at the same time, attempts at voluntary compli-
ance under several administrations have also not 
been effective. Globalization, outsourcing, and 
the weakening of labor unions have fundamentally 
altered the workplace and challenged oSHa’s 
ability to protect workers as originally conceived by 
the oSHact. 
 While the majority of employers have a genuine 
concern about the health and safety of workers, 
most feel intimidated by oSHa. Injured workers 
and families of those who have been killed are 
deeply angered that oSHa levies a mere slap on 
the hand with its extremely low fines for non-
compliance—fines that by no means serve to deter 
as intended. The general public continues to 
barely know what oSHa is or what it does and 
continues to be ill-informed about the magnitude 
Learning from past failures
This report is inspired by the European Environment agency’s (EEa) Late Lessons from Early Warnings: the Precautionary Principle 
1896–2000 (http://www.eea.europa.eu/publications/environmental_
issue_report_2001_22). EEa’s report outlined 14 environmental and 
occupational health cases where early evidence existed of potential 
harms but no action was taken. The report reveals the economic and 
human costs of inaction as well as lessons learned to improve envi-
ronmental and occupational health decision-making. EEa’s report 
and the Lowell Center’s work as ¡one of the leading U.S. advocates 
of the precautionary principle have strongly influenced environmental 
and health policy debates in the U.S. and in Europe. This report, 
Lessons Learned: Solutions for Workplace Safety and Health builds 
on these earlier efforts, making the case for precautionary and pre-
ventive action to improve workplace health and safety in the U.S.
of harm in today’s workplaces—harms that not 
only hurt the lives of workers and their families, 
but also cause enormous economic and social 
costs for the rest of society. 
Learning from late lessons
There is a sad history of knowing about occupa-
tional health hazards and the programs and poli-
cies that could fix them, but not taking the action 
that’s required. By researching the lessons learned 
from our occupational safety and health history, 
we learn that the failure to act to protect workers is 
not only caused by weak oSHa regulations or 
enforcement. Failure to act is often the result of 
multiple factors, such as: the practices of numerous 
federal agencies whose decisions impact worker 
health yet do not include worker health consider-
ations in their decision processes; the politiciza-
tion of science; or the inherent conflicts between 
economic and social interests. In essence, harm to 
workers from occupational health hazards is a sys-
tem failure. Hence, systems solutions are needed.
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 Reforms are desperately needed, and effective 
reforms can be identified by studying and reveal-
ing lessons learned from our failures in a range of 
occupational safety and health settings. Effective 
workplace health and safety programs need to be 
integrated with other aspects of the design of pro-
duction systems and community health. By learn-
ing more about limits of government and industry 
to protect workers from occupational injury and 
disease we can advance recommendations that 
would co-optimize goals of worker health, com-
munity health and economic prosperity.  
 
Six case studies of health and safety  
problems and solutions 
This report includes six case studies of occupa-
tional health and safety failures across sectors, 
populations and hazards. The Lowell Center for 
there	is	a	sad	history	of	knowing	about	occupational	health	hazards		
and	the	programs	and	policies	that	could	fix	them,	but	not	taking	the		
action	that’s	required.
Sustainable Production (Lowell Center) of the 
University of Massachusetts Lowell has produced 
this report to provide evidence and recommenda-
tions for systemic national policy reforms that will 
lead to stronger, more effective prevention-focused 
worker health and safety protections. The case 
studies document the history of selected workplace 
health and safety policies and practices and draw 
lessons from these to inform and stimulate new 
policy initiatives.   
 Case studies were chosen based primarily on 
three factors: (1) addressing a large population of 
workers or vulnerable populations; (2) timely or 
relevant to current events; (3) teaching lessons 
with important policy implications. a list of over a 
dozen potential case studies was developed. These 
were presented to a large group of advisors drawn 
from labor unions, government and academia. 
I N T roDUC T I o N :  Healthy Workplaces Support Healthy Communities
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This input was used to narrow the list to the final 
six case studies from which our “stories within the 
stories” were extracted: 
• Floor finishers, lacquer sealers, and fires: safer 
product alternatives are the solution
• When my job breaks my back: shouldering the 
burden of work-related musculoskeletal disorders
• The poison that smells like butter: diacetyl and 
popcorn workers’ lung disease
• Injuries are not accidents: construction will be 
safe when it’s designed to be safe
• Regulating methylene chloride: a cautionary 
tale about setting health standards one chemical 
at a time
• Safe food from safe workplaces: protecting 
meat and poultry processing workers
Based on initial research and input from advisors, 
key lessons to explore were identified for each case 
study. The research approach for each case study 
varied though all included: (1) literature reviews, 
including government, academic and non-profit 
organization reports; newspaper articles; and peer 
reviewed journal articles and (2) key informant 
interviews with experts on each case. Each case 
study was developed and refined by the Lowell 
Center research team and peer reviewed by one 
or more experts in the field. Based on the case 
studies, the research team extracted key lessons 
and developed recommendations for future sys-
temic reforms in the final chapter of this report.
 This report is guided by a fundamental per-
spective of the Lowell Center: healthy workplaces 
are inextricably linked to healthy communities, 
local and global ecosystems and economic vitality. 
our experience as scientists, policy analysts and 
technologists has taught us that the most effective 
way to ensure that workers, communities and the 
environment are protected from hazards is through 
the redesign of production and consumption sys-
tems so that they are inherently more sustainable. 
We understand the challenges involved in such 
systematic changes but believe that a big vision, 
combined with small successful examples, is the 
way to infuse hope and opportunity into a system 
that may appear severely broken. 
© 2010 Earl Dotter
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the more diacetyl a 
worker had breathed, 
the worse his or her  
lung function was.
What’s the best way  
to prevent fires from  
quick-drying floor finishes?  
Substitute a safer product.
©
 2
0
1
0
 Earl D
otter
6  |  Lowell Center for Sustainable Production  |  University of Massachusetts Lowell Lessons Learned: Solutions for Workplace Safety and Health  |  7
CASe  S t udy  1
Floor Finishers, Lacquer Sealers, and Fires: 
Safer Product alternatives are the Solution
Pia Markkanen, David Kriebel, Joel Tickner, Molly M. Jacobs
in 2004, two 35-year-old Vietnamese immigrants, toan Bui and Ha Vu, were refinishing hardwood floors 
in a three-family house in Somerville, a city on Boston’s northern periphery. this was not at all an 
unusual scene. the older cities of new england feature tens of thousands of nineteenth- and early 
twentieth-century houses with fine old wood floors, which periodically need to be refinished. From an 
environmental and health perspective, there’s a lot that’s good about wood floors: they’re easy to keep 
clean, they’re comfortable and warm underfoot, and when they eventually get scuffed and dirty, they 
can be sanded and refinished several times before they need to be replaced. 
Floor finishing is heavy, noisy, and dusty work, but it also requires attention to detail and a commitment 
to quality workmanship. in Massachusetts, the industry is now dominated by Vietnamese immigrants. 
An estimated 80 percent of all floor sanders/finishers in Boston are ethnic Vietnamese. in 2006, 
127 of 144 registered Boston hardwood floor contractors had Vietnamese workers, and there are 
undoubtedly many more contractors who are not registered with the city. 
toan Bui and Ha Vu were typical workers in a typical trade—until 2004, when they died on the job in 
a fiery and entirely preventable disaster in which two co-workers were also badly burned. they had fin-
ished sanding the old floors and were coating them with a lacquer sealer that is typically 80 percent 
flammable solvent, with the remainder a mixture of resins that serve to coat and protect the wood. the 
entire house caught fire in a matter of seconds after the lacquer sealer was ignited by a pilot light in 
a gas stove.1,2
S
aDLy,  oTHER  DEaTHS  HaVE 
occurred under circumstances nearly iden-
tical to those described above. Between 1995 
and 2005, more than 25 fires directly at-
tributed to hardwood floor installation 
and refinishing occurred in Boston alone, result-
ing in a property loss valued at over $1.5 mil-
lion.2 In 2005, in the nearby town of Hull, Mas-
sachusetts, a floor sander died from burns and 
another received minor burns while finishing 
wood floors that they had installed in a single-
family home. a recent survey of 109 floor sanders/ 
finishers in central and eastern Massachusetts found 
that 43 percent of respondents knew of fires that 
had broken out on hardwood floor-finishing 
jobs done by their company.3 
 In Toronto, two floor finishers died in 1991 as 
they were applying a lacquer finish to a new, un-
finished hardwood floor, a fire broke out and an 
explosion followed. Ching Chan died of a suspect-
ed heart attack after helping his friend Chung 
Chow out of the burning building. Chung Chow 
died later from third-degree burns over 95 per-
cent of his body. “The force of the explosion was 
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Between	1995	and	2005,	more	than	25	fires		
directly	attributed	to	hardwood	floor	installation	
and	refinishing	occurred	in	Boston	alone.	
C aS E  S T UDy  1 :  Floor Finishers, Lacquer Sealers, and Fires
so great it blew most of the brick off the back of 
the house and gutted it from basement to roof,” 
Sergeant Miles of york Region Police told report-
ers.4 Ten years later, another Toronto floor fin-
isher died: 62-year-old albert Ernst was burned 
to death as he was applying a lacquer sealer to a 
the floor-finishing industry 
Floor sanders and finishers belong to the broad 
occupational group of carpet, floor, and tile in-
stallers and finishers. In 2008, this set of occupa-
tions accounted for about 160,500 jobs in the 
United States, and 35 percent of these workers 
were self-employed.9 The US Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) predicts 11 percent employment 
growth during 2008-2018 for floor sanders and 
finishers due to the increasing use of hardwood as 
a flooring material as well as the growing demand 
for residential renovations. although earnings 
vary by geographic location and by union mem-
bership status, median hourly wages for floor 
sanders and finishers—at about $15 per hour—are 
the lowest in the broad occupational group.9  
 Most carpet, floor, and tile installers and finish-
ers learn their trades informally on the job—first 
by helping carry materials, then learning about the 
tools and simple tasks, and later performing more 
difficult tasks like cutting and installing various 
floor covering materials. Many of those who begin 
working for someone else eventually set up their 
own businesses as independent contractors.9 
exposures to floor finishers
When a hardwood floor is installed, the wood 
flooring is first laid down on concrete or another 
type of foundation layer. Workers then smooth 
wood imperfections with sanding machines.9 
Then they examine the floor and remove excess 
glue from joints using a knife or chisel, and they 
may further sand the wood surfaces by hand with 
sandpaper.9  Finally, workers apply a sealer to the 
floor, followed by a polyurethane varnish. Work-
ers use brushes or rollers, often applying multiple 
coats of varnish.9 
 Floor sanders and finishers are exposed to dust, 
noise, and heavy physical exertion. airborne wood 
dust, a well-established cause of cancer, often ex-
ceeds the nIoSH Recommended Exposure Limits 
(RELs) during sanding.10 In addition, some old 
floors are caked with layers of lead paint, so that 
sanding creates clouds of highly inhalable lead 
dust, creating a serious hazard not only for work-
ers but for residents as well. 
 Hardwood floor installation and finishing usu-
ally involve the use of three kinds of chemical 
products: (1) an adhesive to apply wood flooring 
basement parquet floor.5 Both Ernst’s helper and 
the building’s owner missed  fiery deaths by sec-
onds because the helper had gone upstairs to bring 
the owner to see the first coat being applied. 
 During 1992-2002, 52 fatal injuries among 
workers in the occupational group of carpet, floor, 
and tile installers and finishers in the United 
States were reported to the Bureau of Labor Statis-
tics.4 This is undoubtedly an underestimate: re-
porting of occupational fatalities is incomplete in 
the United States, and the data for small indepen-
dent contractors are particularly inadequate. of 
the known deaths, 21 percent (11/52) resulted 
from fires and explosions.4,5  
T his case study highlights two major themes: (1) hazards of highly flammable wood floor-finishing products, in particular a number 
of serious fires these chemicals have caused in many communities; 
and (2) unprotected immigrant workers who need safer chemical alter-
natives to use at work. We start by describing the general nature of 
the floor-finishing work. The majority of the case study focuses on 
causes and aftermath of the two fatal fires in Massachusetts during 
2004–2005 including the landmark State 2010 legislation that now 
prohibits the commercial use and sale of lacquer sealers in floor 
finishing.1,6,7,8 The case demonstrates the necessity of toxics use 
reduction (TUr) strategies—through government legislation, economic 
incentives, outreach, and training—as an essential element to promote 
public safety and fair business competition while making operations 
safer. Legislation is needed to ban hazardous products when less 
hazardous alternatives are clearly on the market. 
ABou t  t H i S  C A S e  S t u dy
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to concrete or another type of foundation layer; 
(2) a sealer applied to the sanded wood surface; 
and (3) a varnish applied as a top coat as soon as 
the sealer has dried.11 Some sealers contain lacquer 
to speed drying, and are known as lacquer sealers.5 
Some floor-finishing products contain chemicals 
that are toxic to the nervous system and reproduc-
tive system, cause cancer, and/or trigger allergies 
or asthma.4 and so while the fire hazard is perhaps 
the most frightening, it is not the only risk that 
these workers face. 
Lacquer sealers have as much as 80% solvent in them . . . 
a gallon of lacquer on the floor is like pouring 3 quarts of 
gasoline on your basement. There are arson laws against 
that but no restrictions on using lacquer sealers in a closed 
environment like your home. 
— WoodFloorDoctor.com5
How flash fires happen 
Most lacquer sealers are made from nitrocellulose 
alkyd resins and plasticizers.5 However, it’s the added 
lacquer thinner that makes these sealers both fast-
drying and highly flammable.5 These products are 
inexpensive, and because they dry very quickly, 
many contractors use them as a quick first coat un-
der varnish, despite their flammability.5 We would 
like to emphasize here that most floor sealers are not 
lacquers and are not flammable—industry  experts 
who advised the Massachusetts Floor-Finishing 
Safety Task Force explained that lacquer sealers are 
not actually designed for floor finishing and fail to 
bind properly to coats of finish.12
 For a liquid to be flammable, two conditions must 
be met:  the liquid must be able to vaporize, and 
vapor at a sufficiently high concentration must come 
into contact with an ignition source. The flash point 
of a liquid is the lowest temperature at which the 
liquid produces enough vapor to catch fire in the 
presence of a flame or other ignition source. a 
product’s flash point can be found on its Materials 
Safety Data Sheet (MSDS), a summary of a chemi-
cal’s health effects, which employers are required 
by law to provide to workers, or on the product 
label, or by calling the product manufacturer.1
 The lower a liquid’s flash point, the more flam-
mable the liquid. Liquids that are formally classi-
fied as “flammable” have flash points under 100°F.4 
Some floor-finishing products have much lower 
flash points, in the range of 25° to 50°F; indeed, 
the product that led to one of the fatal fires in 
Massachusetts had a flash point of 9°F.4 In floor-
finishing work, disastrous fires originate when 
lacquer sealer vapors come into contact with an 
ignition source, either a flame or a spark.4,13,14 
 It may seem that it should be easy to remember 
to extinguish pilot lights and other open flames, 
but this is not an adequate protection when chem-
icals can volatilize to explosive vapors so quickly.
anything that requires electricity can produce 
sparks: use of ventilation equipment, turning 
light switches on or off, unplugging an electric 
cord from a socket; or striking a metal object, 
such as a nail or staple in the floor. Even pouring 
liquid from one container to another can create 
enough friction to generate sparks if the contain-
ers are not grounded.4 
In	floor-finishing	work,	disastrous	fires	originate	
when	lacquer	sealer	vapors	come	into	contact	with	
an	ignition	source,	either	a	flame	or	a	spark.
rule of thumb: eliminating hazards  
is better than controlling them
Workers routinely work safely around highly flam-
mable liquids and gases in a number of industries, 
including the oil and gas industry and the chemi-
cal refining industry. In these industries, there are 
requirements that all tools be non-sparking—
hammers and screwdrivers are made of exotic met-
als such as bronze or beryllium; all electrical 
equipment must be elaborately shielded to ensure 
that sparks cannot occur; fire equipment and fire 
brigades are mandatory. Clearly, these kinds of pre-
cautions are not practical in residential home con-
struction and repair. What are the alternatives? 
 occupational hygienists are professionals 
whose job is to design workplaces to be safe for 
workers. They follow a set of fundamental princi-
ples, called the hierarchy of controls (see sidebar, 
Hierarchy of controls) when they search for solutions to 
a workplace hazard such as flammable chemicals. 
Long experience has shown that it is generally 
more effective to find solutions high up this list, 
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and move down to lower levels of control only 
when more effective methods are not feasible. For 
example, to control lung disease from breathing a 
toxic dust, it is generally more effective to use a 
ventilation system (#2 on the list) than a mask 
(#5). Masks require individual compliance, they 
often don’t fit well, and they are uncomfortable. 
They leak if they don’t have a good seal with the 
face, and workers often refuse to wear them. a 
well-designed ventilation system is subject to fewer 
kinds of failure.
the Massachusetts path to protections  
for floor-finishing workers 
alarmed by the deaths of floor finishers, commu-
nity and public interest organizations mobilized 
in 2004 to protect workers and press for action by 
the state. as a result, a task force was formed, and 
its work ultimately formed the basis of a state law 
protecting floor-finishing workers.  
the Massachusetts Floor-Finishing Safety task Force 
In Massachusetts, community organizing and the 
resulting participatory action research played a 
critical role in investigating causes of the fatal fires 
as well as developing and recommending a host of 
solutions to prevent these fires in the future. The 
process of many community stakeholders joining 
forces as well as maintaining this stakeholder part-
nership over several years (from 2004 until today) 
was groundbreaking. Through these years, partic-
ipatory action research included various informa-
tion collection strategies—for example, focus 
groups and interviews with the floor-finishing in-
dustry representatives, as well as with safety and 
environmental specialists; laboratory investiga-
tions and experiments; surveys among floor fin-
ishers; field investigations; and review of existing 
available data. 
 Viet-aID (Vietnamese-american Initiative for 
Development), a community-based organization that 
has been a leader in the fire investigation efforts, 
worked closely with the Massachusetts Coalition 
for occupational Safety and Health (MassCoSH) 
and other groups to raise awareness about the 
dangers of using lacquer sealers. The Dorchester 
occupational Health Initiative (DoHI)—funded 
by the national Institute of Environmental Health 
Sciences—had been conducting a health study 
among floor sanders and finishers when the fires 
occurred, and thus was able to mobilize a response 
quickly and release recommendations within weeks 
of the second fatal fire. MassCoSH—a part of 
DoHI—promptly formed the Massachusetts Floor-
Finishing Safety Task Force, which comprised rep-
resentatives from labor, industry (contractors), 
floor-finishing product manufacturers, govern-
ment agencies, and environmental groups, to share 
their knowledge of the industry.4,13 
 The Task Force conducted focus groups and in-
terviews with business owners and product distrib-
utors and also carried out field investigations. In 
collaboration with the Massachusetts Toxics Use 
Reduction Institute (TURI), the Task Force tested 
a range of floor-finishing products in the TURI 
laboratory. Through this concerted community 
effort via participatory action research, the Task 
Force was able to develop a series of policy recom-
mendations for improved protection of hardwood 
floor sanders/finishers, their customers, the gen-
eral public, and the environment.4,13 In particular, 
the Task Force’s findings and recommendations 
(see sidebars Key findings and Priority Recommendations) 
focused on: (1) providing information for legisla-
C aS E  S T UDy  1 :  Floor Finishers, Lacquer Sealers, and Fires
Hierarchy of controls against workplace hazards:  
lacquer sealers
1. Substitute a less hazardous chemical or eliminate the need for 
the chemical altogether. Substitution would involve a less flam-
mable agent, and is the solution that was pursued in Massachu-
setts. Eliminating the need for the chemical should also be effec-
tive. approaches might include using a different kind of flooring 
that does not need to be varnished, or installing wood flooring that 
is pre-varnished in a (safer) factory.
2. Use engineering controls such as ventilation systems to reduce 
the hazardous exposure.
3. Make administrative changes that could reduce exposures— 
for example by using the chemical on smaller sections of floor 
spread out over longer periods of time.
4. Improve training and provide better information about the hazard 
and ways to avoid it.
5. Provide personal protective equipment. In this case, that’s hard to 
do—fire-proof suits are not feasible enough to merit consideration.
6. Monitor exposures and workers’ health.
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tors who seek to promote safer floor-finishing 
practices; and (2) helping employers, unions, 
professional organizations, consumers, and com-
munity organizations to better understand hard-
wood floor-finishing hazards and to undertake 
necessary safety measures. 
recommendations to the Massachusetts 
legislature and other efforts
on September 29, 2005 MassCoSH, along with 
its DoHI partners, released its floor-finishing 
safety report at the Massachusetts State House. 
The report—Protecting Workers and Homeowners from Wood 
Floor-Finishing Hazards in Massachusetts—called for a 
sweeping effort by employers, government, and 
communities to address not only the critical prob-
lem of fires but the health concerns associated with 
floor refinishing.13 after the report, the Massachu-
setts Floor-Finishing Safety Task Force (Task Force) 
was expanded to include members of industry, labor 
and community, and convened between January 
and april 2006 to develop specific policy recom-
mendations for the state’s legislature.2 other efforts 
to protect workers and the public from floor- 
finishing hazards were attempted. The level of 
protection offered by these efforts varied, and they 
met with mixed success. 
 The Task Force had found that many non- 
flammable, effective, floor-finishing products are 
available on the market. First, the industry tried to 
Key findings of the Massachusetts Floor-Finishing Safety task Force4
1. Non-flammable floor-finishing products are commercially available. Tests conducted by Green Seal and the Massachusetts 
Toxics Use reduction Institute have found that non-flammable water-based products meet or exceed nearly all quality mea-
sures of flammable products tested. although water-based products typically cost more than oil-based products ($30–$90 
per gallon versus $10–$30 per gallon), a number of Boston-area floor-finishing businesses use water-based finishes for 
some or all jobs. These companies choose water-based finishes because they are more durable, reduce solvent exposure, 
dry in less time, allow occupants to return to the premises faster, and do not cause fires. Many non-flammable oil-based 
products are also available.
2. Small business owners face a number of barriers to safer and healthier products and practices. Increasing numbers of 
Boston hardwood floor-finishing businesses are owned and operated by Vietnamese immigrants. With little access to train-
ing in finishing techniques or health and safety, and virtually no Vietnamese-language information on the industry and its 
hazards, many of these companies rely on word of mouth and product distributors for advice on products and practices. yet, 
some distributors do not promote safer products. Small companies may also lack understanding of the cost-benefit 
trade offs of using nonflammable products.
3. Massachusetts boasts a range of resources for addressing the urgent issues associated with wood floor finishing. 
Vietnamese-american community groups have built strong networks of trust and communication with local businesses. 
Their input will be key to developing effective policies for this industry. organizations including the Massachusetts Toxics 
Use reduction Institute and New Ecology, Inc. possess expertise in the identification, testing, and promotion of safer prod-
ucts. The Division of occupational Safety (DoS) oversees licensing of asbestos and lead contractors, and the DoS’s oSHa 
Consultation Program provides free health and safety assistance to small businesses. The Dorchester occupational Health 
Initiative—a partnership of nonprofit organizations, community health centers, and university researchers—is charged with 
developing health and safety education with Vietnamese-american hardwood floor finishers in Boston.
With	.	.	.	virtually	no	Vietnamese-language	
information	on	the	industry	and	its	hazards,	
many	[immigrant-owned]	companies	rely		
on	word	of	mouth	and	product	distributors	
for	advice	on	products	and	practices.	
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move ahead with the voluntary ban of lacquer seal-
ers. Initially nearly all floor-finishing product 
distributors in Central and Eastern Massachusetts 
voluntarily stopped selling lacquer sealers. How-
ever, one distributor started selling lacquer sealers 
again in response to the pressure from contractors 
who were accustomed to using them. Driven by 
concerns about a “level playing field,” all the dis-
tributors began selling the products again to avoid 
losing customers.  
 around 2007, the Task Force unanimously 
called for two pieces of legislation in Massachu-
setts: (1) a ban prohibiting the use and sale of 
highly flammable floor-finishing products (those 
with flash points of less than 100°F), although at 
this time, the Task Force was skeptical about the 
likelihood a ban would succeed in being approved 
by the legislature; and (2) a certification process 
requiring that a) floor-finishing industry owners 
and employees become trained and certified, b) 
owners designate a certified worker to be respon-
sible for completing a safety checklist, and c) com-
panies provide a floor-finishing safety fact sheet to 
be signed by the consumer.2
 In addition to the above, Task Force members 
urged the Massachusetts Board of Fire Prevention 
Regulations (the Board) to incorporate a ban on 
highly flammable products into the Massachusetts 
Fire Code. as a direct response to education and 
testimony by the Task Force members, the Board 
did take action. It adopted a regulation, effective 
June 1, 2010, requiring: (1) a permit and a warn-
ing sign on every door of any building where highly 
flammable products are used for floor finishing; 
and (2) removal of ignition sources such as pilot 
lights before the products are used.14 The Task 
Force continued to pursue the ban in order to 
broaden the enforcement beyond fire depart-
ments and because a ban would give the distribu-
tors, who were in strong support of the ban, the 
ability to remove the product from the market 
more easily.11 
Landmark legislation in Massachusetts 
as described above, the Task Force had been 
doubtful about the ban getting through the legis-
lature. In 2008, an influential legislator expressed 
a concern about the certification initiative;a how-
ever, he surprised Task Force members by encour-
aging them to pursue the ban more actively. Con-
sequently, the Task Force switched gears and 
actively sought the ban. Despite numerous obsta-
cles, including a last-minute rally by a chemical 
company, the bill made it through the legislature—
one month before the end of the legislative 
session. 
 In July 2010, the Massachusetts state legislature 
banned the commercial use of the highly flamma-
ble lacquer sealers for floor finishing that had 
contributed to the fatalities in Somerville and 
Hull in 2004 and 2005. The new law prohibits 
the commercial use and sale of lacquer sealers 
C aS E  S T UDy  1 :  Floor Finishers, Lacquer Sealers, and Fires
a  The certification initiative languished even though experts emphasized there was no safe way to use a flammable product in an industry that 
by its nature involves friction, wood dust, electricity, and heavy metal machinery.
recommendations of the Floor-Finishing  
Safety task Force4
1. Establish a licensing program for floor refinishing businesses; to 
ensure that the program is effective and accessible to people 
from diverse cultural and economic backgrounds, take immediate 
steps to form an oversight committee which comprises all affect-
ed stakeholders, including workers, small businesses, community 
organizations, labor unions, and health and safety experts. 
2. require both use and sales of non-flammable floor-finishing prod-
ucts with flash points at or above 100°F in place of flammable 
products with flash points below 100°F. 
3. Promote the use of safer and healthier floor-finishing products 
through mechanisms such as tax credits, grants, low-interest 
loans, or other means of providing economic support for small 
businesses to substitute safer and healthier products and equip-
ment for those associated with fire hazards and other public 
health hazards. Promote state procurement through the Massa-
chusetts Environmental Purchasing Program. 
4. Partner with organizations such as the Dorchester occupational 
Health Initiative to develop, distribute, and promote culturally and 
linguistically appropriate training materials on safer and healthier 
products and practices. Extend these efforts throughout the 
state.
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with a flashpoint below 100°F if the coating alters 
a wood surface for purposes that are directly or 
indirectly connected with any business or other 
undertaking intended for profit. The law was 
signed by Governor Deval Patrick on July 2, 2010 
and will take effect 180 days from signing.8,15,16 
Governor Patrick described the law as “common-
sense.”17 The law sets a minimum $2,500 fine 
for a first violation and minimum $5,000 fine 
for subsequent violations with the possibility of 
imprisonment.8
 Before its passage, the bill received broad sup-
port, including endorsements from product dis-
tributors, contractors, labor and community 
groups, and the Metro arson/Fire Investigators 
association. In a hearing before the legislative 
committee, Quynh Dang—whose father owned a 
floor sanding business involved in the Somerville 
fire of 2004—testified, saying that the only way to 
make the industry safer was to prohibit the use of 
flammable lacquer sealers.18 The Vietnamese busi-
ness community in Massachusetts is pleased about 
the Bill’s passage. Michael Le, a Task Force mem-
ber and a product supplier to Vietnamese-owned 
floor-finishing businesses, called the deaths a 
“wake up call”: 
I suddenly realized that all these customers were being  
exposed to these safety hazards. . . . I understood their  
language, I understood their need to earn a living . . .  
and I had  to play a proactive role to protect these   
contractors and home owners. 
— Michael Le, owner of Capital Wood2 
In	2010,	the	Massachusetts	state	legislature	banned	the	commercial		
use	of	flammable	lacquer	sealers	for	floor	finishing.		
Common precautions used in industry to prevent sparking 
around flammable liquids are simply not practical in residential 
home and construction repair. 
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L e S S o n S  L e a r n e d
Approaches at both state and federal levels can be effective in protecting immigrant workers from fire and explosion hazards. 
State-level protections for immigrant laborers  
in small businesses 
Immigrant laborers in small businesses are vulnerable to 
serious injuries and exposures from occupational haz-
ards. as described above, the vast majority of Massa-
chusetts floor sanders and finishers are Vietnamese. all 
three workers killed in the two fatal fires were Vietnam-
ese. Immigrant groups have also had long-term expo-
sure to hazardous chemicals in other occupational set-
tings, including nail salons (Vietnamese), cleaning 
services (Brazilians), and dry-cleaners (korean).17,18,19
 Safety and health practitioners are aware that even 
large profit-making businesses can perceive safety mea-
sures as a nuisance that threatens their competitive 
edge. For small enterprises—which must compete hard 
to keep their businesses alive—a decision to shift to a 
safer product or process may jeopardize their business. 
For example, several Massachusetts distributors volun-
tarily pulled the most flammable products from their 
shelves. However, as long as sales of these highly flam-
mable materials remained legal, distributors risked 
losing customers to other businesses who continued to 
sell the unsafe product. 
 Immigrant laborers in small businesses—in any in-
dustry—need access to safer products; therefore, infor-
mation and training mechanisms must convey how and 
where to obtain these safer alternatives. In this case, 
floor finishers were a market for safer alternatives from 
the distributors, who were eager to switch to safer alter-
natives but continued to be pressured by contractors 
who were accustomed to using lacquer sealers.  
 Use of safer products should be supported with eco-
nomic incentives, whereas unsafe products should be 
discouraged with economic disincentives. Initially, the 
Task Force thought that economic incentives were nec-
essary to switch to safer floor-finishing alternatives (see 
sidebar, Priority Recommendations, Recommendation 3).4 
Such incentives turned out to be unnecessary in this 
case. Reader-friendly business cases that demonstrate 
the cost-benefit trade-offs of safer and healthier alter-
natives, and show that safe practices do not compromise 
the quality of the service and success of the business, are 
useful anywhere. The Task Force called for promoting 
safer procurement throughout the entire state govern-
ment through the Massachusetts Environmental Pur-
chasing Program.4 
 The Task Force also requested the Commonwealth of 
Massachusetts to partner with community-based orga-
nizations to develop, distribute, and promote training 
materials and other information mechanisms that are 
culturally and linguistically effective (see box: Priority 
Recommendations, Recommendation 4).4 otherwise, there 
is a possibility that businesses will rely on anecdotal in-
formation or product distributors’ advice on safer and 
healthier work practices. 
 States can also adopt broader chemical safety policies 
to protect both workers and communities. at the time 
of writing this case study, Massachusetts has a Safer 
alternatives bill in the legislature.20 The bill expands 
the successful Massachusetts Toxics Use Reduction act 
(TURa) program—which has demonstrated that reduc-
ing the use of toxic chemicals both protects health and 
saves businesses money—in supporting industries in 
their efforts to replace toxic chemicals with safer alter-
natives in consumer products and manufacturing 
processes.20 The Massachusetts Safer alternatives pro-
gram would initially target 10 priority chemicals (lead, 
formaldehyde, trichloroethylene, perchloroethylene, 
dioxins and furans, hexavalent chromium, organo-
phosphate pesticides, pentabromodiphenylether [PBDE], 
di-(2-ethylhexyl)phthalate [DEHP], and 2,4-dichlo-
rophenoxyacetic acid [2,4-D]) that are currently re-
placeable with feasible safer alternatives for many uses.20 
Federal protections for immigrant laborers   
in small businesses 
With the exception of oSHa’s Hazard Communication 
(HaZCoM) Standard, the current federal regulatory 
system addresses only poorly the handling of a range of 
hazardous chemicals at work. as pointed out in other 
case studies in this publication, US chemical regula-
tions have thus far been characterized by a one-chemi-
cal-at-a-time approach, setting Permissible Exposure 
Limits for individual chemicals. The consequences of 
floor-finishing fires are so serious that oSHa would be 
more than justified in issuing an emergency temporary 
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standard to ban  flammable products in floor finishing.
 Even the HaZCoM framework remains limited in 
its capacity to protect workers. First, unless individual 
states have adopted HaZCoM laws to cover public-
sector workers—as is the case in Massachusetts—oSHa’s 
HaZCoM covers only private-sector workplaces. Sec-
ond, HaZCoM neither guides nor encourages the 
shift towards less hazardous chemical alternatives when 
such products are on the market. Third, chemical 
manufacturers do not do a good job of anticipating 
“foreseeable” uses of their products, which can end up 
in private homes and be handled under highly hazard-
ous conditions. Fourth, and perhaps most important, 
HaZCoM does not take account of the vulnerability of 
immigrant laborers: the standard does not require la-
bels, Materials Safety Data Sheets, and training materi-
als for non-English speakers to be written in their na-
tive languages. The HaZCoM sections about labels 
and MSDSs in which the words “language” or “lan-
guages” appear are:21 
The employer shall ensure that labels or other forms of  
warning are legible, in English, and prominently displayed on 
the container, or readily available in the work area throughout 
each work shift. Employers having employees who speak other 
languages may add the information in their language to the 
material presented, as long as the information is presented  
in English as well. (Section (f)(9)) 
 Each materials safety data sheet shall be in English  
(although the employer may maintain copies in other languages 
as well), and shall contain at least the following information. 
(Section (g)(2))
The EPa’s 1976 Toxics Substances Control act (TSCa) 
does not offer much protection for any workers in jobs 
like wood floor finishing. nonetheless, TSCa reform 
is a prominent topic for discussion and on-going effort 
in the US Congress. In September 2009, EPa announced 
the following six Essential Principles for Reform of Chemicals 
Management Legislation:22 
1. Chemicals should be reviewed against safety stan-
dards that are based on sound science and reflect 
risk-based criteria protective of human health and 
the environment. 
2. Manufacturers should provide EPa with the neces-
sary information to conclude that new and existing 
chemicals are safe and do not endanger public health 
or the environment. 
3. Risk management decisions should take into account 
sensitive subpopulations, cost, availability of substi-
tutes and other relevant considerations.
4. Manufacturers and EPa should assess and act on pri-
ority chemicals, both existing and new, in a timely 
manner. 
5. Green chemistry should be encouraged, and provi-
sions assuring transparency and public access to in-
formation should be strengthened. 
6. EPa should be given a sustained source of funding 
for implementation. 
EPa’s principle #3 could address some concerns that 
have been highlighted in this case study. a reformed 
TSCa could authorize EPa to ban extremely hazardous 
products—such as highly flammable floor-finishing 
materials—when safer alternatives are available on the 
market. 
 While the TSCa reform is important, we do not need 
to stay inactive until the TSCa reform has passed: safer 
alternatives policies can be initiated and adopted sys-
tematically at the state level as well as locally.  
 In the construction case study in this volume, we dis-
cuss further the role of training and advocacy for occu-
pational safety and health for foreign-born immigrant 
workers. Proper training—especially when enhanced 
with active problem solving—has been shown to improve 
occupational safety and health knowledge, safety atti-
tudes, and work practices among foreign-born immi-
grant laborers despite language barriers, educational 
background, or documentation status.23,24 
 This case study has described hazards of highly flam-
mable wood floor-finishing products, specific needs of 
immigrant labor for safer and healthier products, and 
the new 2010 law in Massachusetts that prohibits the 
commercial use and sale of flammable lacquer sealers 
for floor finishing. The Massachusetts example also 
points the way for promoting similar initiatives nation-
wide to protect immigrant labor in small businesses. 
16  |  Lowell Center for Sustainable Production  |  University of Massachusetts Lowell Lessons Learned: Solutions for Workplace Safety and Health  |  17
Acknowledgments
We would like to acknowledge three sources of documents and support that were instrumental in devel-
oping this case study: MassCoSH, which coordinated the Floor-Finishing Fire Safety Task Force in 
Massachusetts; Dr. Lenore azaroff of the University of Massachusetts Lowell; and the Massachusetts 
Department of Public Health.  
 We thank Marcy Goldstein-Gelb of MassCoSH and Dr. azaroff for peer reviewing this case study.
C aS E  S T UDy  1 :  Floor Finishers, Lacquer Sealers, and Fires
CaSE  STUDy  1  —  t iMeL ine 8,14,22
D a T E E V E N T
2004 Somerville, MA: Two Vietnamese floor sanders/finishers, Toan Bui (age 35) and Ha Vu 
(age 35), died in a fatal fire while refinishing wood floors in a three-family house. Two of 
their co-workers were badly burned. 
danvers, MA: Floor-finishing fire caused serious damage to a home, and a child of the 
homeowner was injured. 
2005 2005 Hull, MA: Tinh Huynh (age 43), a Vietnamese floor sander/finisher, died in a fatal 
fire in a single-family home. a co-worker sustained minor burns. The workers were applying 
lacquer sealer which was ignited by a pilot light on a gas hot water heater. 
needham, MA: Two homes destroyed in a floor-finishing fire.
2006 Milton, MA: Floor-finishing fire caused serious injuries to homeowner’s father, minor 
injuries to a worker, and damage to the home. 
taunton, MA: Home destroyed in a floor-finishing fire.
dennis, MA: Home destroyed in a floor-finishing fire.
2007 Marblehead, MA: Fire consumed floor-finishing products in a contractor’s automobile. 
2009 uS ePA announced its Essential Principles for reform of Chemicals Management 
Legislation, which included the principle that risk management decisions should take  
into account sensitive subpopulations, cost, and availability of substitutes. 
2010 Massachusetts enacted legislation prohibiting the commercial use and sale of any 
flammable penetrating floor lacquer sealer with a flash point below 100°F. 
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a back injury can  
force a choice between 
working in pain or not 
working at all. 
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CASe  S t udy  2
When My Job Breaks My Back
Shouldering the Burden of Work-related  
Musculoskeletal Disorders 
Pia Markkanen, David Kriebel, Joel Tickner, Molly M. Jacobs
“i’m a registered nurse; now, a back-injured registered nurse with a cumulative trauma spinal injury 
from ten years of lifting and moving patients. i worked at an acute care hospital on medical/surgical, 
telemetry, and intermediate care units. the patients were generally elderly and acutely ill with a variety 
of cardiac, medical, and surgical conditions. Many were unable to move themselves up or turn side- 
to-side in bed, to sit up, stand up, or transfer to the chair or bedside commode without being physi- 
cally pulled, lifted, or occasionally, even picked up and carried. Confused patients sometimes resisted, 
increasing the strain. Much heavy lifting was required. 
“i first experienced severe low back and leg pain while walking through my kitchen during a scheduled 
day off. i could not walk, sit, and hardly move. i had to call and report that i could not come to work 
because of back pain. other than a brief unsuccessful attempt a few months later, i have been unable 
to return to floor nursing. i’ve been seen by neurologists, orthopedic surgeons, neurosurgeons, and a 
chiropractor. i was diagnosed with degenerative disc disease, lumbar strain, and bulging or herniated 
discs. i’ve had two Mris, two discograms, a series of lumbar blocks, and ultimately, an anterior lumbar 
fusion of L4/L5  and L5/S1, with donor bone grafts to replace the discs, and posterior fixation with 
four titanium screws. the workers’ compensation battle took years before the decision came in my 
favor that my injury was work related. i had to fight hard before being permitted for modified light duty. 
“Almost everything in my life has been altered by being back-injured. i’ve been unable to do many 
things that i formerly did with ease. i can no longer flip a mattress or even assist to turn a mattress. 
i need help changing sheets on the bed. i can’t vacuum as before and either let it go, get help, or wait 
until my analgesic kicks in and then do as much as i can. Sitting for any length of time is painful. 
driving is painful because of the vibration and seated position—i drove over 5000 miles with the injury 
for multiple appointments. i’m not able to pick up small children—the first thing that upset me greatly 
was realizing that i may not be able to pick up a potential grandchild someday.
“i hope you recognize the healthcare worker’s vulnerability and are inspired to work toward zero-lift 
policies, lift teams, and permanent modified light duty for injured clinicians. Caring for patients and 
receiving their trust touches us deeply. i loved being a hospital floor nurse. Still, my experience as a 
back-injured nurse has provided the incentive to learn and the motivation to speak out. i’m grateful for 
the opportunity to be part of the larger effort for reduction of back injuries to healthcare workers.” 
— Charney W & Hudson a (Eds). Back Injury among Healthcare Workers: Causes, Solutions, and Impacts. 
    Boca raton: CrC Press. 2004. adapted with copyright permission.
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W
oRkPLaCE ERGonoMIC In-
juries remain one of the most signi-
ficant occupational health challenges 
in the United States and worldwide. 
Work-related Musculoskeletal Dis-
orders (MSDs)—also called “ergonomic injuries”—
typically involve muscles, tendons, and/or nerves. 
Taken together, these are the soft tissues that hold 
the body together and do its physical work.1  MSDs 
are one of the leading causes of lost work time 
in the United States. The situation is the same in 
Europe, with MSDs accounting for a higher pro-
portion of work absences due to illness/injury 
than any other health condition.2 a recent study 
estimated that 100 million Europeans suffer from 
chronic pain from a MSD—although 40 percent 
are undiagnosed.2 Musculoskeletal disorders are 
expensive for business and a serious burden for 
workers. Beyond the lost work time and lost wages, 
they also mean lost productivity, lowered morale, 
and “unexplained” absenteeism.1–4  
A portrait of work-related musculoskeletal 
disorders
Who is injured at work?  How many are injured?
nurses face very serious risk of back injury, as the 
story above shows. But MSDs are found in every 
sector of the economy. They are notoriously un-
der reported in all the available statistics, includ-
ing the injury logs that employers are required to 
maintain under the occupational Safety and 
Health act (oSHact), the surveys of the US Bu-
reau of Labor Statistics (BLS), and state workers’ 
compensation data. So, although we’ll use some of 
these sources to illustrate the magnitude of the 
problem, keep in mind that the actual burden is 
Beginning with a personal story of a nurse’s back injury, this case study provides facts and history for the larger crisis of musculo-
skeletal disorders at work.5 We reveal data on the magnitude of the 
problem, including the number of injuries and estimates of how much 
these injuries cost. a timeline shows the key events in the history of 
US federal regulation of musculoskeletal hazards. We will identify 
critical components of a workplace ergonomics program and lessons 
learned that can lead toward viable solutions for protecting workers. 
ABou t  t H i S  C A S e  S t u dy
probably considerably larger. Table 1 presents data 
for the five occupational groups that account for 
the largest numbers of MSDs, according to the 
2008 BLS data.6 Table 2 (page 22) lists the high-
MSD occupations within high-risk industry sec-
tors for compensable MSD claims in Washington 
State during 1993–2001. 
How much do workers’ musculoskeletal  
disorders cost?
In the United States, estimates of workers’ com-
pensation for MSDs range between $13 and $20 
billion annually in direct costs.1 The indirect 
costs—for example, various production losses as well 
as hiring and training replacement workers—can 
multiply this figure by as much as two to five times.1 
The national academy of Sciences (naS) con-
cluded in 2001 that $50 billion was a reasonable 
estimate of the total annual costs of MSDs when 
compensation costs and lost wages and produc-
tivity are factored in.7  In the healthcare industry, 
inflation-adjusted direct and indirect costs associ-
ated with back injuries are estimated to be $7.4 
billion annually, in 2008 dollars.8,9
 In Europe, direct costs of MSDs account for 
up to 2 percent of the European gross domestic 
product annually, and the costs of back pain 
alone are estimated to exceed €12 billion.2 In 
2002, the World Health organization (WHo) 
conducted a global study on the burden of occu-
pational low-back pain. Worldwide, 37 percent of 
low-back pain was attributed to work, resulting in 
a total of 818,000 disability-adjusted life years 
lost annually.10 
How do people get musculoskeletal disorders  
from work?
People have probably always recognized that work 
could lead to injury. among the earliest to docu-
ment what we would call “ergonomic hazards” was 
Musculoskeletal	disorders		
(Msds)	are	found	in	every	work-
place.	and	they	are	notoriously	
underreported.	
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Manual material handling, as 
these delivery men are doing, is 
a “leading cause of work-related 
musculoskeletal disorders.”
tABLe  1
the top five occupational groups for work-related musculoskeletal disorders (MSd): number of MSd cases  
and median days away from work for MSds, by occupation group and part of body affected, in 2008. 
Major occupational groups total MSds
Median days away from work  
by part of body affected
Case
counts
incidence 
rate/10,000 
workers All Back Shoulder Arm Wrist Knee
transportation and material moving occupations 66,240 85 12 8 30 27 12 30
Manufacturing occupations 42,720 49 13 5 19 15 18 23
Health care support occupations 29,640 110 6 5 8 8 6 11
Construction and extraction occupations 28,880 53 11 7 30 45 27 26
installation, maintenance, and repair occupations 27,540 61 12 6 19 15 12 52
All occupations 317,440 33 10 6 18 17 16 21
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics. nonfatal occupational Injuries and Illnesses Requiring Days away from Work, 2008. US Department of Labor. 2009. 
Available at: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/osh2_12042009.pdf. Accessed November 15, 2010.
© 2010 Earl Dotter
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tABLe  2
occupations with the highest rates of compensable MSds in high-risk industries  
in the state of Washington, 1993–2001. 
High-risk  
industries occupations
Forest nurseries 
and forest product 
gathering
Nursery workers
Laborers/farmworkers
Production inspecting/packing workers
Floral designers
Masonry, stone-
work, tile, plaster-
ing
Drywall installers
Insulation installers
Brickmasons
roofing roofers
Carpenters
Laborers
Meat products Butchers and meat cutters
Laborers and freight stockers/handlers
Hand packers
dairy products Laborers and freight stockers/handlers
Truck drivers
Hand packers
Sawmills Lumber handlers
Millwork Laborers
Woodworking machine operators
assemblers
Cabinetmakers
iron and steel found-
ries
Mold and core workers
Furnace/oven workers
Grind/polish machine operators
Laborers
Machine operators
High-risk  
industries occupations
Heating,  
ventilation, and  
air conditioning
Welders/cutters
assemblers/fabricators
Laborers
Grind/polish machine operators
nursing and per-
sonal care facilities
Nursing aides and orderlies
Health aides
Licensed Practical Nurses (LPNs),  
registered Nurses (rNs) 
Maids/housekeeping workers
Local and  
suburban  
passenger  
transport
Emergency medical technicians
Bus drivers
Physician assistants/registered nurses
Mechanics
Taxi drivers
trucking and  
courier services
Truck drivers
Freight handlers/stockers
refuse and recyclables collectors
Graders/sorters
Air transportation 
scheduled and air 
courier services
Freight/stock handlers
Flight attendants
Couriers/messengers
Transport/ticket/reservations workers
Mechanics
examples of high-
risk occupations 
that cross over 
many industries
Housekeepers/janitors
Data entry operators
Stockers/receivers
assemblers/packagers
Source: Silverstein, B, Evanoff, B. Musculoskeletal Disorders. In: Levy B, Wegman D, Baron S, Sokas R, (Eds). occupational and Environmental Health: Recognizing 
and Preventing Disease and Injury. 5th edition. Philadelphia (PA): Lippincott Williams and Wilkins. 2006; Table 23-2, 495-496.
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the Italian physician Bernardino Ramazzini (1633–
1714). He observed that health problems originated 
from either prolonged stationary or unnatural 
postures (e.g., bakers, workers who stand, seden-
tary workers, weavers) or tasks requiring heavy 
muscular performance or force (e.g., porters and 
woodworkers).11 His diagnoses are entirely mod-
ern and correct by current standards: for example, 
“numbness in the upper extremity in scribes due 
to incessant movement of the hand and always in 
the same direction” or “sciatica in potters due to 
continual turning of the potter’s wheel.”1 Ramazzi-
ni also recognized the need to undertake measures 
to prevent MSDs caused by repetitive motions and 
lifting, and he recommended reduced work time 
for those in strenuous jobs requiring a standing 
position or severe muscular effort.1 Ramazzini and 
subsequent occupational physicians documented 
such conditions as “bricklayer’s shoulder,” “carpen-
ter’s elbow,” and “telegraphist’s cramp,” which leave 
little doubt as to the link between work and physi-
cal injury.12,13  But despite this body of evidence, 
relatively little public or regulatory attention was 
paid to MSDs until the 1980s.12,13 
 Today, MSDs are commonly categorized in 
three broad groups:1
1. Low-back pain—associated with heavy manual 
handling (e.g., lifting), frequent twisting and 
bending, forceful movements, and full-body 
vibration.1 The European agency for Safety and 
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Health at Work estimates that lower-back disorders 
affect 60 to 90 percent of Europeans at some 
point in their life and that any one time, 15 to 
42 percent of Europeans are affected.14 
2. neck and upper-extremity disorders (shoul-
der, arm, elbow, hand/wrist)—associated with 
the frequency and duration of forceful move-
ments, mechanical stress, static or awkward 
postures, and hand-arm vibration.1 
3. Lower-extremity disorders (knees, hips, legs, 
ankles, feet)—associated with kneeling, squat-
ting, load carrying, and prolonged standing.15 
Less attention has been paid to lower-extremity 
MSDs; however, there is increasing evidence of 
work-related knee and hip disorders.1   
The diagnosis of MSDs is complicated by the fact 
that many other factors contribute to the risk.1 
In addition to normal life activities, housework, 
and hobbies, certain individual characteristics 
also affect risk. These include obesity, spinal ab-
normalities, genetic predisposition, pregnancy, 
and aging.2 
 In 1997, after an exhaustive review of the scien-
tific literature, the US national Institute for oc-
cupational Safety and Health (nIoSH) summa-
rized the strength of the evidence for a series of 
occupational hazards and a wide range of MSDs 
(Table 3).16 The authors paid particular attention 
to assembling evidence and analyzing the strength 
of the association between MSDs and working 
conditions, in particular how work-related MSDs 
could be reduced or prevented.16 a committee 
of the national academy of Sciences (naS) con-
curred in 2001 that there is a clear relationship 
between back disorders and physical load, includ-
ing material handling, load moment (the turning 
force of a load on a part of the body), frequent 
bending and twisting, heavy physical work, and 
In	the	healthcare	industry,…	
costs	associated	with	back	injuries	
are	estimated	to	be	$7.4	billion	
annually,	in	2008	dollars.	
tABLe  3
there are varying degrees of evidence linking workplace  
risk factors to different musculoskeletal disorders. 
Body 
part or 
syndrome risk factor
Strong 
evidence evidence  
insufficient 
evidence
Back Lifting/forceful 
movement
✓
awkward posture ✓
Heavy physical work ✓
Whole body vibration ✓
Static work posture ✓
neck and 
neck / 
shoulder
repetition ✓
Force ✓
Posture ✓
Vibration ✓
Shoulder repetition ✓
Force ✓
Posture ✓
Vibration ✓
elbow repetition ✓
Force ✓
Posture ✓
Combination of above ✓
Carpal 
tunnel 
syndrome 
repetition ✓
Force ✓
Posture ✓
Vibration ✓
Combination of above  ✓
tendinitis repetition ✓
Force ✓
Posture ✓
Combination of above ✓
Hand-arm 
vibration 
syndrome
Vibration ✓
Source: National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health. Musculoskeletal Disorders and Workplace 
Factors: a Critical Review of Epidemiologic Evidence for Work-Related Musculoskeletal 
Disorders of the neck, Upper Extremity, and Low Back. US Department of Health and Human Services, 
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention. 1997. Available at: http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/docs/97-141/. Accessed 
November 15, 2010. 
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the world, and the topic remains politically heat-
ed. attempts by the US occupational Safety and 
Health administration (oSHa) to develop an 
ergonomics standard have been subject to bitter 
disputes between labor and management as well as 
among the US Congress and the White House.4 
 The first steps toward federal regulations aimed 
at reducing MSDs can be traced to voluntary ergo-
nomic guidelines for the meatpacking industry 
that were issued by oSHa in 1990. The Secretary 
of Labor, Elizabeth Dole, justified this move by 
saying, “These painful and crippling illnesses now 
make up 48 percent of all recordable workplace 
illnesses. We must do our utmost to protect work-
ers from these hazards, not only in the red meat 
industry, but all US industries.”17 Secretary Dole 
committed the Labor Department to “taking the 
most effective steps necessary to address the prob-
lem of ergonomic hazards on an industry-wide 
basis” and “to begin rulemaking on an Ergonom-
ics Standard.”18 according to Dole, there was 
sufficient scientific evidence to proceed to address 
“one of the nation’s most debilitating across- 
the-board worker safety and health illnesses of 
the 1990s.”18 
 Since that time, at least three major publica-
tions have demonstrated the strong scientific evi-
dence linking MSDs and workplace risk factors 
that was needed to justify oSHa’s Ergonomic 
Standard. nIoSH reviewed more than 600 stud-
ies and determined, as stated in a 1997 report, 
that “a large body of credible epidemiological re-
search exists that shows a consistent relationship 
between MSDs and certain physical factors, espe-
cially at higher exposure levels.”16 
 The national academy of Sciences produced 
two reports.7,19 In 1998, the naS brought together 
65 leading national and international scientific 
and medical MSD specialists for a two-day meet-
ing to review the scientific evidence for the work-
relatedness of MSDs and to assess whether workplace 
interventions were effective in reducing ergonomic 
hazards.17 The panel found more than enough 
evidence for oSHa to proceed; however, Con-
gress appropriated almost a million dollars—as a 
delaying tactic—to the naS to produce another, 
more in-depth study.17 The second naS study 
came out in early 2001, but Congress never re-
viewed it, and the standard was repealed two 
tABLe  4
High-risk jobs for selected musculoskeletal disorders. 
Musculoskeletal 
disorder High-risk jobs
Low-back  
pain  
(sciatica*)
Nurses aides/orderlies
Truck drivers
Carpenters and  
apprentices
Maids and housekeeping  
cleaners
Drywall installers
Carpet installers
Nurses
Construction laborers
Garbage collectors
Glaziers
Freight/stock handlers
Brick masons
Carpal tunnel 
syndrome and 
tendinitis
Meat cutting
Food processors
Hairdressers
Kitchen workers
Sewing operators
Handpackers
Typists
Stock handlers/baggers
Lumber turners
Carpenters
assembly workers using  
hand tools
Foundry workers
Laborers
Machine operators
roofers
elbow/forearm 
disorders
Carpenters
Laborers
assembly work with  
hand tools
Drywall installers
Electricians
Welders
Butchers/meatcutters
Machinists
Plumbers
Hairdressers
Handpackers
Bus drivers
Grinders/polishers
Kitchen/food preparation
Shoulder  
disorders
Truck drivers
Welders
Meatpacking assembly 
workers
Nursing assistants
Garbage collectors
Carpenters
Drywall installers
Masons
Freight handlers
neck and  
neck/shoulder 
disorders
Dental workers
VDT workers
Nurse/ assistants
Microscopists
Surgeons
Electronics assemblers
*Jobs with high-risk activities for sciatica based on Washington State Workers’ Compensation Claims for 1993–2001. 
Source: Silverstein, B, Evanoff, B. Musculoskeletal Disorders. In: Levy B, Wegman D, Baron S, Sokas R, (Eds.), 
Occupational and Environmental Health: Recognizing and Preventing Disease and Injury. 5th edition. Philadelphia (PA): 
Lippincott Williams and Wilkins. 2006; 488-516. 
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whole-body vibration. For disorders of the upper 
extremities—neck, shoulders, arms, elbows, wrists, 
and fingers—repetition, force, and vibration are 
particularly important risk factors.7 one such dis-
order is carpal tunnel syndrome, caused by com-
pression of the median nerve in the wrist. Table 4 
lists jobs that carry a high risk of selected musculo-
skeletal disorders. 
Why did oSHA’s ergonomics Standard fail? 
The US regulatory history on protection of work-
ers from MSDs is perhaps the most tumultuous in 
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months later. The most ardent opponents of 
the Ergonomics Standard were re-elected and be-
came even more determined to stifle any further 
attempts to prevent ergonomic hazards. 4  
 Under oSHa’s Ergonomics Standard, general 
industry employers—with 11 or more workers—
whose employees perform manufacturing or 
manual handling jobs would have been required to 
implement at least a basic ergonomics program 
and, under certain circumstances, a full ergo-
nomics program.20 The basic program would have 
included a commitment by management to take 
leadership responsibility for the program, the 
participation by employees in the program, and 
the provision of hazard information to workers, 
along with the creation of a system through which 
workers could report injuries. 
 The full program would include, in addition 
to the elements of the basic program, the following: 
a hazard analysis of the job; the implementation 
of engineering, work practice, or administrative 
controls to eliminate or substantially reduce the 
hazards identified in that job; training the em-
ployees in that job, as well as their supervisors; 
and the provision of MSD management includ-
ing, where appropriate, temporary work restric-
tions and access to a health care provider or other 
professional if a covered MSD occurred. 
 oSHa estimated that the Ergonomics Standard 
would have affected approximately 1.9 million 
employers and 27.3 million workers in general 
industry workplaces. The agency also estimated 
that the standard would have prevented about 3 
million work-related MSDs over the following 
10 years, with annual benefits of approximately 
$9.1 billion.20 annual compliance costs were es-
timated at $900 per establishment and $150 
per problematic job fixed. During the first year 
after promulgation, employers would have been 
required to control approximately 7.7 million 
jobs with the potential to cause or contribute to 
covered MSDs.20  
 The Ergonomics Standard would have required 
many industries to change their employees’ work 
practices. This is why opposition to the standard 
was instantaneous, organized, and well funded.17 
The package delivery company UPS, the american 
Trucking association, and their allies hammered 
out a strategy to attach riders to Congressional 
osHa	estimated	that	the	ergonomics	standard	
would	have	prevented	about	3	million	work-related	
musculoskeletal	disorders	over	the	following	10	years.	
budget bills for fiscal years 1995–1998, prohibit-
ing oSHa from issuing an ergonomics standard, 
and in 1996, banning oSHa from collecting 
“ergonomics data.” 17,18   
 on november 14, 2000, after more than a de-
cade of preparatory work, oSHa finally issued 
its Ergonomics Standard. It went into effect on 
January 16, 2001. Unfortunately, it lived only two 
months. In March 2001, the Congressional Re-
view act was invoked—for the first and to date the 
only time since it took effect in 1996—to invalidate 
a federal standard.21 The opposition did more 
than overturn the federal standard. In november 
2003, the state of Washington’s ergonomics stan-
dard was defeated through a ballot initiative 
financed by the Building Industry association of 
Washington (BIaW) that misled voters into be-
lieving that the state standard would cost the 
state jobs.18  
 In the case of Washington State, Silverstein ex-
amined how the delicate balance between scientific 
deliberation and political values was disrupted in 
the electoral process that resulted in the repeal of 
the Washington Ergonomics Standard.  The Wash-
ington State ergonomics rule was most successful 
in the regulatory and legal areas, where: 1) the 
process was most transparent; 2) the process was 
open to public involvement; 3) differing views 
could be presented fully; and 4) decision makers 
were expected to explain the rationale for their 
decisions. The rule did most poorly in the legisla-
ture and at the ballot box, where these four fea-
tures were lost and full deliberation was replaced 
by unhindered political pressure. The executive 
agency responsible and accountable for adopting 
rules was excluded from the electoral debate and 
could not defend its decisions, facts, and views be-
fore the public.22 
 Why did the oSHa Ergonomics Standard 
fail? In addition to the fact that the vast majority of 
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occupational safety and health (oSH) rules pro-
posed at the federal or state level have met stern 
opposition from the business community, Silver-
stein proposed three other reasons for the excep-
tional industry attention to opposing ergonomics 
initiatives: (1) MSDs are widespread across indus-
tries and occupations, whereas most previous 
oSH rules applied to relatively small groups of 
industries and employers; (2) as workplace ergo-
nomics affects both the work organization and 
design, the rulemaking raised fears that em- 
ployers’ privileges and power were threatened; and 
(3) the US political landscape changed dramati-
cally in 1994, when ergonomics became a target 
for deregulatory enthusiasts and a poster child for 
the political attack on oSHa.22  
 Some have argued that the Ergonomics Stan-
dard was repealed largely on ideological grounds, 
to rally the most conservative forces in the society 
to defeat “big government” and “big labor.”24 
Some say that employers don’t like ergonomics 
policies because implementation of the pro- 
grams would involve active worker participation. 
another perspective points to limits in the scien-
tific evidence used to support the standard, and 
confusion over the appropriate ways to weigh the 
evidence.25 Costs seem to be one of the main rea- 
sons to oppose the standard, despite cost-effective-
ness studies. Many employers find it hard to believe 
that investments in ergonomics interventions are 
worthwhile and that they would be paid back soon 
enough in saved workers’ compensation costs, re-
duced absenteeism, and increased productivity. 
What has oSHA done since 2000? 
oSHa has not issued enforceable regulations on 
MSD hazards since 2000.17 The Congressional 
Review act that overturned the Ergonomics Stan-
dard prohibits oSHa from issuing a standard 
that is substantially similar to the one that was 
repealed.23 
Voluntary guidelines
From 2004 through 2006, the most visible ap-
proach by oSHa was the development of volun-
tary industry-specific ergonomic guidelines. In 
addition to the earlier Ergonomics Program 
Management Guidelines for Meatpacking Plants, 
oSHa has developed guidelines for nursing 
homes, retail grocery stores, poultry processing 
plants, and shipyards.26,27,28,29,30 
General duty Clause
oSHa inspectors have the power to issue citations 
for ergonomic hazards by invoking the General 
Duty Clause of the occupational Safety and Health 
act (Section 5(a)). This clause states: “Each em-
ployer shall furnish to each of his employees em-
ployment and a place of employment which are 
free from recognized hazards that are causing or 
are likely to cause death or serious physical harm 
to his employees.” Before it invokes the General 
Duty Clause, oSHa requires a “yes” answer to 
each of the following questions: (1) Is there an 
ergonomic hazard that is causing injuries? (2) 
Does the employer in question know (or should 
the employer know) about the hazard?  (3) are the 
injuries caused by the ergonomic hazard resulting 
in serious physical harm? (4) are there feasible al-
ternatives available to the employer for reducing, 
abating, or minimizing the hazard?4 
recordkeeping 
In 2003, MSDs were removed from the oSHa 
300 log (oSHa’s Form 300, Log of Work-Related 
Injuries and Illnesses), which comprises the oSHa- 
mandated occupational injury and illness record-
ing forms (see the timeline that appears at the end 
of this profile). In January 2010, the new oSHa 
administration proposed to restore MSDs to the 
oSHa 300 log.32 
Sector-based initiatives:  
Hope for health care workers  
If generic ergonomics regulation has created oppo-
sition too fierce to overcome, can a sector-based regu-
latory approach gain adequate support? The 2008 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) data on nonfatal 
occupational injuries (Table 1) show that support 
occupations in health care (nursing aides, order-
lies, and attendants) had the highest incidence rate 
of MSD cases per 10,000 workers nationwide.6 
The nurse’s story in the introduction to this case 
study illustrates how painful—both physically and 
psychologically—it is to experience a serious back 
injury. Patient care jobs require much heavy 
lifting and frequent prolonged days, including 
evening and night shifts.33 The greater the patient’s 
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disability, the more frequently non-neutral body 
postures and overexertion are required of the 
worker.34 
 However, ergonomic interventions have been 
successfully applied to patient care tasks (see Table 5, 
page 28). These interventions have not only re-
duced injuries but also resulted in cost savings. 
The injured nurse cited above had this to say:5 
About a year into my injury, I had done my homework. I 
had learned that lift teams, no-lift policies, and patient lift 
equipment had proven effective in preventing health care 
workers’ back injures for at least a decade. I had been a 
nurse for just 10 years. The technology and methods  
for preventing health care workers’ back injures had  
been available during the entire time. What an awful  
discovery—my injury could have been prevented. 
Successful interventions have sparked legislative 
initiatives. In 2003, the american nurses asso-
ciation initiated a “Handle with Care” campaign 
to protect both health care workers and patients 
against injuries. To date, this campaign has been 
the impetus for legislation for safe patient han-
dling in nine states.41 In seven of these states, there 
is now a comprehensive patient handling program 
in place: Illinois (2009), Minnesota (2009), 
Maryland (2008), new Jersey (2007), Rhode Is-
land (2006), Texas (2006), and Washington 
(2006).41 Hawaii has passed a resolution calling 
for safe patient handling. 
 as multiple states have already acted, the focus 
has turned to the federal level. In May 2009, Rep-
resentative John Conyers (D-MI) introduced na-
tional legislation—the nurse and Health Care 
Worker Protection act of 2009  (HR 2381)—for 
the safe handling of patients and nursing home 
residents throughout the health care system.42 
In June 2009, the Coalition for Healthcare 
Worker and Patient Safety (CHaPS) was formed 
to support the bill. The bill is applicable to all 
health care settings. In particular, it directs the 
Department of Labor to issue an occupational 
safety and health standard to reduce injuries to 
patients and health care workers “by establishing a 
safe patient handling and injury prevention stan-
dard.” The standard would specify “the use of 
engineering controls to perform lifting, trans-
ferring, and repositioning of patients and the 
Manual handling and transferring of 
patient is a serious back injury risk to 
healthcare workers. However, ergonomic 
interventions have been successfully  
applied to patient care tasks and these  
interventions have not only reduced  
injuries but also resulted in cost savings.
Patient	handling	may	require	
lifting	a	patient	who	is	far	away	
from	the	worker,	placing	heavy	
loads	on	the	spine.
© 2010 Earl Dotter
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tABLe  5
examples of ergonomic intervention studies in nursing homes and other health care facilities.
Citation 
in brief
Study duration/ intervention 
design type
Study setting/ 
population
reduced lost work days or 
injuries observed cost-effectiveness
Martin 
et al., 
200935
10-year pre/post. Nurses in 89 pub-
lic health services 
agencies in Victo-
ria, australia.
  24% reduction in back injury 
claims/1,000 full time equivalent 
(FTE) nursing staff. 
Park 
et al., 
200936
one-year pre/post.   
Lifting equipment, training.
ohio nursing 
home staff.
$500 equipment purchase 
per nursing home worker 
was associated with a 21% 
reduction in back injury rate.
Equipment: approximately $768  
reduction in claim costs per 
worker. Training: $1,643 reduc-
tion in back claim costs over  
10 years per employee.
oSHA, 
200927
Zero manual lift policy. Electrically 
adjustable beds.
Wyandot County 
Nursing Home in 
Upper Sandusky, 
ohio.
No back injuries from  
resident lifting have  
occurred in more than  
five years.
Workers’ compensation costs re-
duced from an average $140,000 
to less than $4,000 a year. re-
duced absenteeism and overtime: 
annual savings approximately 
$55,000. Less staff turnover:  
additional $125,000 savings. 
oSHA, 
200927
Zero manual lift policy. Schoellkopf 
Health Center in 
Niagara Falls,  
New york. 
Lost work days reduced from 
364 to 52. Light duty days 
dropped from 253 to 25.
Workers’ compensation losses 
fell from $84,533 to $6,983 
annually. 
oSHA, 
200927
Ergonomics added  in safety and 
health program.
Citizens Memo-
rial Health Care 
Facility in Bolivar, 
Missouri.
55% reduction in lost work 
days. reduction in lifting-
related injuries of at least 
45% during each of the next 
four years.
Direct savings of approximately 
$150,000 in workers’ compensa-
tion costs over a 5-year period. 
nelson 
et al., 
200637
1.5-year pre/post design. Six ele-
ments: 1) Ergonomic assessment 
Protocol; 2) Patient Handling 
assessment Criteria and Decision 
algorithms; 3) Peer Leader role, 
“Back Injury resource Nurses”; 
4) Equipment; 5) after-action 
reviews; 6) No Lift Policy.
824 nurses in 23 
units: 19 nursing 
home units and 4 
spinal cord injury 
units.
18% reduced injuries. Injury 
rate reduction: 24.0 to 16.9 
per 100 caregivers.
return on investment for patient 
handling equipment of 3.75 years. 
annual post-intervention savings 
of over $200,000/year (workers’ 
compensation, reduced lost and 
modified work days).
Fujishiro 
et al., 
200538
4-year pre/post. Ergonomic 
consultation and financial support 
for patient handling and lifting 
devices.
Health care work-
ers in 100 work 
units in 86 health 
care facilities.
Injury rate reduction: 12.32 
to 6.64 per 200,000 
employee-hours. 
  
Collins 
et al., 
200439
6-year pre/post. Mechanical lifts 
and repositioning aids, a zero lift 
policy, and employee training on 
safe lift usage. 
1,728 nursing 
home staff in  
6 nursing homes. 
adjusted pre/post injury  
rate ratios: 0.39 for work-
ers’ compensation claims, 
0.54 for oSHa 300 logs, 
and 0.65 for first reports  
of employee injury.
Investment of $158,556 for lifting 
equipment and worker training 
recovered in less than three years 
(annual workers’ comp savings  
of $55,000).
Brophy 
et al., 
200140
7-year pre/post. Five-step ergo-
nomics program and mechanical 
lifting devices 
Nursing assis-
tants in 525-bed 
county nursing 
home in upstate 
New york.
Lost work days: 1,476 to 
625 per year (58%) Low 
back injuries among nursing 
aides: from 15.7 to 11.0 
per 100 FTE.
average low-back injury yearly 
costs from $201,100 to 
$91,800.
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elimination of manual lifting of patients” by all 
health care workers. 
 on May 11, 2010, Senator Patty Murray chaired 
the US Senate Hearing on Safe Patient Handling 
and Lifting Standards for a Safer american Work-
force.43 Elizabeth Shoegren, an injured nurse from 
Minnesota, testified that, in an average eight-hour 
shift, a nurse on a medical/surgical unit can care 
for three to eight patients, resulting in lifting 1.8 
tons in an average eight-hour shift. a nIoSH 
representative testified that manual handling of 
patients is a serious risk to healthcare workers. 
Patient handling may require lifting a patient who 
is far away from the worker, placing heavy loads on 
the spine; repeated lifting of this type can result in 
scarring that causes more damage. Moreover, 
studies have suggested that that there can be injury 
risks even when two people are lifting a 110-pound 
patient from a bed to a chair.8,45 
 It remains to be seen how successful the House 
bill will be. In any case, state legislatures have 
momentum to continue passing safe patient han-
dling bills that protect both health care workers 
and patients.
Vulnerable workers in high-strain jobs:   
At high risk for psychosocial hazards
While recent state-led safe patient-handling ini-
tiatives have brought renewed hope to those who 
advocate for workplace ergonomics policy, vulner-
able workers in high-risk jobs in other sectors 
should not be forgotten. In particular, women 
from ethnic minority groups are often invisible as 
workers, and thus the most vulnerable to psycho-
social hazards—that is, sources of mental stress in 
the workplace. Such psychosocial hazards often 
emerge from poor work organization. 
 The 2001 naS panel mentioned earlier con-
cluded that certain psychosocial workplace haz-
ards—including rapid work pace, monotonous 
work, low job satisfaction, low decision latitude, 
and job stress—were linked in turn with low-back 
disorders. High job demands and job stress were 
linked to upper extremity disorders.7 It has been 
suggested that psychosocial factors may exert their 
influence indirectly by altering muscle tension or 
other physiologic processes and decreasing micro-
pauses in muscle activity.1 
 The Job Demand-Control Model—developed 
by Robert karasek—cross-classifies jobs on psy-
chological demands (high/low) and decision lati-
tude (high/low), as shown in Figure 1 (page 30). 
Jobs in which the worker faces high psychological 
demands but has little decision latitude are desig-
nated high-strain jobs.46 a high level of psycho-
logical demands on the job may contribute to 
MSDs—particularly in high-strain jobs, in which 
a worker has little ability to decide what to do, 
how to do a particular job task, and how to use or 
develop job skills.1
in the laundry room, ergonomic engineering 
solutions can help hotel housekeepers in 
their daily tasks. this laundry bin’s bottom 
rises automatically as laundry is removed,  
to reduce bending.
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Hotel housekeeping 
Hotel housekeeping is an example of a high-strain 
job in which workers are vulnerable to injury. In-
deed, many housekeepers’ bodies today are at the 
breaking point because their jobs are characterized 
by the room quota system, which creates immense 
time pressure. In addition to ergonomic hazards, 
they also face job insecurity. The firing in 2009 of 
nearly 100 Hyatt Hotels housekeepers—mostly 
immigrant women—in the Boston area prompted 
a reaction across the United States and raised 
consciousness of hotel housekeepers’ working 
conditions.47   
 Hotel workers are 48 percent more likely to be 
injured on the job than the typical worker in the 
service sector.48 These workers experience a simi-
lar excess of serious, disabling injuries—those that 
require days away from work or reassignment to 
light duty: they sustain disabling injuries at a rate 
51 percent higher than service sector workers over-
all.48 Buchanan and colleagues reported that room 
cleaning work was of particular concern, and that 
the injury rate for both traumatic injuries and 
non-traumatic MSDs was highest among Hispanic 
female housekeepers. This subgroup also had the 
highest rate of musculoskeletal disorders.49 
 Valessie McCaskill’s story is typical of house-
keeping workers’ experiences in the hotel indus-
try.48 She had worked at the Chicago Hilton and 
Towers for a little over three years when the pain in 
her right leg became severe. “Some days my leg 
would swell up and I would literally limp from 
room to room. When the pain was at its worst, I 
would sit on the beds and cry because it hurt so 
much. In the rooms, at least no one would see 
me.” Two years ago, an iron garbage can fell on 
her while she worked in a linen closet at the end of 
her shift. “The next day I could barely walk. on 
my way to work, my leg buckled and I collapsed at 
the employee entrance. My leg was so swollen the 
doctors had to cut through my pants.” 
 Eventually, her doctors told her nearly all of the 
cartilage in her knee was gone and that she needed 
knee replacement surgery. She was out of work for 
five months. “The doctors told me I should stay 
out at least six months, but I had two teenage 
daughters at home to take care of. Catholic Chari-
ties helped me pay some of my rent and utility bills 
but I needed to go back to work before we lost 
everything.” Today, her knee has significantly im-
proved but she still suffers workplace pain. “Late-
ly, the pain has been the worst in my right arm. 
I feel like there are needles in my fingertips. So 
I start every morning with a pill—aleve, Tylenol, 
something to get me ready to do all the pulling and 
lifting.” 
 The higher the quota, the faster the housekeeper 
has to work. a 16-room quota—which is not un-
common—means that the housekeeper must clean 
each room in less than 30 minutes to allow time to 
stock the cart and travel between rooms. House-
Many	[hotel]	housekeepers’	bodies	today	are	at	the	breaking	point		
because	their	jobs	are	driven	by	a	room	quota,	which	creates	immense		
time	pressure.	
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Karasek’s demand-Control Model. High-strain jobs are those with 
high psychological demands combined with low decision latitude.
Source: Karasek R. Theorell, T. Healthy Work: Stress, Productivity, and the Reconstruction of Working Life.  
Basic Books, 1990.
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keepers routinely report that they must race 
through their tasks in order to complete them on 
time. When rushing to clean a slippery tub or lift a 
heavy mattress, workers are more likely to get hurt. 
Further, hotel housekeepers report that clean bed 
linens and towels are often understocked, and vac-
uums do not always work well. Such supply short-
ages or other practical obstacles disrupt the pace of 
work and consume valuable minutes. In recent 
years, the workload that hotel companies demand 
of their housekeepers has increased significantly. 
Chronic understaffing, coupled with the addition 
of time-consuming amenities—luxury items like 
heavy mattresses, fragile coffeepots, and in-room 
exercise equipment—has placed housekeepers at 
greater risk of injury. To complete their quotas, 
housekeepers are increasingly forced to skip meals 
and other breaks—in other words, to pass up the 
rest that is necessary to prevent injury.48 
Poultry processing
Poultry processing is also a high-strain job. In 
northeastern north Carolina, oSHa inspectors 
cited two poultry processing plants for serious 
ergonomics problems in 1989. Work was often 
carried out in sustained awkward postures with 
repetitions—in some jobs, repetitive movements 
were documented at more than 30,000 per shift 
(roughly once per second over an eight-hour 
shift).50 one of these plants was the largest em-
ployer of women in the community, located in a 
sparsely populated area with a black majority; 
nearly one-third of the population lived below the 
poverty level. Lipscomb and colleagues stated that 
these rural women were failed by the occupational 
safety and health systems designed to protect them. 
a 30-year-old single mother who had left a job in 
home health care to make better money in one of 
these poultry processing plants says:
 
Awkward postures, overexertion, repetitive motions, 
and fast-paced work to meet their daily room quotas 
put hotel housekeepers at a high MSd risk. 
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Before I even got to the plant, they [friends and family] 
were like “if you ever got to the plant, your hands ain’t  
going to be good no more.” And I believe that. You ever 
start working in a plant, on that line, and start doing 
chicken stuff, your hands ain’t never be the same. Sure 
ain’t. My hands won’t never be the same, probably. I don’t 
really think about it. I would say to anybody, the plant is  
a job. It ain’t the worst job. It ain’t the best job, but it’s 
better than sitting home, not getting no income. I say, “if 
you can’t find nothing else, go to the plant. But let that be 
your LAST choice.” I would tell the young people, my 
children, “I’m not going to tell you don’t go, but let that be 
your last choice.”50 
ergonomic interventions pay for themselves 
as mentioned earlier, workplace ergonomic in-
terventions have not only reduced MSDs but have 
resulted in cost savings. There are numerous stud-
ies and workplace examples of the effectiveness of 
interventions in various industries. We listed nine 
such studies for nursing homes and health care 
facilities detailed in Table 5 above. Workplace in-
terventions may include a number of initiatives—
for example, ergonomics consultations, zero-lift 
policies, use of ceiling lifts and inflatable transfer 
mats, mechanical aids for material handling, and 
training. Successful workplace ergonomics programs 
include at least these five elements: (1) leadership 
commitment; (2) written policy; (3) employee in-
volvement; (4) continuous monitoring; and (5) 
implementing adjustments based on monitoring 
results.4 In addition to leadership commitment 
and employee involvement, oSHa’s voluntary ergo-
nomic guidelines advocate the following program 
components: (1) worksite analysis; (2) hazard pre-
vention and control; (3) medical management; and 
(4) training and education.26-30 
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Poultry processing  
is a high-strain job. Work is 
often performed in sustained  
awkward postures with  
serious repetitions.
In	some	[poultry	processing]	jobs,	repetitive		
movements	were	documented	at	more	than		
30,000	per	shift	(roughly	once	per	second		
over	an	eight-hour	shift).
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safe	patient	handling	is	not	simply	an	initiative		
or	a	program	or	a	policy,	it	is	a	culture	change.
 Engineering solutions seem to be the preferred 
method for primary MSD hazard prevention and 
control.4 nIoSH has estimated that a 100-bed 
nursing home facility can expect to spend $25,000 
to $30,000 on portable (not ceiling-mounted) 
mechanical lifts, depending on how many resi-
dents require the use of a lift. a good combination 
of floor and ceiling lifts can be accomplished with 
an investment of $50,000–$60,000 in a similar 
100-bed facility.51 Cost-benefit analyses reviewed 
by nIoSH demonstrated that initial investments 
in mechanical lifting equipment and training can 
be recovered in two to three years through reduc-
tions in workers’ compensation costs.51 
 In 2006, Washington State passed a Safe Patient 
Handling (SPH) law for acute care hospitals. In 
testimony before the US Senate Hearing on Safe 
Patient Handling and Lifting Standards for a 
Safer american Workforce, Barbara Silverstein 
described the following requirements and incen-
tives of this law:43,52 
• a joint management-worker SPH committee 
with at least half of the committee comprised of 
direct care staff;
• a needs assessment for all patient care areas;
• a minimum of one patient handling device per 
10 acute care beds per unit;
• the right to refuse unsafe handling;
• an annual evaluation;
• a Department of Health audit of SPH imple-
mentation and practice; 
• a tax credit equivalent to $1,000 per acute care 
bed for SPH equipment purchases up to $10 
million total; and 
• a reduced premium for those hospitals in the 
State Fund workers’ compensation program if 
they have a fully implemented SPH program.
In the same US Senate Hearing, June altaras, a 
nurse executive in Washington State, shared the 
results of the Swedish Medical Center’s successful 
SPH program. In her testimony, she stated:53 
We have developed a system that reduces workplace  
injuries and corresponding lost or restricted days of work, 
which has a direct result on our bottom line. Patient safe 
handling is not simply an initiative or a program or a  
policy, it is a culture change and as such it requires the  
engagement and support of front line staff in designing the 
approach, establishing a workflow and selecting equip-
ment. In addition, it requires the support of senior leader-
ship, middle management and unit experts. This is not  
a small undertaking, it is a long-term commitment;  
however, the results can be dramatic.
Since 2007, there has been a significant decrease 
in the incidence of workers’ compensation claims 
among workers at Washington hospitals but an in-
crease among workers in nursing homes (which 
are not covered by the legislation). 
Medical management 
although the main focus must be on primary pre-
vention of MSDs, it is essential that injured work-
ers have access to appropriate and timely medical 
care. The medical management of a MSD aims at 
reducing and eliminating symptoms, preventing 
the disorder from progressing, reducing the dura-
tion and severity of functional impairment, and 
preventing or reducing the severity of disability.1 a 
good medical management program comprises 
surveillance, timely access to appropriate health 
care providers, follow-up of treated workers, co-
ordination with primary prevention efforts, job 
evaluation of injured workers, and availability of 
appropriate job modification.1 
 a recent study on MSDs in the European 
Union recommended that national governments 
adopt a version of the United kingdom’s Fit Note 
policy, whereby clinicians and employers are en-
couraged to focus on the capacity of workers with 
MSDs, rather than on their loss of capacity, and to 
improve the flow of information between clini-
cians and employers.2 The vast majority of injured 
workers are able to return to productive work 
quickly as long as their job is modified to reduce 
physical exposures to the affected body parts.1 
Job modifications are frequently inexpensive and 
simple. Modified duties are meaningful to injured 
workers, as they would like to keep on contribut-
ing and applying their skills rather than only 
draining resources. However, modified duties are 
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not instituted smoothly. The injured nurse who 
was quoted earlier shared the following:5 
Workers’ Compensation insurance carriers might consider 
reducing time loss and vocational rehabilitation costs by 
encouraging employers to retain injured nurses—to keep 
those nurses who are still able to work employed in the  
facility where they were injured. This may be a logical piece 
for cost containment. [As a back-injured hospital nurse], 
what can I do? All of the hospital-based nursing skills  
listed except lifting heavy weights. Now, if I’m ready, will-
ing, and able to perform all these skills right now, without  
re-training, would it not be more cost-efficient to just  
put me back to work, performing the skills in the facility 
where I was working when injured, rather than spend- 
ing scarce resources on re-training and continued time  
loss payments?5 
Lifting devices Protect Backs…and Patients
Here are two examples of patient lifting devices. Technologies like these 
can reduce workers’ back injuries, keep patients safe and save money. 
(Images provided by Vancare.)
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L e S S o n S  L e a r n e d
Musculoskeletal disorders are a serious problem, not only in occupational health but also in pub-lic health more broadly. What are viable mea-
sures to protect millions of affected workers? Two are 
described here. 
effective MSd prevention begins with good data 
Most important, it is necessary to acquire more and 
better data on MSDs across all economic sectors. ade-
quate information is the foundation for both national 
and worksite-level analyses. at a minimum, MSDs need 
to be brought back to oSHa 300 logs, and indeed the 
new oSHa administration proposed this in January 
2010. The assistant Secretary of Labor for oSHa, 
Dr. David Michaels, stated:32
Restoring the MSD column [in the OSHA 300 log for reporting 
work-related injuries] will improve the ability of workers and 
employers to identify and prevent work-related musculoskeletal 
disorders by providing simple and easily accessible information. It 
will also improve the accuracy and completeness of national 
work-related injury and illness data.
Better injury records strengthen the estimates of 
MSD costs and savings. While restoring MSDs in the 
oSHa 300 log is essential, health care providers should 
also participate in the process of enhancing medical 
records so that they provide more complete evidence 
on MSDs.4 
Solutions lacking the force of law do not  
provide enough protection for workers
In addition, although workplace ergonomics programs 
continue to play a key role in improving workplace 
ergonomics, voluntary approaches alone are weak. 
Workplace policies and programs do not protect workers 
effectively unless they are backed up by a legal obligation. 
 oSHa’s only enforcement tool for ergonomics, the 
General Duty Clause, has limited power. as we review 
the political history of ergonomics and its timeline, it is 
sadly obvious that the generic (that is, all-industry-
wide) ergonomics standard may not get a second chance 
anytime soon in Congress. 
 although the oSHa Ergonomics Standard was de-
feated, this event did not spell the end of all legislative 
initiatives on ergonomics. as noted above, advocacy 
groups and state legislators have been exemplary in 
campaigning for and adopting safe patient handling 
legislation to protect both health care workers and 
patients. Such an initiative might succeed at the federal 
level as well. Legislative ergonomics initiatives may be 
most successful when they address first the high-risk 
tasks, then jobs, and finally entire industries. 
legislative	ergonomics	initiatives	may	be	most		
successful	when	they	address	first	the	high-risk	tasks,	
then	jobs,	and	finally	entire	industries.
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CaSE  STUDy  2  —  t iMeL ine 18
y E a r E V E N T
1970s-80s oSHa cites MSD hazards under the oSHact’s General Duty Clause. 
1990 oSHa issues Ergonomics Program Management Guidelines for Meatpacking Plants.
american National Standards Institute (aNSI) Z-365 committee formed by the National Safety Council to develop  
a voluntary ergonomics standard. 
Secretary of Labor Elizabeth Dole commits the Labor Department to “taking the most effective steps necessary to address 
the problem of ergonomic hazards on an industry-wide basis” and to begin rulemaking on an ergonomics standard. 
1993 The Clinton administration makes the promulgation of an ergonomics standard a regulatory priority. oSHa commits  
to issuing a proposed rule. 
1995 The House passes its Fy 1995 recission bill that prohibits oSHa from developing or promulgating a proposed rule  
on ergonomics. 
President Clinton vetoes the recission measure.
1996 The House appropriations Committee passes a 1997 funding measure that includes a rider prohibiting oSHa from issuing 
a standard or guidelines on ergonomics. The rider also prohibits oSHa from collecting data on the extent of such injuries 
and, for all intents and purposes, prohibits oSHa from doing any work on the issue of ergonomics.
The House of representatives approves the amendment stripping the ergonomics rider.
California issues its final ergonomics standard.
1997 NIoSH releases report Musculoskeletal Disorders and Workplace Factors. 
California’s ergonomics regulation becomes effective.
Industry groups try to disband the voluntary aNSI Ergonomics Standard committee.
a new congressional budget rider: The Congress prohibits oSHa from spending any of its Fy 1998 budget to promulgate  
or issue a proposed or final Ergonomics Standard. 
1998 National academy of Sciences releases report Work-Related Musculoskeletal Disorders: A Review of the Evidence.23 
The NaS panel finds that scientific evidence shows that poor workplace ergonomic factors cause musculoskeletal disorders. 
Congress appropriates a budget for another NaS study on ergonomics. 
oSHa freed from a prohibition on ergonomic rulemaking. 
1999 oSHa releases its draft proposed Ergonomics Standard and it is sent for review by small business groups under the  
Small Business regulatory and Enforcement Fairness act. 
Industry groups call for oSHa to wait for completion of the NaS study before proceeding with an Ergonomics Standard.
North Carolina oSHa adopts draft Ergonomics rule.
Washington State issues a proposed Ergonomics rule.
Federal oSHa issues the proposed Ergonomics Standard.
2000 oSHa concludes public hearings on the proposed Ergonomics Standard.
For the first time, the voluntary american Conference of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (aCGIH) voluntary threshold 
limit values (TLVs) include an ergonomics measure (hand activity level TLV). 
Washington State adopts its Ergonomics rule.
Congressional budget rider for the Federal oSHa rule: The House appropriations Committee adopts a rider to the Fy 2001 
Labor-HHS funding bill prohibiting oSHa from moving forward on any proposed or final Ergonomics Standard.
President Clinton promises to veto the Labor-HHS bill. 
oSHa issues the final Ergonomics Standard on November 14.
North Carolina labor commissioner adopts oSHa’s final Ergonomics Standard. 
The Congress adopts Labor-HHS funding bill without a rider on the Ergonomics Standard.
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y E a r E V E N T
2001 Ergonomics Standard takes effect on January 16. 
NaS releases its second report on work-related MSDs.24 
oSHa Ergonomics Standard is repealed by the Congress and the President through the Congressional review act  
in March 2001.
The aCGIH TLVs to include lifting TLVs  as the second ergonomics measure.
2002 Washington State Superior Court judge upholds the state’s Ergonomics rule.
2003 oSHa issues voluntary ergonomics guidelines for nursing homes.
The US Department of Labor revokes both the requirement that employers identify MSDs on the oSHa 300 logs  
and the definition of MSDs.
Washington State’s Ergonomics rule repealed by voters through an industry-funded ballot initiative. 
aNSI’s voluntary Ergonomics Standard abandoned by the National Safety Council. 
2004 oSHa holds its National advisory Committee on Ergonomics symposium. 
oSHa issues voluntary ergonomic guidelines for the retail grocery store and poultry processing industries. 
2006–2007 New Jersey, rhode Island, Texas, and Washington issue safe patient handling legislation to protect health care workers.28
2008 oSHa issues voluntary ergonomics guidelines for the shipyard industry. 
Maryland issues safe patient handling legislation to protect health care workers.
2009 Illinois and Minnesota issue safe patient handling legislation to protect health care workers. 
The Nurse and Health Care Worker Protection act (Hr 2381)—the federal safe patient handling legislation— 
is introduced in the House.
2010 oSHa proposes to revise its recordkeeping regulation by restoring an MSD column on the oSHa 300 log. 
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Tests of lung function given to 
workers in the microwave popcorn 
factories showed rapid deteriora-
tion of breathing ability, ultimately 
linked to breathing the flavoring 
compound diacetyl.
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CASe  S t udy  3
The Poison that Smells Like Butter:
Diacetyl and Popcorn Workers’ Lung Disease
Molly M. Jacobs, David Kriebel, Joel Ticker
“My name is eric Peoples. i was born in Joplin, Missouri and raised in Carthage, Missouri where i pres-
ently reside. i am 35 years old and have been married to Cassandra Peoples for 14 years. i have two 
children, Adrianna, age 13 and Brantley, age 11. i have bronchiolitis obliterans. Bronchiolitis obliterans 
is a severe, progressive disease of the lung which has robbed me of my health, deprived my wife of a 
husband and my children of a daddy.
“. . . i went to work at the Jasper Popcorn Company in the fall of 1997 and left in March, 1999. i would 
give anything to have known then what i know now. At that time i was in perfect health, looking 
forward to a long, healthy life. the plant was run by local people and was one of the best jobs in the 
area. My co-workers were kind, honest people and treated me well the entire time i worked there.
“. . . Let me bring it home to you if i can. i have a 24% lung capacity. i am currently on the inactive 
Lung transplant registry. one case of pneumonia could cause me to need the transplant now. the 
average rate of survival for someone with a lung transplant is about five years. 75% of lung transplant 
patients are dead after 10 years. 
“one of the doctors who worked on the first case involving the two workers with bronchiolitis oblit-
erans in 1990 said that the flavoring industry was using workers as ‘blue collar guinea pigs.’ i played 
by the rules. i worked to support my family. this unregulated industry virtually destroyed my life. don’t 
let it destroy the lives of others. these chemicals that are used on food in large scale production must 
be tested and proper instructions and labeling supplied with their sale.”
— Statement of Eric Peoples to the House Committee on Education and Labor, 20071
F
IRST DESCRIBED In 1835, BRONCHIOLITIS 
obliterans is a life-threatening and irrevers-
ible lung disease. It is a rare disease—most 
chest doctors see only a handful of cases in 
their careers. In individuals with bronchiolitis 
obliterans, the airways of the lungs are inflamed and 
scarred, resulting in severe shortness of breath and 
a dry cough. 
 Popcorn worker Gerald Morgan described liv-
ing with bronchiolitis obliterans this way: “Take four 
bulldozers and put them on your chest. Then put 
an elephant on top of those bulldozers.”2
 yet Eric Peoples’ disease started out, as many 
do, as “unremarkable.” Patients first present with 
a non-productive cough or shortness of breath, 
symptoms that may not be recognized as serious at 
the beginning. only 10 months after working in 
the mixing room of the Jasper Popcorn Company, 
Eric Peoples developed symptoms that he thought 
were simply the result of a cold or the flu.3 as he 
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This case study tells the story of disabling and potentially fatal lung disease among workers exposed to butter flavoring chem-
icals. The case study follows the chronology of the story as it unfold-
ed, revealing the response by federal and state agencies and the fac-
tors that influenced their actions, or lack thereof, to protect workers. 
This case points out the challenges of chemical-by-chemical regula-
tion spanning multiple agency jurisdictions, and highlights the essen-
tial role played by occupational/environmental health specialists on 
the front lines of detecting and minimizing harm to workers.
ABou t  t H i S  C A S e  S t u dy
“take	four	bulldozers	and	put	
them	on	your	chest.	then	put		
an	elephant	on	top	of	those		 	
bulldozers.”	
described his illness at that time, “We tried to treat 
it with over-the-counter medications, and noth-
ing seemed to work.”4 Peoples’ doctors first diag-
nosed him with pneumonia. When his symptoms 
didn’t improve, he saw a specialist and was given a 
diagnosis of asthma.3 When Peoples was hospital-
ized for continued breathing difficulties, further 
tests revealed bronchiolitis obliterans.3 The 27-year-old 
was told that there was no cure and that he would 
need a double lung transplant to survive.3 
 Unlike many lung diseases, bronchiolitis obliterans is 
not caused by smoking. It’s a poorly understood 
and uncommon disease, linked to severe viral in-
fections, some bad drug reactions, and, in a small 
number of prior cases, exposure to strongly irri-
tating vapors or gases like ammonia, sulfur diox-
ide, and chlorine.5,6 Because of the tragic stories 
of Eric Peoples and a handful of other workers, 
researchers have now added a food flavoring 
chemical, diacetyl, to the list of agents linked to 
this disease.
the disease cluster
In early 2000, a lawyer, whose mother had fallen 
ill working at the same popcorn plant as Eric 
Peoples, showed the medical records of several 
workers to Dr. allen Parmet, a kansas City physi-
cian who specializes in occupational hazards.3 
Immediately seeing a pattern, given the rarity of 
bronchiolitis obliterans, Dr. Parmet wrote to the Mis-
souri Department of Health and Senior Services 
(MoDHSS) in May 2000, reporting eight cases of 
bronchiolitis obliterans among former workers of the 
Jasper Popcorn Company, a microwave popcorn 
manufacturer, now the Gilster-Mary Lee Corpo-
ration.7,8 Dr. Parmet’s letter also stated that 20 to 
30 former employees might have respiratory 
symptoms suggestive of subclinical bronchiolitis.7 
MoDHSS sought assistance from the national In-
stitute for occupational Safety and Health (nIoSH) 
as it proceeded with its investigation of the cases 
and also alerted the occupational Safety and 
Health administration (oSHa) on May 19, 2000 
requesting that oSHa, “. . . inspect the facility for 
compliance with your regulations. as a regulatory 
agency, we believe that you can more promptly ad-
dress this situation, and if there is an obvious haz-
ard to workers, address it quickly.”7 
oSHA’s initial response 
a few days later, on May 23, 2000, an oSHa in-
spector was sent to the Gilster-Mary Lee Corpora-
tion popcorn plant. In the inspection report, the 
inspector noted that company management had 
only recently become aware of the potential hazard 
in their facility when told by a workers’ compensa-
tion attorney that there were eight former em-
ployees with breathing problems.9 Even though 
company management seemed to dismiss claims of 
work-related illness, they had asked their insur-
ance carrier to sample the plant for dust.9 The re-
sults were well below the allowable level set by 
oSHa.9 Seeing these results, the oSHa inspector 
conducted no additional dust sampling, because 
it was his “professional opinion that it would be 
ludicrous to re-sample the area again.”9 Samples 
of respirable oil mist were collected and sent to an 
oSHa lab in Salt Lake City. 
 yet the lab did not test the samples, indicating 
that “oSHa’s sampling method for oil mist per-
tained only to oil mist particulate off gassed from 
petroleum based oils not vegetable food grade 
oils.”9 The inspector “determined the company to 
be in compliance and closed out the case file since 
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there were no other oSHa sampling protocols at 
his disposal to test further at the plant.”9 oSHa’s 
primary approach to protecting workers is enforc-
ing specific standards. Where there is no standard, 
oSHa historically has taken only limited action 
despite its general duty to protect workers. 
nioSH investigates
nIoSH has a different mission—it is charged with 
investigating hazards and making general recom-
mendations for improving workplace health and 
safety, including recommendations to oSHa; it 
has no enforcement powers of its own. Working 
with MoDHSS, nIoSH investigators quickly de-
termined that the eight sick employees worked 
primarily in just two production areas of the 
plant—they had worked either as mixers or as 
microwave-packaging workers. Based on the pres-
ence of eight affected workers, nIoSH and 
MoDHSS calculated a 5- to 11-fold excess of occu-
pational lung disease compared to what would be 
expected based on national surveillance data.8 
 In november 2000, the government agencies 
broadened their investigation to include all cur-
rent workers at the Jasper plant. They found that 
the workers had nearly three times the rates of 
chronic cough and shortness of breath that would 
be expected based on national data, and twice the 
rates of physician-diagnosed asthma, and chronic 
bronchitis.10 
 These early nIoSH and MoDHSS worksite in-
vestigations could not identify any known sub-
stance to explain the illnesses.8 yet because the risk 
of permanent lung damage was concentrated 
among mixers and packaging workers, nIoSH is-
sued interim recommendations (with no legal 
force) in December 2000 that all workers wear 
respirators until further notice.8 
 as part of the november 2000 survey, nIoSH 
and MoDHHS also took samples of the worksite 
air. Samples detected respirable dusts and volatile 
organic compounds, which were primarily ke-
tones, including diacetyl.11 Mixing area employees’ 
exposures to diacetyl were 17 to 1,000 times great-
er than exposures of other employees at the plant, 
whereas the difference in exposure to respirable 
dusts was less than 10-fold between the least and 
most exposed groups.11 This prompted health in-
vestigators to take a closer look at diacetyl.
diacetyl: Generally recognized as safe? 
Diacetyl (also called 2,3-butanedione) occurs 
naturally in trace quantities in dairy products, 
fruit, and wine.12 The microwave popcorn indus-
try found that it made a good butter flavoring and 
increased the amount of diacetyl in its flavorings 
for a more intense butter taste.12 The compound 
was first identified by the noted scientist Louis 
Pasteur in the 1860s in his research on the fer-
mentation of beer and ale.12 In the early 1900s, 
scientists realized they could inexpensively synthe-
size diacetyl from methyl ethyl ketone.12 It is esti-
mated that diacetyl is now added to more than 
6,000 food products, including baked goods, 
beverages, candy, chips, and frozen dinners.12 
neither oSHa nor nIoSH has required or rec-
ommended limits for diacetyl in workplace air that 
would ensure the safety of workers handling the 
chemical.13 
 as a chemical in food, diacetyl is regulated un-
der the authority of the federal Food and Drug 
administration (FDa). In general, food additives 
require premarket approval by FDa to ensure that 
they are safe for their intended use.14 There’s an 
important loophole, though. Substances that are 
generally recognized as safe (GRAS) are not considered 
“food additives” and thus do not require premar-
ket FDa approval.15 
 according to the FDa, a substance is deter-
mined to be to be GRaS if information about the 
substance is widely known and if there is consensus 
among qualified experts that available informa-
tion indicates that the substance is safe under the 
conditions of its intended use. For substances 
used in food before 1958, a GRaS determination 
can be made through experience based on com-
mon use in food.14 
 Diacetyl has been considered GRaS since 1980, 
when an FDa review committee examined two tox-
icity studies—neither using humans and neither 
having any relevance to lung disease—and made 
the determination that: “There is no evidence . . . 
that demonstrates or suggests reasonable grounds 
to suspect a hazard to the public when [diacetyl is] 
used at levels that are now current or that might 
reasonably be expected in the future.”16 The two 
studies that formed the basis of this determination 
were a test of mutagenic activity in cells cultured in 
the lab and an animal feeding study looking for 
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evidence of teratogenicity (effects on the fetus). 
Each study demonstrated no effect. 
 With hindsight, we can see a missed opportu-
nity to prevent the cluster of lung disease cases in 
the microwave popcorn plants when, in 1994, the 
national Institute for Environmental Health Sci-
ences’ national Toxicology Program (nTP) nom-
inated diacetyl for mechanistic, metabolism, and 
carcinogenicity studies based on ingestion.17 With 
very limited funds available for this program, nTP 
“peak” concentrations in the popcorn production 
areas in general were as high as 98 ppm.11 
 This investigation also considered the health of 
workers, and it didn’t just focus on the eight cases 
of the serious lung disease, bronchiolitis obliterans, but 
examined all the workers to see if there was evi-
dence of a gradient of lung damage in the work-
force generally. and there was: rates of symptoms 
of deep lung damage (such as chronic cough and 
wheeze) were found to track closely with where a 
worker spent most of his/her time working.10 
Measurements of breathing capacity across the 
workforce at Jasper showed the same thing—the 
more diacetyl a worker had breathed, the worse 
his/her lung function was.8,10 
 This was particularly strong evidence of diace-
tyl’s danger. not only was diacetyl linked directly to 
a handful of cases of disabling lung disease in the 
most heavily exposed, but it seemed also to have 
significant pulmonary health effects on those with 
lower levels of exposure. This meant that there 
could be thousands of “silent” cases of illness spread 
across industry, wherever diacetyl was being used. 
nioSH moves forward
In January 2001, nIoSH assisted Gilster-Mary 
Lee to improve ventilation, thus dramatically de-
creasing diacetyl concentrations in the mixing and 
packaging areas and reducing the risk of bronchiolitis 
obliterans in that plant.11 
 Eight months later, nIoSH issued its interim 
report on the investigations at the Gilster-Mary 
Lee plant. It provided evidence that the butter fla-
voring mixture containing diacetyl and other vola-
tile organic compounds caused damage to the 
lungs of rats that was consistent with the way that 
bronchiolitis obliterans attacks human lungs.11 nIoSH 
promptly shared its findings with workers at the 
plant in September 2001. The Institute’s fact sheet 
began with the warning: “There is a work-related 
cause of lung disease in this plant. We at nIoSH 
believe the problem is continuing even after the 
company made changes that we recommended.”18 
 In 2002, nIoSH published the first of several 
toxicological studies in which rats were exposed to 
airborne concentrations of butter flavoring simi-
lar to those found in factories.19 There was sub-
stantial lung damage in the rats, described by the 
lead researcher, Dr. ann Hubbs, as “the most 
the	more	diacetyl	a	worker	had	breathed,	the		
worse	his/her	lung	function	was.
can test only a few chemicals each year, and diace-
tyl was ultimately dropped from consideration in 
1999. However, based on its initial testing, nTP 
acknowledged “the potent irritant properties of 
this chemical.”17 Even if diacetyl had been sub-
jected to a larger battery of tests, these might not 
have found evidence of lung toxicity, because as a 
food additive, the focus of nTP’s additional test-
ing focused on risks from ingestion, not from 
inhalation.17 
 Why were workers allowed to breathe very high 
concentrations of a toxic chemical? There were no 
workplace standards controlling its use, and no 
evidence that it would be harmful to workers. and, 
in the absence of any evidence that it was harmful, 
it was considered safe. not until 2007, seven years 
after the Jasper, Missouri cluster was identified, 
did the nTP begin long-term animal testing, in-
cluding respiratory toxicity testing, of diacetyl, 
based on a request by the United Food and Com-
mercial Workers International Union (UFCW).17 
First links between respiratory illness  
and butter flavoring chemicals
The nIoSH and MoDHHS survey of the Jasper 
popcorn factory in november 2000 found the 
diacetyl concentration in the air of the mixing 
tank room to average 18 parts per million (ppm). 
an intermediate concentration, 1.3 ppm, was 
documented in the packaging area, and lower but 
still detectable levels (averaging 0.02 ppm) were 
detected in other areas of the plant.8 Short-term 
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dramatic cases of cell death ever seen in some tis-
sues.”20 Subsequent toxicological studies pub-
lished in 2006 exposed rats to pure diacetyl and 
found similar results.21 
 Unbeknownst to nIoSH researchers at the 
time, the German chemical manufacturer BaSF 
had previously conducted an acute inhalation tox-
icology study, published as an internal report in 
1993, that exposed rats to diacetyl for a single 
four-hour period. The results—which were never 
published in the scientific literature or reported 
to any government agency, but emerged during 
the legal trials of the cases brought by the Gilster-
Mary Lee workers—found that in rats, “[exposures 
at the] mid and high concentrations resulted in an 
abundance of symptoms indicative for respiratory 
tract injury.”22,23 
 nIoSH also conducted similar medical and 
industrial hygiene evaluations in five other micro-
wave popcorn plants. Results similar to those at 
the Gilster-Mary Lee plant were found: the preva-
lence of respiratory symptoms and the prevalence 
of airway obstruction were higher among workers 
in mixing operations and in packaging areas near 
tanks of oil and flavorings.24 among the important 
findings from these five plants was documentation 
of airway obstruction in a worker in the flavoring 
mixing area where the diacetyl concentrations were 
relatively low—less than 1.0 ppm. This suggested to 
nIoSH that the “safe” level in air must be well 
below this concentration.24 
Where was oSHA?
It is often nIoSH that takes the lead to better 
characterize an occupational health problem and 
recommend solutions when a new and unknown 
workplace hazard emerges. yet these solutions are 
simply recommendations. only oSHa has the 
regulatory authority to enforce nIoSH’s recom-
mendations. In contrast to nIoSH, whose scien-
tists made successful efforts to identify hazards and 
to minimize new cases of respiratory illness among 
microwave popcorn manufacturing workers, oSHa 
watched and waited.
 Sixteen months after the oSHa inspector had, 
in effect, closed out the case at the Gilster-Mary 
Lee facility, an attorney representing several of the 
sick workers filed a complaint with oSHa, and 
followed up with another complaint in December 
Cooking oils, spray, 
and butter substitutes 
may contain diacetyl to 
provide or enhance the 
flavor of butter.
2001. as detailed in a case study of popcorn work-
ers’ lung produced by the Project on Scientific 
knowledge and Public Policy, the attorney’s 
letter “alleged that not enough had been done to 
improve ventilation in the plant, as evidenced by 
the fact that ‘one employee lost half of his lung 
capacity working in the plant after the remedial 
measures that nIoSH suggested were taken’ (em-
phasis in original).”25 
 This prompted oSHa to send another inspec-
tor to visit the plant, but the inspector did not 
conduct an inspection. oSHa then sent a letter to 
the attorney who had filed the complaints, deny-
ing the need for further investigation at the plant. 
The letter explained: “[T]he hazard which you 
brought to our attention has been corrected and 
. . . Gilster [sic] Mary Lee is complying with the 
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recommendations of nIoSH. . . . The hazard does 
not fall within oSHa’s jurisdiction because there 
is no Permissible Exposure Limits [sic] for the food 
blend chemicals of concern that are used at the 
factory.”25 But this reasoning is clearly flawed. The 
lack of a specific standard for diacetyl may limit 
oSHa’s specific regulatory power, but not its 
authority to ensure that workplaces are safe. 
 The occupational Health and Safety act of 
1970 created oSHa and gave it the authority to 
ensure that workplaces are free from “recognized 
with diacetyl exposure only in 2006, six years after 
it was first alerted to the problem, five years after 
nIoSH first identified the likely risk factor con-
tributing to the respiratory disease, and four years 
after strong incriminating evidence emerged from 
nIoSH’s animal studies, showing that diacetyl was 
the most likely culprit.26 
regulation by litigation
as one legal analyst has written about this junc-
ture in the diacetyl story, “In the face of regulatory 
paralysis and scientific uncertainty came trial law-
yers.”27 Workers can’t usually sue their employers 
when their jobs make them sick—workers’ com-
pensation laws bar such direct suits. But lawsuits 
can be filed against the companies that produced 
the hazardous chemicals—in this case, the diacetyl-
containing butter flavorings. Such actions are 
known as “third-party” suits.27 
Legal action against the manufacturer of diacetyl
International Flavors and Fragrances (IFF), Inc. 
acquired the original manufacturer of the butter 
flavoring used by Gilster-Mary Lee Corporation 
in 2000. a class action lawsuit was filed against 
IFF by the Gilster-Mary Lee workers and their 
spouses in September 2001 alleging that IFF and 
its corporate predecessor, Bush Boake allen, Inc. 
had manufactured butter flavoring that caused 
their injuries.28 a trial date was set for March 1, 
2004.28 after complex legal maneuvering separat-
ed individual injured worker’s claims from the 
class action, a Missouri jury took just over three 
hours to deliver a verdict in favor of Eric and Cas-
sandra Peoples. IFF was ordered to pay $18 mil-
lion to Eric Peoples and $2 million to his wife.4 
During the trial, the plaintiffs argued that IFF had 
failed to warn Gilster-Mary Lee employees about 
the dangers of the butter flavorings or to provide 
adequate safety instructions.27 IFF argued that di-
acetyl was not the cause of Peoples’ disease, and 
that even if it was, harm was caused by his improp-
er handling of the chemical.27 as stated by IFF’s 
attorney in closing arguments, information sent 
to microwave popcorn plant officials warned that 
the flavoring should be mixed in a well-ventilated 
area and that a respirator should be worn when 
heating it. “We know beyond a shadow of doubt 
that if you use basic hygiene practices, you don’t 
hazards.” Specific standards for individual chemi-
cals are only one way to achieve this. When faced 
with a hazard for which no standard exists, oSHa 
has the authority to issue an emergency temporary 
standard or to invoke the “general duty clause” 
that requires employers to reduce or eliminate 
recognized hazards. yet oSHa’s legal advisors 
within the Department of Labor’s office of the 
Solicitor often prevent oSHa from taking such 
actions. The Bush administration’s Department 
of Labor was not interested in having oSHa use 
its authority under the general duty clause to pro-
tect workers from diacetyl exposure. Further, oSHa 
also denied a petition for emergency temporary 
standards filed jointly by the United Food and 
Commercial Workers Union and the International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters. 
 In September 2002, oSHa entered into an 
alliance with the Popcorn Board, a trade group, to 
promote hazard communication and outreach ef-
forts to at-risk workplaces.25 yet six months later, 
in March 2003, the alliance ended for reasons 
unknown, even though concern about exposures 
to diacetyl and other artificial butter flavoring 
compounds in the microwave popcorn manufac-
turing industry was peaking.25 oSHa began in-
specting facilities to control hazards associated 
In	contrast	to	nIosH,	whose	scientists	made	
successful	efforts	to	identify	hazards	and	to		
minimize	new	cases	of	respiratory	illness	among	
microwave	popcorn	manufacturing	workers,	
osHa	watched	and	waited.
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“Into	the	void	left	by	regulatory	
paralysis	and	scientific	uncertainty	
came	trial	lawyers.”
have a problem in this plant.”4 Eric Peoples, how-
ever, noted that plaintiff’s attorneys had acquired 
during discovery detailed information that dem-
onstrated IFF’s failure to warn Gilster-Mary Lee 
Corporation of the real harms of diacetyl:1 
The company that supplied the butter flavor, Bush Boake 
Allen…[acquired by IFF] had extensive notice about the 
hazards of butter flavor. They treated butter flavor as a 
hazardous chemical within their own plant. Since at least 
1994 their own workers were required to wear respira-
tory protection when working around the butter flavor. 
Despite wearing full-face respirators, many of their em-
ployees suffered severe eye injuries. Because of the dangers 
of the product, the entire manufacturing process was en-
closed so no one could be exposed to the vapors. In addi-
tion, information had come to IFF about the respiratory 
effects of exposure to diacetyl. In 1986, two employees of 
a baking company had been diagnosed with bronchiolitis 
obliterans while mixing a butter flavoring for use on cin-
namon rolls. 
 . . . Despite all this information the buckets contain-
ing this product said the product was safe. The Material 
Safety Data Sheets said the product had “no known health 
hazards” and that’s what I believed. 
Between spring and summer 2005, IFF suffered 
many verdicts against it, and by november 2005 it 
had settled with 54 microwave popcorn plant 
workers.2 all cases severed from the original class 
action were settled.27 Today, hundreds of cases in 
several states are still pending. In august 2010, a 
jury in Chicago awarded another Jasper popcorn 
plant worker with bronchiolitis obliterans a $30.4 mil-
lion verdict.29
 The early litigation results and rising consumer 
concern about the safety of microwave popcorn 
probably played a role in the decision by leading 
microwave popcorn manufacturers to eliminate 
diacetyl from their products in 2007, as described 
below.30 
Successful regulation by litigation? not so fast
The diacetyl legal cases were rather quickly tried 
and settled compared to many other “toxic torts,” 
cases. In toxic tort cases, plaintiffs claiming harm 
bear the burden of proving causation by a prepon-
derance of the evidence. The diacetyl plaintiffs 
thus had the burden of demonstrating that their 
lung problems would not have developed without 
their exposure to diacetyl, and that their disease 
should have been foreseen by their employer.27 
 Demonstrating that an industrial or envi- 
ronmental chemical exposure was the cause of a 
plaintiff’s disease is not an easy task. The legal 
requirement to demonstrate “factual” causation is 
inherently difficult because of scientific uncer-
tainty: no matter how much we study the health 
effects of a chemical, uncertainties in our knowl-
edge linger, given the complexities of the human 
body and limitations in the design of observa-
tional and even experimental studies. 
 Science by its very nature never operates in 
absolute certainties, but by the weight of the evi-
dence. Despite this tenet of science, companies 
being sued in toxic torts often raise the specter of 
doubt by focusing on the limitations and uncer-
tainties in the scientific evidence.31 These uncer-
tainties are magnified further in cases when the 
plaintiff’s disease has a long latency period (like 
cancer) or when the disease might also have been 
caused by some common exposure (like smoking). 
 In addition, in federal courts and in some state 
courts that follow the Supreme Court’s Daubert de-
cision, judges have the authority to decide—often 
pretrial—whether expert evidence is sufficiently 
scientific to merit consideration in the case.a 
While judges have always maintained the authority 
to determine the admissibility of evidence, Daubert 
courts apply a more rigorous standard of evidence 
a Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (1993) directed federal judges to serve as “gatekeepers” of expert testimony. In a subsequent 1997 decision in General Electric v. 
Joiner, the Supreme Court set a high bar for overturning trial judges’ decisions about admissibility of expert testimony: appellate judges were to uphold trial judges’ decisions unless they 
could find that the trial judge had abused his discretion. In 1999, the Supreme Court clarified in Kumho Tire v. Carmichael that it intended Daubert to apply to all expert testimony, 
not just evidence that relies on science. These three cases are known as the Daubert Trilogy. See Berger, MA. What has a decade of Daubert wrought? American Journal of Public 
Health. 2005:95:S59-65. 
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and determine whether specific scientific expert 
testimony is both “relevant” and “reliable.” Be-
cause plaintiffs bear the burden of proof, defen-
dants often file a Daubert motion first, calling into 
question the relevance and reliability of the plain-
tiff’s expert scientific testimony. These evidentiary 
standards are a giant hurdle for plaintiffs to sur-
pass.32 Judges have routinely misinterpreted sci-
entific uncertainty to mean that specific evidence 
is “irrelevant” or “unreliable,” and have thus sup-
the best solution is to identify and replace toxic 
chemicals before they enter the economy.
the hierarchy of industrial hygiene controls: 
when substitution isn’t safe
nIoSH follows a well-established hierarchy of 
industrial hygiene controls when making recom-
mendations to control workplace hazards. an em-
ployer is typically urged to start at the top of the list 
and try to control the hazard there, before moving 
down to a less effective strategy. The nIoSH hier-
archy for diacetyl looks like this:13 
1. Substitute a nonhazardous flavoring for the 
hazardous one.
2. Use engineering controls such as a closed pro-
duction system, isolated mixing rooms, or very 
good local exhaust ventilation.
3. Make administrative changes to reduce expo-
sures, such as enforcing procedures for safe 
handling, attention to maintenance, and rapid 
cleaning of spills.
4. Improve training and provide better informa-
tion about the hazard and ways to avoid it.
5. Provide personal protective equipment such as 
respirators and gloves.
6. Monitor exposures and workers’ health.
The hierarchy of industrial hygiene controls for 
diacetyl, like those for most other industrial chem-
icals, puts substitution at the top because, if the 
chemical is eliminated, it can’t do any harm—
there’s no need to worry about whether the venti-
lation system is being properly maintained, or 
whether each worker is using his/her respirator 
properly, for example. 
 But in its warning to popcorn manufacturers in 
2003, nIoSH skipped substitution in its recom-
mendations: “Engineering controls are the primary 
method for minimizing exposure associated with 
the use or manufacture of potentially hazardous 
flavoring.”13 Why? nIoSH was likely worried that 
so little was known about the safety of flavorings 
that the manufacturers might choose a substitute 
chemical for which there was no evidence of risk, 
but which later turned out to be just as hazardous 
as diacetyl. 
 This is a serious systemic flaw in the way chemi-
cals are regulated today. So few of the chemicals in 
commerce have been adequately tested that substi-
C aS E  S T UDy  3 :  the Poison that Smells Like Butter
science	by	its	very	nature	never	operates		
in	absolute	certainties,	but	by	the	weight	of		
the	evidence.	
ported a defendant’s motion for summary judg-
ment, by which cases are dismissed before ever 
being heard before a jury.33 
 as legal scholars have noted, the diacetyl cases 
did not exhibit the barriers typical of most toxic 
tort cases.27 While scientific uncertainty linking 
health harms associated with diacetyl remains—as it 
does for nearly every exposure-disease associa-
tion—bronchiolitis obliterans is a rare disease with only a 
few known causes. Rule out other known risks, 
such as organ transplantation and exposure to 
other toxic fumes, and you’re left with only one 
likely cause: diacetyl. and unlike many diseases, 
bronchiolitis obliterans has not been linked to smoking. 
 In addition, breathing diacetyl leads to severe, 
disabling lung disease without much of a time lag, 
and this simplifies the investigation of causal risk 
factors. Lastly, Eric Peoples’ case and the other 
initial Gilster-Mary Lee Corporation employees’ 
cases against IFF were filed in state courts not 
subject to evidentiary standards under the Daubert 
decision. 
 Thus, while our tort law system worked to pro-
vide a remedy for harms incurred by diacetyl-exposed 
workers, and may have ushered in a move towards 
eliminating this hazard in the absence of regula-
tion by our federal and state governments, regula-
tion by litigation is not a solution for the vast ma-
jority of toxic harms facing workers. Even though a 
successful toxic tort claim prevented future cases of 
disease, it can’t restore Eric Peoples’ lungs. Clearly, 
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tution may be a risky proposition. The Government 
accountability office (Gao) has called the Envi-
ronmental Protection agency’s (EPa’s) meager 
record in assessing the toxicity of chemicals—
among the tens of thousands in commerce—a 
“high risk” issue for public health.34 Safe work-
place exposure limits (either oSHa’s Permissible 
Exposure Limits (PELs) or nIoSH’s recom-
mended Exposure Limits (RELs)) have been 
developed for fewer than 5 percent of the 1,037 
flavoring ingredients that have the potential to be 
respiratory hazards based on their volatility and 
irritant properties.13 
 Despite this context, substitution is precisely 
what many microwave popcorn manufacturers 
did. In 2007, Pop Weaver and Conagra, the two 
largest suppliers of microwave popcorn, an-
nounced that they were eliminating diacetyl from 
their products.30 Two other suppliers, General 
Mills and american Pop Corn, subsequently fol-
lowed the same course of action, each stating they 
were on the road to “eliminating” diacetyl from 
their recipes, or had already done so.35 
 But they didn’t eliminate the hazard. The “new, 
safer, butter substitutes” in some cases are at least 
as toxic as diacetyl, and in other cases are essen-
tially diacetyl by another name.36 “Diacetyl trim-
mer” releases diacetyl in the presence of heat and 
water; and “butter starter distillates (starter mix)” 
contains high concentrations of diacetyl.36 
 “We’ve been very clear to flavor manufacturers, 
food companies and regulators that the so-called 
substitutes are diacetyl,” said John Hallagan, general 
counsel for the Flavor and Extract Manufacturers 
association.36 on December 23, 2009, nIoSH 
Director John Howard sent a letter to David 
Michaels, the new assistant Secretary of Labor for 
oSHa, stating that research at nIoSH and the 
national Institute of Environmental Health Sci-
ences addressing the respiratory toxicity of diacetyl 
substitutes demonstrates that the principal com-
ponent of one such substitute, 2,3-pentanedione, 
has very similar animal toxicity to that of diacetyl. 
Moreover, another substitute, acetoin, lacks toxicity 
testing data and “accompanies diacetyl in many of 
the workplaces where bronchiolitis obliterans occurs in 
workers who make or use flavorings.”37
 While substitution is the preferred approach 
to protect not only workers but also the broader 
Bronchiolitis obliterans—a lung disease as frightening 
as it sounds—was diagnosed in a cinema employee 
who routinely popped dozens of bags of microwave 
popcorn to fill a dispenser like this.
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public from chemical hazards, it’s dangerous to 
pick substitutes without a thorough overhaul of 
our system to manage the safety of chemicals in 
commerce. Even limited evidence of hazard from 
a chemical should stimulate the search for safer al-
ternatives. Designed correctly, chemical regulations 
can stimulate scientific research and technological 
innovation. But at present, the United States has a 
disjointed collection of overlapping jurisdictions 
for chemicals, and a system that tends to treat haz-
ards as “safe until proven hazardous”—just the op-
posite of what is needed to protect workers and the 
public. Tragically, the doctor quoted by Eric Peoples 
was right when he said that workers are our nation’s 
“blue collar guinea pigs.”1 
What is the true scope of diacetyl’s impact? 
From the public health perspective, Eric Peoples 
and the other Gilster-Mary Lee workers made sick 
by diacetyl are sentinels: their experience raised 
the alert about this chemical. But a much larger 
group of people have been affected by it. 
More workers affected
nobody knows how many workers are exposed to 
artificial butter flavorings, because there is no way 
to identify facilities that use these chemicals. In 
2004 and 2006, Dr. Phil Harber, an occupa-
tional physician at the University of California at 
severe airway obstruction—a broad category of seri-
ous lung disease that includes bronchiolitis obliterans.39 
Eight workers in this study were confirmed as hav-
ing either bronchiolitis obliterans or fixed obstructive 
lung disease.39 
 When these two sentinel cases of bronchiolitis 
obliterans were found in California, the California 
Department of Health Services’ Hazard Evalua-
tion System and Information Services (HESIS) 
wanted to rapidly warn other workers about the 
risk of diacetyl, but had no way of finding out 
which workplaces used butter flavorings.40 Cali-
fornia’s experience is emblematic of this problem 
nationally: there are no federal laws requiring 
firms to disclose the volume of chemicals that they 
produce or the customers to whom they sell them.b 
In California, attempts to request that chemical 
manufacturers and importers voluntarily disclose 
their client lists have been ineffective. For exam-
ple, of the 96 manufacturers and importers that 
HESIS contacted requesting client lists for seven 
chemicals that pose chronic health hazards, only 
six companies complied with the request.40 of 127 
manufacturing facilities in California using fla-
vorings, only 16 voluntarily disclosed that they 
used diacetyl.41 California attempted to pass a law 
to rectify this problem, but the bill was vetoed by 
the Governor in 2007.40 The lack of an infra-
structure to support health officials in meeting 
their responsibility to identify and warn workers 
who are at risk, and identify early-stage cases of 
disease, is a significant gap in efforts to protect 
worker safety and health. 
the first cases among the public
When the cases of bronchiolitis obliterans at the Jasper 
popcorn plant hit the national news media, one of 
the first questions journalists asked was: is there a 
risk to people who buy and eat microwave pop-
corn? In 2003, EPa’s Indoor air Quality Re-
search program began a study to characterize com-
pounds released when microwave popcorn was 
popped and opened. The study was completed in 
late 2005.42 The agency circulated its report to 
the popcorn industry to assure company officials 
that no confidential business information was 
b Massachusetts and New Jersey have the only state laws that require high volume users  of toxic chemicals (facilities that use 10,000 pounds per year and employ at least 10 employees) 
to report their use to state agencies. Supply chain information is not included in these laws.
nobody	knows	how	many	workers	are	exposed	to	
artificial	butter	flavorings,	because	there	is	no	way	
to	identify	facilities	that	use	these	chemicals.	
Los angeles, diagnosed the first two cases of bron-
chiolitis obliterans in California. The two worked at 
separate flavoring manufacturing facilities, and 
both handled diacetyl.38 These cases triggered an 
investigation by the California Department of 
Health Services of medical surveillance data from 
15 flavor manufacturing companies in California. 
The study found evidence of increased risk of 
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disclosed or would be released to the public.43 yet 
EPa never publicly released its results. Despite a 
petition and a Freedom of Information act re-
quest to get EPa to release its findings to the pub-
lic, EPa refused to do so, saying that this might 
prevent the scientists involved in the study from 
getting their work published in the peer-reviewed 
literature.42,43 The EPa scientists’ research was 
published in november 2007. Their work re-
vealed that diacetyl was one of the predominant 
emissions and that 80 percent of the total chemi-
cal emissions occur when the microwave popcorn 
bag is first opened after popping.44 yet the re-
search fell short of determining what, if anything, 
these results mean for consumer risk. 
 nevertheless, risks to consumers did come to 
light. Two months before EPa’s scientists pub-
lished their research, Dr. Cecile Rose, the direc-
tor of occupational disease clinical programs at 
national Jewish Medical and Research Center in 
Denver, evaluated a 53-year-old Colorado man 
for decreasing lung function.45 The man had eat-
en microwave popcorn twice a day for more than 
10 years.45 as Dr. Rose told the New York Times, 
“When he broke open the bags, after the steam came 
out, he would often inhale the fragrance because 
he liked it so much.”45 Dr. Rose later measured 
diacetyl levels in the man’s home that were similar 
to levels found in the microwave popcorn plants.45 
Since 2007, cases of lung disease possibly linked 
to butter flavoring exposure in microwave pop-
corn have been identified, including a Blockbuster 
Video employee who, every Friday and Saturday, 
popped 30 bags of microwave popcorn in a small 
back room of the store and emptied them into a 
larger popcorn machine for patrons to scoop out 
and enjoy with their movies. a lung biopsy con-
firmed a diagnosis of bronchiolitis obliterans.36 
Hope for greater protections  
through regulatory action
With intensifying public pressure, thanks in part 
to a significant number of media stories about the 
cases of popcorn workers’ lung, as well as public 
health scientists calling upon FDa, EPa, and 
oSHa to act, more protective policies are being 
pursued by some, but not all, agencies.25 
 FdA: Despite petitions to the FDa by the Proj-
ect on Scientific knowledge and Public Policy on 
September 6, 2006 and by US Congressional 
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Representative Rosa DeLauro of Connecticut on 
September 11, 2007 requesting that FDa revoke 
diacetyl’s GRaS status, diacetyl is still on the 
GRaS list as of this writing. In January 2010, the 
Project on Scientific knowledge and Public Policy 
received a letter from Mitchell Cheeseman, acting 
Director of the FDa’s office of Food additive 
Safety, stating that the petition is still under active 
review, and that this review is incorporating all 
existing scientific evidence and is considering the 
issue of inhalation.46 
 ePA: Despite publishing its research in 2007 
confirming emissions of diacetyl from opening a 
bag of  microwave popcorn after cooking, EPa has 
not acted on this evidence or explained what its 
findings mean for consumer health.
 Cal oSHA: Prompted by the cases of bronchiolitis 
obliterans among workers in California exposed to 
butter flavoring ingredients and inaction by oSHa 
on the issue, California pushed forward regulatory 
options to prevent harm to workers who are exposed 
to diacetyl. on august 18, 2006, the Division of 
occupational Safety and Health at the California 
Department of Health Services received a letter 
from 23 California legislators requesting adop-
tion of an emergency standard and then a perma-
nent standard covering exposure to diacetyl. a 
similar letter was sent to the occupational Safety 
and Health Standards Board by the California 
Labor Federation and the California affiliate of 
the United Food and Commercial Workers Inter-
national Union. 
 In november 2009, a proposed diacetyl stan-
dard was issued for public comment. The first di-
acetyl standard in the country was passed by a 6-1 
vote by the California occupational Safety and 
Health Standards Board on September 16, 2010. 
The adopted standard affects flavoring and food 
manufacturing facilities that use diacetyl and food 
flavorings that contain 1 percent or greater con-
centration of diacetyl. This “process-oriented stan-
dard” does not mandate a PEL, but rather a series 
of industrial hygiene controls, hazard communi-
cation, and medical surveillance procedures that 
affect exposure levels not only of diacetyl, but of 
other butter flavoring ingredients as well. Thus 
the standard has the capacity to reduce exposures 
not only to diacetyl, but also to hundreds of chem-
icals that are found with diacetyl in various butter 
flavoring mixtures. 
 oSHA: oSHa has faced pressure by Congress 
to use its regulatory authority to protect workers 
from diacetyl. on June 13, 2007, Congresswoman 
Lynn Woolsey introduced a bill entitled “Popcorn 
Workers’ Lung Disease Prevention act.” The bill 
would require oSHa to (1) issue an interim stan-
dard within 90 days to regulate worker exposure to 
diacetyl; (2) issue a final standard within two years 
that provides no less protection than the recom-
mendation in nIoSH’s December 2003 alert; 
and (3) require nIoSH to study and report to 
oSHa on the safety of food flavorings that may be 
used as substitutes for diacetyl.47
 The bill was passed on September 26, 2007. 
yet days before, oSHa preempted the legislation 
by announcing that it would initiate a rule-making 
process for diacetyl, issue a Safety and Health In-
formation Bulletin, and provide Hazard Commu-
nication Guidance. Both of these products simply 
provide basic information about a hazard. The 
former is intended for the public and oSHa’s in-
ternal staff; the latter is intended for employers.
 oSHa has issued its Safety and Health Infor-
mation Bulletin and Hazard Communication 
Guidance, but has yet to promulgate a rule. on 
January 21, 2009, oSHa issued an advanced 
notice of Proposed Rulemaking in the federal 
register. on november 25, 2009, Senator Sher-
rod Brown wrote to Secretary of Labor Solis urg-
ing her to expedite the final rule-making process, 
taking place 10 years after the dangers of diacetyl 
were first publicly documented.48 
 on a factsheet about diacetyl on its website, 
oSHa still maintains (as of this writing) that “a 
cause-effect relationship between diacetyl and 
bronchiolitis obliterans is difficult to assess because of 
mean diacetyl exposure levels ranging over four 
orders of magnitude for workplaces with affected 
individuals. In addition, food-processing and 
flavor-manufacturing employees with this lung 
disease were exposed to other volatile agents.”49 
according to oSHa’s spring 2010 regulatory 
agenda, its next step is to conduct a scientific peer 
review of its draft risk assessment of diacetyl.50
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L e S S o n S  L e a r n e d
The story that unfolded in a small popcorn plant in Jasper, Missouri, provides important lessons for the entire country.
  First, when physicians are trained in occupational 
health and effective state occupational health surveil-
lance systems are in place, workers’ lives are protected. 
If it were not for astute physicians such as Dr. alan Par-
met and Dr. Phil Harbor, who diagnosed the first cases 
of occupation-induced illness among workers exposed 
to butter flavoring chemicals and who initiated effective 
health hazard investigations by their state health de-
partments and nIoSH, even more workers’ illnesses 
would have gone unnoticed and additional cases would 
undoubtedly have occurred. We are extremely fortunate 
that the popcorn lung story unfolded in the time and 
places it did, as the chance of a rapid response in other 
cities and states across the United States might not have 
been as likely, given lack of capacity and resources. 
 The Institute of Medicine has declared that there is a 
“critical shortage” of specialty-trained occupational 
and environmental physicians in communities, in aca-
demic medical centers, and in public health and related 
agencies.51 according to a survey of medical school 
graduates, only 1.4 percent have taken an occupational 
medicine elective, and among the half of medical 
schools that require teaching of occupational medicine, 
the mean required curriculum time over the four years 
was four hours.52,53 Similarly, according to a survey by 
the Council of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, 
34 of 50 US states have minimal to no surveillance or 
epidemiology capacity in occupational health.54 The 
occupational medical and epidemiologic response seen 
in this case study is a model for the type of public health 
infrastructure needed across the United States. 
 a second key lesson revealed by this story is that pro-
tecting workers from future diacetyl/butter flavorings 
disasters requires a new system of ensuring adequate 
safety and health information regarding all chemicals in 
commerce and a more coordinated federal chemicals 
management infrastructure. While the Department of 
Labor’s failure to respond by having oSHa use its reg-
ulatory authority to protect workers using butter flavor-
ings is indefensible, we must ask a much larger and 
more fundamental question. Why is our chemicals 
management system in the United States—a system that 
spans jurisdictional boundaries across EPa, FDa, 
oSHa, and other agencies—dependent on first de-
stroying the lives of workers like Eric Peoples, our “blue 
collar guinea pigs”? Why was diacetyl determined to be 
“generally recognized as safe” based on minimal testing, 
and why was no thought given to the impacts on workers 
or the general public exposed by routes other than in-
gestion? and while substituting a safer butter flavoring 
for diacetyl is the most protective strategy to prevent 
occupational illnesses, why is there no system to foster 
research that produces and identifies safer chemicals? 
 no tale of toxic harms has a happy ending. But the 
story of popcorn workers’ lung teaches us of the need 
for effective occupational health and chemical regulatory 
systems to prevent workers from falling ill simply by  
showing up for work and doing the job asked of them. 
the	story	of	popcorn	workers’	lung	teaches	us	of	the	need	
for	effective	occupational	health	and	chemical	regulatory	
systems	to	prevent	workers	from	falling	ill	simply	by		
showing	up	for	work	and	doing	the	job	asked	of	them.
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CaSE  STUDy  3  —  t iMeL ine
D a T E E V E N T
1980 FDa issues a GraS designation for diacetyl based on a test of mutagenic activity in cells 
cultured in the lab and an animal feeding study examining evidence of teratogenicity.  
No inhalation studies were conducted.
February 1993 researchers for the German company BaSF publish an internal report of the inhalation 
toxicity of diacetyl in rats. The rats underwent a single four-hour exposure to diacetyl 
vapors. animals exposed at medium and high concentrations showed an abundance  
of symptoms indicative of respiratory tract injury.
1994 NTP nominates diacetyl for comprehensive mechanistic, metabolism, and carcinogenicity 
studies based on ingestion exposure. 
1999 NTP drops diacetyl from its comprehensive testing list, though initial testing found the 
chemical to have potent irritant properties. 
May 2000 Dr. Parmet notifies the MoDHHS to report multiple cases of bronchiolitis obliterans 
among workers of a Jasper, Missouri, popcorn plant. Dr. Parmet’s letter also suggests that 
dozens of former workers also show symptoms of subclinical bronchiolitis obliterans. 
May 2000 MoDHHS notifies oSHa of Dr. Parmet’s letter and asks oSHa to inspect the Jasper,  
Missouri, popcorn plant.
May 2000 oSHa inspector visits the plant, but oil mist samples cannot be analyzed by oSHa’s  
laboratory. 
August–november 
2000
NIoSH investigates a Missouri microwave popcorn facility; findings indicate that workers 
exposed to flavorings at the microwave popcorn plant are at risk for developing obstructive 
lung disease.
december 2000 NIoSH issues interim recommendations to the Jasper microwave popcorn plant for all 
workers to wear respirators to control exposure to the artificial butter flavoring compounds 
pending the implementation of engineering controls.
August 2001 NIoSH issues its Interim report about its Jasper popcorn plant investigation. 
September 2001 NIoSH investigators return to the Jasper factory they studied to distribute materials  
describing investigation results, ongoing activities, and precautions to be taken by workers.
September 2001 a class action lawsuit is filed against IFF by Jasper plant workers and their spouses.
September and 
december 2001
attorney representing sick workers files complaints with oSHa, noting that workers’ health 
continued to decline after the Jasper plant took measures recommended by NIoSH.
February 2002 oSHa replies to complaint filed by attorney, stating that the hazard has been corrected 
based on the plant’s compliance with NIoSH’s exposure control recommendations and 
that oSHa does not have jurisdiction over the food chemicals concerned because there  
is no Permissable Exposure Limit (PEL). 
April 2002 and 
August 2002
articles in Morbidity and Mortality Weekly Report (april 26, 2002) and in the New England 
Journal of Medicine (august 2002) are published describing MoDHHS’s and NIoSH’s 
investigations. The articles reveal that the rates of airway obstructive symptoms were 
higher among workers who worked in the production area of the plant versus other areas. 
The papers also reported that the more a worker was exposed to diacetyl, the worse  
her/his lung function was. 
2002–2003 NIoSH scientists conducting toxicity experiments find significant adverse respiratory  
effects from exposure to diacetyl vapors. one of the lead researchers reveals that the 
substantial lung damage observed in the rats tested represented “the most dramatic 
cases of cell death ever seen in some tissues.”
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d A t e E V E N T
September 2002– 
March 2003
oSHa begins alliance with the Popcorn Board to promote hazard communication to  
at-risk workplaces. The alliance ends six months later without issuing and circulating  
any hazard information. 
Spring–Summer 
2003 
EPa’s Indoor air Quality research Update reports that a project to characterize compounds 
emitted through popping and opening microwave popcorn is expected to be completed in 
December 2003.
december 2003 a NIOSH Alert is issued suggesting safeguards and asking employers to caution workers. 
The alert recommends: “engineering controls are the primary method for minimizing  
exposure associated with the use or manufacture of potentially hazardous flavoring.”
March 2004 a Missouri jury delivers a verdict in favor of Eric and Cassandra Peoples for $20 million—
the first of many trials of Jasper popcorn plant workers.
August 2006 a group of California legislators, UFCW, and the California Labor Federation petition  
Cal oSHa to adopt an emergency temporary standard for diacetyl in California.
September 2006  
& May 2007
The Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy and Congresswoman rosa DeLauro 
write to FDa Commissioner andrew von Eschenbach requesting that the agency re-examine 
diacetyl to revoke its GraS status.
June 2007 FDa Commissioner andrew von Eschenbach responds to DeLauro’s request, stating that 
“the agency does not have evidence that would cause it to take immediate action with 
respect to diacetyl” and that “FDa continues to monitor the scientific literature for studies 
conducted to define and clarify the dangers associated with exposure to diacetyl vapors.”
June 2007 Congresswoman Lynn Woolsey introduces a bill that would force oSHa to set an interim 
standard for diacetyl exposure within six months and a final rule in two years.
August 2007 Manufacturer Pop Weaver announces that it has eliminated diacetyl from its microwave 
popcorn.
September 2007 Dr. Cecile rose, chief occupational and environmental medicine physician at National 
Jewish Medical and research Center, diagnoses a case of bronchiolitis obliterans in a man 
who did not have occupational exposure to diacetyl but was a regular, heavy consumer  
of microwave popcorn. 
november 2007 EPa scientists publish their research in Critical Reviews in Food Science and Nutrition 
finding that diacetyl was a predominant compound emitted from cooking microwave  
popcorn and that more than 80 percent of the total chemical emissions occur when  
the bag is first opened after cooking.
September 2007– 
december 2007
Conagra, Pop Weaver, General Mills, and american Pop Corn announce that they are  
eliminating diacetyl from their products or have already done so. 
September 2007 The US House of representatives passes the Popcorn Workers Lung Disease Prevention 
act, which requires oSHa to set a standard to protect workers from diacetyl.
January 2009 oSHa issues a advanced Notice of Proposed rulemaking for a diacetyl standard.  
november 2009 Senator Sherrod Brown writes Secretary of Labor Solis to expedite diacetyl rulemaking.
november 2009 Proposed Cal oSHa standard for diacetyl is issued for public comment.
december 2009 FDa’s acting Director of the office of Food additive Safety states that petitions from the 
Project on Scientific Knowledge and Public Policy and Congresswoman DeLauro about 
diacetyl’s GraS status are still under review. 
december 2009 NIoSH Director John Howard sends letter to David Michaels, assistant Secretary of Labor 
for oSHa stating that the new substitutes for diacetyl demonstrate animal toxicity very 
similar to that of diacetyl.
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This welder looks  
about as well protected 
as could be. But real 
safety requires more  
than personal protection 
equipment. Safety in con-
struction means planning 
and managing every  
aspect of a site with  
safety in mind.
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CASe  S t udy  4
Injuries are not accidents:
Construction Will Be Safe When It’s Designed to Be Safe
Pia Markkanen, David Kriebel, Joel Tickner, Molly Jacobs
on August 13, 2005, a 56-year-old male construction worker was fatally injured when he was run over 
by a bulldozer. He had been working at a commercial construction site in north Carolina. As he 
stepped in front of a gravel pile to direct a truck driver, he was struck by a bulldozer running in reverse. 
His boss, the owner of the contracting company, was operating the bulldozer, spreading gravel. the 
dozer’s back-up alarm was on. A co-worker in a skid-steer loader near the gravel pile saw the bulldozer 
backing toward the victim, and he yelled a warning. But neither the driver of the bulldozer nor the 
worker in its path heard him shout. the track of the bulldozer struck the victim on the back of his legs 
and rolled over his legs and torso. emergency medical workers arrived promptly after the 911 call and 
found that the victim had no signs of life. He was pronounced dead at the site. 
— Fatality Assessment and Control Evaluation (FACE) Program, National Institute for occupational Safety & Health (NIoSH)1 
U
nnECESSaRy DEaTHS LIkE THIS 
one happen all the time—there are 
approximately three fatal construction 
injuries each day in the United States.a 
and for every death, there are more than 
100 nonfatal injuries serious enough to result in 
time lost from work.b
 Fatal injuries in construction continue to take 
a heavy toll despite a long history of government 
efforts to enforce safety measures. yet safety man-
agement systems involving workers and managers 
in continuous assessment and prevention can 
provide the commitment to safety that is critical to 
reducing deaths and injuries on the job. 
 When people hear about these tragic and avoid-
able deaths, they often have one of two reactions. 
They either say, “It should be so simple—how hard 
can it be to keep workers from falling, or being 
crushed, or being electrocuted?” or they say, 
“accidents will always happen. It’s nobody’s fault.” 
The latter view is clearly wrong, and the evidence 
can be found in very safe construction projects all 
over the world, even if they are not as common as 
they should be. The first view is also wrong, but in a 
subtler way. The final error that leads to the injury 
or death—the bulldozer running over the worker—
may be simple to avoid when viewed in isolation. 
However, keeping workers safe requires careful, par-
ticipatory design of the organization of work prac-
tices and the worksite. Investigations of fatal inju-
ries invariably find a complex web of causal factors 
that led up to the final moments of the terrible, 
avoidable event. 
 This case study highlights the complex, very 
hazardous, and often fast-paced work of construc-
tion, an industry that is also known to employ a 
a  Based on the US Bureau of Labor Statistics’ total fatality cases (975) in construction, in 2008.
b  Based on the US Bureau of Labor Statistics’ total non-fatal cases (120,240) in construction, in 2008.
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vulnerable population of immigrant workers. To 
manage its countless occupational hazards and 
protect workers adequately, the construction sec-
tor requires a more comprehensive approach than 
mere compliance with government standards or 
sporadic application of control measures after se-
rious incidents occur. one of the best solutions is 
to implement an occupational safety and health 
management system (oSH-MS) in the worksite.
the highly hazardous construction sector
A complex and dynamic work environment
The construction industry is one of those complex 
economic sectors that pose particular challenges 
in protecting workers’ safety and health.2 Con-
struction work embraces not only building proj-
ects but also maintaining, repairing, renovating, 
and demolishing houses, apartment buildings, 
and office buildings. Larger-scale construction 
projects include not only major buildings (for ex-
ample, health care facilities), but also infrastruc-
ture components (e.g. roads, tunnels, bridges, 
airports, docks).2,3 In these various activities, the 
worker experiences highly hazardous conditions—
not only the hazards of his/her own job, but also 
hazards from co-workers.2,3 Construction workers 
also operate in an unusually dynamic workplace: 
construction requires the physical transformation 
of the site: each new stage of the project brings 
along different materials, technologies, work pro-
cesses, and hazardous exposures.4 
 Dangerous job conditions may include work at 
heights or in excavations; the clutter of building 
materials; motor vehicles and equipment; pro-
longed standing, bending and stooping; noise, 
dust, and welding fumes; power tools; confined 
spaces and cramped spaces; temperature extremes; 
C aS E  S T UDy  4 :  injuries Are not Accidents
electricity; and sometimes work underwater. oth-
er features of construction work that may contrib-
ute to hazardous conditions include working at a 
fast pace, having many employers on the site, 
working jobs of relatively short or episodic dura-
tion, and working alongside trades that generate 
other hazards.3 Furthermore, construction work-
ers are highly mobile and employers may change. 
all these factors make the documentation of con-
struction jobs and hazardous exposures complex.2 
When employed, most workers in the construction 
industry work at least full time and many of them 
more than 40 hours a week.5 
Construction industry tops the injury numbers
Workers in the construction sector are about 
8 percent of the US workforce (more than 11 million 
workers), but the industry consistently accounts 
for a larger number of total fatalities than any other 
sector—accounting for about 22 percent of fatal-
ities across all industries.6 In 2008, the Bureau 
of Labor Statistics (BLS) reported 975 deaths 
from acute traumatic injuries.7,8  The 2008 fatality 
rate, at 9.6 deaths per 100,000 full-time con-
struction workers, was the fourth-highest after 
agriculture, mining, and transportation.8 although 
preliminary BLS data indicate that construction 
fatalities declined to 816 in 2009,9 the construc-
tion industry continues to top the list of high- 
fatality industries.  
	 The leading causes of construction fatalities and 
injuries, accounting for 90 percent of cases, are:10,11 
• falls from elevations (e.g., from floors, 
platforms, ladders, roofs);
• being struck by something that is moving  
(e.g., objects, pieces of equipment, vehicles);
• being caught in/between events or objects 
(e.g., cave-ins, unguarded machinery,  
equipment); and
• electrical shock (e.g., by overhead power lines, 
power tools and cords, outlets, temporary wiring). 
Falls are the most frequent cause of fatalities in 
construction, each year accounting for one-third 
of all construction-related deaths.12 The propor-
tion is higher in residential construction, where 
falls account for nearly half of work-related 
deaths.13 Figure 1 shows trends of construction 
fatalities for falls, highway accidents, contact with 
The first section of the case study profiles the chief character-istics of this hazardous employment sector: number of injuries, 
especially hazardous trades, costs of construction injuries, and the 
magnitude of the immigrant workforce and the nature of its work. The 
second part highlights actions by government and the construction 
industry that could make this sector safe.
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electric current, and being struck by objects dur-
ing 1992–2005.14 
 In 2008, BLS reported that the construction 
industry experienced a total of 120,240 serious 
nonfatal injuries causing days away from work (11 
percent of such injuries across all industries); this 
is the fourth highest percentage among all US in-
dustry sectors, behind trade, transportation and 
utilities (30 percent); education and health ser-
vices (17 percent); and manufacturing (13 per-
cent).15 Construction sector injuries causing days 
away from work had the highest lost-time rate (174 
injuries per 10,000 full-time workers) of any US 
industry sector.15 
 Studies of non-fatal construction-related con-
tact injuries (that is, injuries in which a worker is 
struck by an object or a piece of equipment) treat-
ed in emergency departments during the period 
1998–2005 found that contact injuries accounted 
for over half of all construction injuries treated in 
emergency departments.16,17 The most common 
injuries were due to contact with discharged nails 
from pneumatic nail guns, hand-held power saws, 
and fixed saws.16 Some injuries may involve mul-
tiple workers (e.g., trench cave-ins, collapses of 
walls, roofs, or scaffolding of buildings under 
construction).16 Seven specific tools or pieces of 
equipment—ladders, nail guns, power saws, ham-
mers, knives, power drills, and welding tools—
were responsible for almost two-thirds of the 
injury burden in emergency departments.17
 Construction workers suffer not only occupa-
tional injuries, but also numerous occupational 
illnesses. Many of these illnesses are difficult to 
capture in statistics because of long latencies, as 
described below. 
 among the many trades and occupations in-
volved in the construction industry roofers, along 
with structural iron and steel workers, were the 
trade groups suffering from both the highest rates 
and largest numbers of fatal injuries in 2008.8 
Construction laborers were the largest group 
suffering from non-fatal injuries in 2008.15
injuries are not the only risk: occupational illnesses 
of construction workers
Several specific work-related diseases have been 
associated with working in the construction trades, 
including these:
• lung cancer among asbestos insulation work-
ers, roofers, welders, and woodworkers;3,18-21
• silicosis among sand blasters, tunnel builders, 
rock drill operators, masonry and concrete 
workers, and workers in other trades;3,13,18,22-31
• asbestosis and mesothelioma among asbestos 
insulation workers, steam pipe fitters, building 
demolition workers, and sheet metal  
workers;3,13,20,32-35
• chronic obstructive pulmonary disease (CoPD) 
among cement masons, brick masons, plaster-
ers, sheet metal workers, and welders;13,21,36,37
• skin diseases among laborers who work with 
cement or concrete, masons, tile setters, terrazzo 
workers, painters, and others;3,38-45 and 
• neurologic disorders among painters,  
welders and other workers exposed to organic 
solvents and metals (e.g., lead, chromium, 
manganese).3,13,46-52 
In	the	united	states,	the	construction	industry	
consistently	accounts	for	the	largest	number	of	
total	fatalities	of	any	industrial	sector.	
Source: CPWR - The Center for Construction Research and Training. The Construction Chart Book. 2008. Chart 36c, p36. 
F iGure  1
Leading causes of work-related deaths in construction, 
1992–2005. 
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Welch and colleagues have examined in some depth 
the risk of asbestos-related lung disease among 
sheet metal workers, studying more than 18,000 
workers with more than 20 years’ work experience 
who had been screened between 1986 and 2004.35 
at the first screening, almost 10 percent had as-
bestosis and 21 percent had scarring of the pleura 
(the lining of the lungs). a second exam, given an 
average of 10 years later to those with no evidence 
of asbestos-related lung disease on first exam, 
found that more than 5 percent had developed as-
bestosis and more than 12 percent had developed 
the study showed that construction workers are at 
significant musculoskeletal injury risk.53 The evi-
dence review included the following data sources: 
(1) historical evidence; (2) injury data (e.g., BLS 
data); (3) workers’ compensation data; (4) medi-
cal exam data; (5) worker symptom survey data (e.g., 
national Health Interview Survey data); and (6) 
job exposure analysis data.53 
 In the ergonomics case study of this publica-
tion, we present the BLS 2008 data on the top five 
occupational groups for musculoskeletal disorders 
(see Table 1 of the case entitled When My Job Breaks My 
Back: Shouldering the Burden of Work-Related Musculoskeletal 
Disorders).15 The construction and extraction occu-
pations were among the top five groups. overex-
ertion is the leading cause of musculoskeletal dis-
orders (MSDs) in construction.14 For construction 
and extraction occupations, the 2008 BLS data 
indicated that arm and shoulder MSDs resulted in 
the highest number of days away from work in 
construction.15 However, the incidence rate per 
10,000 full-time workers in construction and ex-
traction occupations was higher for back injuries 
than for injuries of any upper extremity (arm, 
shoulder, hand, wrist, and finger) or lower ex-
tremity (knee, ankle, foot, toe).15 Each day, con-
struction workers lift materials repeatedly, lift and 
twist at the same time, bend over for long periods 
of time, perform sudden movements, and are ex-
posed to whole-body vibration—all these are com-
mon causes of back injuries and illnesses.14 Figure 
2 illustrates the rate of back injuries and illnesses 
per 10,000 full-time workers in selected con-
struction occupations in 2005. 
 Ergonomic risk factors are present in all con-
struction trades, but increased risk of specific MSDs 
is associated with certain occupations.14,53-58 Figure 
2 indicates that laborers are at the greatest risk of 
back injuries and illnesses.14 The Chartbook of the 
CPWR (The Center for Construction Research 
and Training, formerly the Center to Protect 
Workers’ Rights) points out that laborers are also 
at the greatest risk for overexertion injuries.14 
 Hartmann documented that scaffolders, brick-
layers, and carpenters regularly handle heavy weights, 
with resulting excessive pressure on the back.59 and 
bricklaying required bent postures during as much 
as 35 percent of daily worktime. Painters, plumbers, 
and carpenters worked frequently in kneeling 
C aS E  S T UDy  4 :  injuries Are not Accidents
Source: CPWR - The Center for Construction Research and Training.  
The Construction Chart Book. 2008. Chart 16b, p16. 
F iGure  2
rate of back injuries and illnesses per 10,000 full-time (Ft)   
workers with days away from work, by selected construction  
occupation in 2005. 
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pleural scarring.35 Lead poisoning has been docu-
mented not only among painters but also among 
building finishing workers, street and bridge re-
habilitation workers, and utilities workers.3,13,46-48 
asthma, neurological disorders (e.g., manganese-
induced Parkinsonism), and cancer have been 
documented among welders, who are exposed to a 
variety of metal fumes, including manganese and 
iron.49-52 
Musculoskeletal disorders
Schneider carried out a comprehensive review of 
musculoskeletal injury evidence in construction—
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postures. In addition, painters often worked with 
their arms overhead.59 overhead drilling into 
concrete or metal is one of the most physically de-
manding tasks: the work is done with heavy, rotary 
impact hammer drills.60 Workers who drill into 
concrete or metal ceilings suffer pain and MSDs 
at the wrist, forearm, shoulder, and back due to 
high forces and non-neutral shoulder and wrist 
postures.60,61 
How much do construction injuries cost? 
In 2009, the construction industry constituted 
about 4 percent of the total gross domestic prod-
uct in the United States. The proportion declined 
steadily from 2006 to 2009 with the slowdown of 
residential and building construction.62 Various 
researchers have attempted to estimate how much 
construction injuries cost.63,64-67 For example, the 
2008 Chartbook from CPWR provides a useful 
summary of costs of work-related injuries and ill-
nesses in the construction sector.14 Calculating an 
accurate cost estimate for injuries and illnesses is 
difficult. While certain aspects can be calculated 
rather easily (e.g., wage replacement, workers’ com-
pensation costs, medical payments, or production 
losses), other aspects (e.g., the victim’s and family’s 
suffering) are very hard to capture in numbers.14 
Many costs are not compensated, partly because 
they are difficult to link to specific work exposures. 
Construction workers may serve several employers 
—even within a single year—and perhaps have 
dozens of employers over their careers.14 In addi-
tion, occupational illnesses (e.g., noise-induced 
hearing loss, cancers, neurological disorders) are 
usually identified long after the start of the expo-
sure and thus may not be successfully linked to a 
work-related exposure and then compensated. 
MSDs can be classified either as illnesses due to 
Personal protective equipment should  
not be the only solution for protecting  
construction workers’ safety and health.
©
 2
0
1
0
 Earl D
otter
64  |  Lowell Center for Sustainable Production  |  University of Massachusetts Lowell Lessons Learned: Solutions for Workplace Safety and Health  |  65
repeated trauma (e.g., carpal tunnel syndrome and 
tendinitis) or as injuries due to sprains and strains 
(e.g., back injuries).14,53 Finally, about one-fourth 
of the construction workforce is self-employed, 
and most of these self-employed workers are not 
covered by workers’ compensation, so that work-
ers’ compensation costs are not captured.63
 CPWR estimated the total cost of fatal and non-
fatal injuries in the construction industry at nearly 
$13 billion annually.14,c This is intended to cap-
ture direct costs (medical payments), indirect costs 
(wage losses, household production losses, costs of 
administering workers’ compensation), as well as 
quality-of-life costs (pain and suffering of vic-
tims and their families). Deaths are estimated 
to represent 40 percent of the total cost, and non-
fatal injuries and illnesses the rest.14 The death 
of a construction worker is estimated to cost $4 
million in losses; a nonfatal injury costs approxi-
mately $42,000.14
 Waehrer and colleagues developed a cost model 
based on fatal and non-fatal injuries in the con-
struction industry, its subsectors, and 50 con-
struction occupations, seeking to capture quality-
of-life costs along with direct and indirect 
costs.64,65 The total cost of fatal and nonfatal inju-
ries was estimated at $11.5 billion, representing 15 
tion laborers amounted to almost $2.1 billion, 
and to carpenters, about $1.6 billion.65
 Horowitz and McCall examined all accepted 
workers’ compensation claims by oregon con-
struction employees (n = 20,680) during the 
period 1990-2007.66 over 50 percent of claims 
were filed by workers under 35 years old and with 
less than one year on the job. The average claim 
cost was $10,084 and the mean time period (i.e., 
mean indemnity time) for which a worker received 
the compensation was 57.3 days.66 Structural met-
al workers had the highest average days of indem-
nity (72.1), the highest average costs per claim 
($16,472), and the highest injury share of all con-
struction trades examined.66 
immigrant construction workers  
and the nature of their work 
The US construction sector is characterized by a 
multi-ethnic workforce. In 2008, almost 25 per-
cent of construction workers were foreign born.68 
In 2007, more than four-fifths of foreign-born 
workers originated from either Mexico (59 percent) 
or another Latin american country (25 percent).68 
 The share of workers who are Hispanic is greater 
than 40 percent in drywall installation, roofing, 
and concrete work, and among laborers (Figure 
3). The total number of Hispanic construction 
workers increased rapidly from 705,000 in 1990 
to nearly 3 million in 2007, but dropped sharply 
during 2007-2008 due to the economic down-
turn.14 
 In 2008, 11 percent of Hispanic workers in the 
construction trades belonged to a union, com-
pared to 18 percent of non-Hispanic workers. 
Hispanic union members made $7.60 more per 
hour than their non-union counterparts; how-
ever, Hispanic construction workers continue to 
make less than their white non-Hispanic counter-
parts, in both union and non-union jobs. also, 
the highest paid construction trades have fewer 
Hispanic workers.
 Evidence indicates that Hispanic construction 
workers are more likely to suffer fatal and non-fatal 
injuries than their white non-Hispanic co-work-
ers.69,70 During 1992-2006, fatal falls accounted 
C aS E  S T UDy  4 :  injuries Are not Accidents
c  CPWR estimates in this paragraph are all based on the 2002 dollar value.
the	total	cost	of	fatal	and	nonfatal	injuries		
was	estimated	to	be	$11.5	billion.	
percent of all injury costs for private industry.64 
The average cost per case of fatal or nonfatal injury 
was estimated at $27,000 in 2002, significantly 
higher than the cost per case of $15,000 for all 
industries in 2002.64 
 Construction laborers and carpenters ranked 
the highest in costs for both fatal and nonfatal in-
juries. They account for 40 percent of all the con-
struction industry costs.65 The costs of fatal inju-
ries for construction laborers and carpenters were 
more than $1.2 billion and $376 million, respec-
tively. The costs of nonfatal injuries to construc-
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for nearly 40 percent of all deaths of Hispanic 
construction workers, compared to 31 percent for 
white non-Hispanics.13,68,71 Furthermore, Dong 
and colleagues showed that Hispanic workers were 
53 percent more likely to have medical conditions 
resulting from work-related injuries than their 
white non-Hispanic counterparts, but 48 percent 
less likely to receive payment for medical costs from 
workers’ compensation.63 The average medical 
cost per injury was about $210 more (12.4 percent 
higher) for Hispanic construction workers than 
for white non-Hispanic workers.63
 new immigrant workers—in particular undoc-
umented workers—experience communication, 
legal, and cultural barriers to understanding and 
exercising their workplace rights.63 Many undocu-
mented immigrant workers are day laborers hired 
from street corners. They are often employed in 
dangerous conditions and afraid to speak up for 
their rights for fear of possible retaliation.72,73 
Undocumented day laborers have few job alterna-
tives because of their lack of work authorization, 
weak English, relative youth, limited formal edu-
cation, and lack of job experience.72 The majority 
are hired by non-union residential construction 
contractors or directly by landlords/homeowners 
to carry out tasks such as roofing (e.g., carrying 
shingles up to the roof), demolition, drywall in-
stallation, painting, and repairs carried out on 
ladders or scaffolds.72 These employers have typi-
cally little awareness of occupational safety and 
health concerns and rarely use measures to prevent 
injuries and illnesses (e.g., guard rails and other 
fall prevention systems, training, personal protec-
tive equipment).72 
Government action 
Since the passage of the oSHact, oSHa has de-
veloped and adopted a number of standards for 
the construction sector. Most recently, in 2010 
oSHa issued the Final Rule on Cranes and Der-
ricks in Construction and also proposed a rule 
on Walking-Working Surfaces and Personal Pro-
tective Equipment (Fall Protection Systems) to 
prevent injuries from slips, trips and falls.74,75 
Furthermore, oSHa has suggested changes in the 
oSHact’s General Duty Clause that would extend 
an employer’s general duty to protect employees 
from recognized hazards beyond protecting its 
own employees to protecting contract employees 
as well.76 These and other key events in the history 
of occupational safety and health in the construc-
tion industry are listed in the timeline that appears 
at the end of this case study. 
tackling enforcement challenges:  
oSHA’s focused inspections 
Currently, oSHa has about 1,100 federal inspec-
tors and a considerable amount of their time is 
devoted to monitoring safety and health condi-
tions in the construction sector.77 The number of 
construction inspections dropped in the mid-
1990s and has been increasing slightly since 1997. 
However, the total number of inspections per-
formed in 2006 is about 26 percent lower than 
in 1988.14 at the same time, the number of con-
struction establishments increased about 47 per-
cent from 1987 to 2005.14 Further, the dynamic 
nature of construction work creates enforcement 
Source: CPWR—The Center for Construction Research and Training.  
The Construction Chart Book. 2008. Chart 41d, p41.
F iGure  3
Percent of workers who are Hispanic in selected trades in 2007.
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Hispanic	construction	workers	are	more	likely		 	
to	suffer	fatal	and	non-fatal	injuries	than	their	
white	non-Hispanic	co-workers.	
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challenges that are different from those in a fixed 
manufacturing location.4 
 Since 1994, oSHa has been carrying out a 
“focused” inspection program in the construction 
industry—looking only at the four leading hazards 
(falls, struck-by, caught-in-between, and electro-
cutions).11 To qualify for a focused inspection, a 
contractor must have established an effective safe-
ty and health program.11 In 2006, 6 percent of 
oSHa construction inspections were classified 
as “focused.”14 The focused inspection approach 
enables inspectors to target their efforts on sites 
that are likely to be more hazardous. They are thus 
able to conduct more comprehensive inspections 
at these sites. 
national safety and health priorities  
in the uS construction industry 
Through the national occupational Research agenda 
of the national Institute for occupational Safety 
and Health (nIoSH),10 various stakeholders in 
the construction sector have developed the national 
Construction agenda. The agenda consists of 15 
occupational safety and health priorities to guide 
the research community and industry in address-
ing recognized challenges (Table 1).1
 Resources are needed not only for the 15 pri-
orities on the national Construction agenda, but 
also for recently designated emerging issues rele-
vant to construction workers’ safety and health. 
Gillen & Gittleman have reviewed and highlighted 
the following emerging issues:78
•	 climate change and energy considerations, in-
cluding not only green construction develop-
ments and opportunities but also work-related 
heat hazards among construction workers (e.g., 
heat stress/stroke, air pollution, vector-borne 
diseases, and extreme weather events).
unions play an important role in  
safety and health training, information,  
advocacy, and support for immigrant  
construction workers.
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•	 potential hazards from the use of new materi-
als, in particular nanomaterials or lightweight 
composites. one such example is titanium di-
oxide nanoparticles, which are added to cement 
to break down organic pollutants via catalytic 
reactions—this allows concrete to retain its 
whiteness and resist staining. also, nanoscale 
silica is added to cement to improve particle 
packing, increasing the cement density struc-
ture, improving the mechanical properties of 
the cement.
•	 changes in industry structure and practice to 
address safety more efficiently. The construc-
tion industry’s highly complex structure in-
cludes multiple layers of organizations and dis-
ciplines simultaneously performing specialized 
tasks. The communication challenges and self-
interests of these multiple entities can adversely 
affect both safety planning and safety program 
implementation, as well as business innovation 
in general. More integrated delivery of con-
struction and expanded early engagement of all 
project stakeholders are needed. For example, 
the architecture community is developing new 
“integrated practice” approaches to address 
these limitations and inefficiencies. 
•	 changes in the makeup of the workforce, in-
cluding the greater presence of immigrant 
workers and the aging of the workforce. 
•	 underreporting of injuries as well as shifting 
costs and other burdens from the employer to 
workers’ families, health insurance, social ser-
vices, and future employers.
•	 understanding the root causes of illnesses and 
injuries, and in particular understanding the 
connections among the causal factors and pro-
cesses involved in incidents.
Fifteen priorities reflected in strategic goals set by the national Construction 
Agenda to improve construction workers’ safety and health10
t A B L e  1
reduce traumatic injury/events
•	 Falls 
•	 Electrocution 
•	 Struck-by hazards
reduce other health hazards and their impacts
•	 Noise and hearing loss
•	 Silica exposures and associated illnesses 
•	 Welding fumes and associated illnesses 
•	 Ergonomic factors and associated musculoskeletal disorders 
Address contributing factors
•	 Modify construction culture
•	 Implement construction safety and health management systems
•	 Improve understanding of organizational factors in causing injury and illness 
•	 Implement construction hazards prevention through design (CHPtD)
•	 Enhance training and education 
•	 reduce disparities in health and safety in construction 
•	 Improve surveillance of hazards and outcomes 
•	 Engage the media to raise awareness and improve safety and health in construction 
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L e S S o n S  L e a r n e d
Four key strategies emerge from our analysis of construction safety and health: (1) implementing management systems in construction safety and 
health; (2) implementing construction hazards preven-
tion through design (CHPtD); (3) enhancing training 
and other supports for immigrant construction workers; 
and (4) engaging the media to raise awareness and im-
prove safety and health in construction.  
need for an occupational safety and health  
management systems approach
a complex, very hazardous, dynamic, and fast-paced in-
dustry needs a comprehensive and systematic oSH solu-
tion. one of the best such approaches is an occupational 
safety and health management system (oSH-MS). an 
oSH-MS encompasses every critical function through 
the plan–do–check–act cycle: workplace policy planning 
and set-up, implementation and operation of the sys-
tem, evaluation of the system, and continual improve-
ment of oSH performance. oSHa qualifies for focused 
inspections those construction contractors that have a 
comprehensive oSH program (i.e., an oSH-MS) in 
place at their sites.
 Without an oSH-MS, many companies (and not only 
in the construction field) approach safety and health 
sporadically. Some corrective action might be taken when 
serious incidents occur, but these actions rarely tackle 
root causes or aim toward continual improvement. all 
too often, incident reporting and tracking are not taken 
seriously. It is tempting to cut corners when facing dead-
lines. Even when programs are established at worksites, 
their goal often seems to be compliance with a certain 
standard rather than preventing and minimizing as many 
hazards as possible.79 
 Management systems have been gaining in popularity 
ever since the International organization for Standard-
ization (ISo) passed its Quality Management 9000 Series 
(in 1986) and its Environmental Management 14000 
Series (in 1996).80 oSH was seen as a logical component 
of both these ISo standards.80 Since then, various 
frameworks have been developed worldwide, including 
the International Guidelines for occupational Safety 
and Health Management Systems under the leadership 
of the International Labour organization (ILo) in 
2001 (Figure 4).81 In 1988, the ILo adopted its Safety 
and Health in Construction Convention (no.167), 
which has been ratified by 24 countries to date.82,d
 In the United States, oSHa proposed a safety and 
health program rule in 1998 but it was withdrawn in 
2002.83 In 2005, the american national Standards In-
stitute (anSI) adopted an oSH-MS consensus stan-
dard.79 The anSI oSH-MS standard was developed 
by a committee of more than 40 oSH specialists rep-
resenting industry, labor, government, and others.79 
The committee was known as the Z10 committee, and 
hence the standard is generally known as anSI Z10.  To 
date, many companies have successfully implemented 
d  The United States has not ratified the ILO’s Safety and Health in Construction Convention (No. 167, 1988). The only ILO Convention related to occupational safety and health that the  
United States has ratified (in 2001) is the Safety and Health in Mines Convention (No. 176. 1995).
Source:  International Labour Organization. Guidelines on occupational 
Safety and Health Management Systems (ILO-OSH 2001). Figure 2, p5.
F iGure  4
Main elements of the oSH management system  
of the international Labour organization  
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construction safety and health management systems (see 
sidebar, A success story). 
Sustaining the Construction Hazard Prevention 
through design (CHPtd) movement
In 2007, nIoSH established a national initiative called 
Prevention through Design (PtD).85 In all business deci-
sions, the PtD approach emphasizes the importance of 
designing out, or at least minimizing, occupational haz-
ards early in the design stage to prevent occupational in-
juries and illnesses. The first step for the PtD launch was 
the 2007 national Workshop, at which stakeholders 
from eight sectors—including construction—convened to 
formulate the PtD strategy.85 Construction Hazard Pre-
vention through Design (CHPtD) is a procedure in 
which construction engineers and architects consider the 
safety of construction workers as they design a facility.86  
 CHPtD has been recognized and implemented inter-
nationally as a feasible method to reduce occupational 
hazards in construction—in particular in the United 
kingdom (Uk) and australia.87 In 1995, the Uk passed a 
law requiring architects and construction engineers to 
incorporate CHPtD when designing facilities.86 In contrast, 
in the United States, many professional organizations 
were not aware of the nIoSH PtD initiative in 2007. 
 In all countries, there seem to be similar challenges in 
implementing CHPtD, such as designers’ lack of safety 
expertise and additional costs,86 but in the United States 
A success story: one corporation’s construction safety  
and health management system84
a s a result of a partnership between aMEC Construction Management, Inc., and oSHa—a partnership that originated in Calumet City, Illinois—comprehensive safety and health management systems have 
been developed and implemented at participating aMEC job sites. The management systems include 
these core elements: (1) management leadership and employee involvement; (2) worksite analysis; (3) hazard 
prevention and control; and (4) safety and health training. For example, the following activities have been 
undertaken at the sites: 
•	 safety and health orientation training for new employees;
•	 daily safety site audits and weekly hazard assessments, including identification and correction of hazards;
•	 weekly mandatory safety tool-box talks to review the results of the site’s safety audits and hazard assess-
ments; and 
•	 investigation of near-miss incidents. 
To date, over 2,000 employees have received training through the toolbox talks and new employee ori- 
entations. Since the partnership began in april 2002, the overall rate of recordable case incidents for par-
ticipating aMEC subcontractors declined from 9.1 in 2002 to 2.8 in 2004, a 69 percent reduction. 
aMEC’s 2004 case incident rate of 2.8 is 59 percent below the 2002 non-residential construction industry 
national average of 6.9 case incidents.
construction	Hazard	Prevention	
through	design	(cHPtd)	is	a		
procedure	in	which	construction		
engineers	and	architects	consider		 	
the	safety	of	construction	workers		 	
as	they	design	a	facility.
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there are some distinct concerns in moving the CHPtD 
effort further. The most important of these is US archi-
tects’ and engineers’ fear of liability for not following 
standard practices. In contrast, in the United kingdom 
and australia, liability is less of a concern because of leg-
islative requirements for safety. The construction sector 
stakeholders in the national Workshop developed seven 
recommendations to sustain CHPtD in the United States 
(see sidebar).87  
 Research has identified three distinct benefits of 
CHPtD: (1) Project decisions that dramatically influence 
project safety occur early in the project, and are usually 
made by designers and owners. (2) Since many construc-
tion hazards are associated with forces, stresses, dynamic 
motion, and electricity, it would clearly be beneficial to 
include site safety in design decisions (e.g., regarding 
soil cave-ins, the safety of cranes, and protection from 
falls). (3) Engaging all parties in worker safety is impor-
tant for both symbolic reasons and for making better 
plans.86 
 Emerging issues in the national Construction agen-
da (listed above) are particularly relevant to CHPtD.78 
There are recommendations to incorporate CHPtD in 
the US Green Building Council’s (USGBC’s) Leader-
ship in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) 
movement.87 The LEED structure has faced criticism for 
not addressing the safety of construction workers. It is 
vital that green building and sustainability practices—
such as LEED—incorporate prevention of injuries, ill-
nesses, and fatalities during construction.78,87 
 For example, the use of skylights is increasing—and 
as a green construction and energy conservation mea-
sure, this is a good thing. However, falls through fragile 
skylights have resulted in death or serious injury to 
construction workers. Design solutions that protect 
against the risk of falls through skylights during con-
struction, maintenance, and demolition activities in-
clude the following:88 
•	 use of non-fragile skylights that withstand the live load 
associated with a construction or maintenance worker 
inadvertently stepping on or falling on a skylight;
•	 installation of a permanent guard or screen over each 
skylight to handle heavy loads; 
•	 installation of temporary guardrails around the peri-
meter of a skylight installation area; and 
•	 upgrading of fragile existing skylights by installing 
permanent guards or screens (the latter are recom-
mended for plastic dome skylights and light-trans-
mitting panels because they can degrade over time). 
oSH training, advocacy, and community support  
to protect immigrant construction workers
The construction sector employs a particularly vulnerable 
population of immigrant workers. Immigrant workers 
need proper safety equipment, safe tools and materials, 
and training in a language they understand. Further, it is 
essential that immigrant workers neither fear to report 
nor hesitate to report concerns about workplace oSH 
problems to oSHa.89 
Seven recommendations to sustain 
CHPtd in the united States87 
1.  Gather, combine, and share programs, 
checklists, best practices,…customized by type 
of construction and firm size.
2.  Develop case studies for owners and designers.
3.  Clarify liability issues with insurers and   
attorneys to distinguish between real versus 
perceived liability.
4.  Create PtD education for continuing   
education units (CEUs) that are required  
for Professional Engineer and Registered 
architect certification renewals in some states.
5. Develop consensus PtD standards (anSI, 
building code, etc.) to define PtD and the 
PtD process.
6. apply LEED/sustainability experiences  to 
spread PtD.
7.  Collaborate with and educate key profes-
sional organizations (american Institute of 
architects, Construction Industry Institute, 
and Construction Users Roundtable).
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 The significance of training cannot be over empha-
sized, and there is evidence that proper training reduces 
work injuries. a study by Sokas and colleagues found sig-
nificant improvements in oSH knowledge and attitudes, 
as well as improvements in practices on the job, three 
months after a 10-hour oSH awareness class among 
both US-born and Mexican-born union construction 
workers.90 another study, by Williams and colleagues, 
showed that participatory training emphasizing active 
problem solving not only encourages workers to protect 
themselves but also equips workers with the knowledge 
they need to make informed decisions on work assign-
ments and work practices.72 Despite economic barriers, 
limited formal education, undocumented status, and 
limited control over their work environment, Hispanic 
day laborers are receptive to oSH training and to pro-
tecting themselves and co-workers on the job.72 In addi-
tion to training, community support remains crucial for 
offering a public voice for immigrant labor. Researchers 
at the University of Massachusetts Lowell have developed 
educational and training materials especially for Hispanic 
workers, including materials for the oSHa 10-hour 
construction training program (see sidebar, Hispanics Work 
Safe Project). 
the media’s role in improving safety 
Schneider and Check have analyzed the vital role of the 
media in preventing construction-related injuries. Changes 
in legislation, regulations, other policies, and work prac-
tices can all be promoted through the media, with a pos-
itive effect on construction workers’ lives.92 There are 
two major challenges in current media reporting: (1) 
The news media tend to cover catastrophic incidents 
(e.g., involving cranes) in which several workers die at 
once, whereas individual fatalities rarely receive cover-
age. (2) There is no in-depth focus on the “why and 
how” of the incident. Instead, the media often portray 
construction injuries and fatalities as unpreventable trage-
dies.92 These authors emphasized that these challenges 
present an opportunity for safety and health profession-
als to: (1) encourage news media to provide deeper, more 
sustained coverage of construction injuries; and (2) pro-
vide data, insights, and expertise that will help reporters 
and editors to do so. Schneider and Check have provided 
examples of extraordinary in-depth media reporting of 
construction-related injuries—for example, alexandra 
Berzon’s coverage in the Las Vegas Sun of 11 fatalities among 
construction workers within 17 months on Las Vegas’ 
gigantic CityCenter and Cosmopolitan construction 
projects.93 Berzon’s coverage revealed the patterns, root 
causes, and potential solutions of the safety problems 
that led to these fatalities.92 Furthermore, it raised aware-
ness of construction safety among the public and policy-
makers, resulting in changes across the entire Las Vegas 
construction industry.92  
Final thoughts
This case study has provided an overview of the highly 
hazardous construction sector and recommended an oc-
cupational safety and health management system (oSH-
MS) approach as the most important key to improving 
Hispanics Work Safe Project91
H ispanics Work Safe materials include lin-guistically and culturally appropriate training 
modules on construction safety and health, each 
with three basic components: (1) a description of 
the most dangerous tasks; (2) identification of 
the hazards associated with these hazardous tasks; 
and (3) recommended methods of controlling 
and reducing the identified hazards. an impor-
tant training component is an introductory 
30-minute lecture (“Welcome, Hispanic Work-
er!”), which focuses on the following topics: Why 
is this training important? What are we going to 
learn? How can we take advantage of the training 
and translate the knowledge acquired into our 
own daily work practices? all participants receive 
a training manual and a set of educational mate-
rials. Upon successful completion of the 10-hour 
course, the participants receive an oSHa 10-
hour card, a document that is mandatory for em-
ployment in construction in a number of states, 
including Massachusetts.
72  |  Lowell Center for Sustainable Production  |  University of Massachusetts Lowell Lessons Learned: Solutions for Workplace Safety and Health  |  73
C aS E  S T UDy  4 :  injuries Are not Accidents
L e S S o n S  L e a r n e d
safety in construction. Issuing a national oSH-MS frame-
work for the construction sector should not be an im-
possible task. In fact, models already exist, including 
oSHa’s Draft Proposed Safety and Health Program 
Rule of 1998, ILo-oSH 2001, and anSI Z10. 
 It is also vital to keep the momentum going on Con-
struction Hazard Prevention through Design (CHPtD). 
The stakeholders who participated in the national PtD 
Workshop felt strongly that a government regulation on 
CHPtD is not a viable short-term strategy—but that it is 
important for governmental agencies to continue lead-
ing the CHPtD movement. CHPtD is also an avenue to 
incorporate construction workers’ safety and health in 
green building and other sustainability programs.  
 It is critical to identify ways to reduce the growing 
number of fatal and non-fatal injuries among immi-
grant workers, in particular among day laborers. Work-
place training and community support are among the 
most important interventions. oSH interventions 
grounded in partnerships with community-based orga-
nizations can offer successful strategies for reaching out 
to immigrant workers, understanding their needs, and 
developing solutions based on those needs. 
 The potential exists to improve construction workers’ 
safety and health by highlighting fundamental issues 
through in-depth reporting by the traditional media, as 
well as through internet-based and social media. To en-
able reporters and editors to provide deeper, more sus-
tained coverage of oSH matters in construction—with 
adequate data, insights, and expertise—the construction 
oSH community must develop relationships with media 
outlets. as a result of this kind of networking, the news 
media will become less likely to cover only catastrophic 
incidents or leave the false impression that construction 
injuries are unpreventable tragedies. 
 We started this case study by describing a struck-by 
fatality, documented by nIoSH-FaCE Program.1 How 
can occurrences similar to this collision fatality be 
prevented? The nIoSH investigators developed four 
recommendations for employers to prevent similar inci-
dents (see sidebar).1,e 
 In addition to the four recommendations for employ-
ers, the nIoSH investigators recommended a specific 
Prevention-through-Design (PtD) action for manufac-
turers of equipment (e.g., bulldozers): “manufacturers 
of heavy equipment should explore the possibility of in-
corporating collision avoidance technology in their 
the	media	often	portray		
construction	injuries	and	fatalities		
as	unpreventable	tragedies.	
e  The NIOSH-FACE report offers more detailed discussion of each recommendation at http://www.cdc.gov/niosh/face/In-house/full200511.html.
nioSH-FACe Program  
recommendations for employers  
to prevent collisions1
•	 Develop, implement, and enforce a policy 
that requires workers on foot to maintain a 
safe clearance from mobile equipment and 
train all workers regarding this policy.
•	 Develop, implement, and enforce a policy 
that requires mobile equipment operators to 
operate mobile equipment in accordance with 
safety guidance provided in the equipment 
operator’s manual and provide additional 
training to all mobile equipment operators 
regarding this policy.
•	 Consider conducting a pre-work safety meet-
ing each day to discuss the work to be per-
formed, potential safety hazards and safe work 
procedures, and means to be used for com-
municating changes to the work plan. 
•	 Ensure that personal protective equipment, 
including high-visibility clothing, is provided 
and used in accordance with company policy.
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equipment.”1	 Radio frequency identification (RFID) 
tags and tag readers are one such collision warning tech-
nology: each worker on foot wears a small RFID tag, each 
piece of mobile equipment is equipped with a tag reader, 
and the equipment operator receives a warning when a 
tag is sensed.1,94 
 oSHa and nIoSH are part of the Roadway Work 
Zone Safety and Health alliance, which includes these six 
other partners from the employers’ and employees’ or-
ganizations: american Road and Transportation Builders 
association (aRTBa), associated General Contractors 
of america (aGC), International Union of operating 
Engineers (IUoE), Laborers’ International Union of 
north america (LIUna), LIUna Education and Train-
ing Fund, and national asphalt Pavement association 
(naPa).95 The alliance provides construction industry 
employers, workers (including Spanish-speaking and 
other high-risk or hard-to-reach workers), and others 
with information, guidance, and training resources spe-
cifically to reduce and prevent exposures to roadway work 
zone safety and health hazards (e.g. flagger safety, safer 
deployment of traffic control and direction devices, safer 
night work precautions, work zone speeding control as 
well as runover/ backover control).95 The national Work 
Zone Safety Information Clearinghouse is located at 
http://www.workzonesafety.org—many tools and documents 
developed by the alliance are at this site.
 an important overall strategy to prevent collisions in 
worksites is an Internal Traffic Control Plan to design 
worksite traffic patterns in such a way that the amount of 
vehicle backing is reduced and the exposure of workers 
on foot to vehicles is minimized.96  Collisions happen in 
part because of limited visibility around the equipment.97 
nIoSH has developed blind zone analysis diagrams for 
various types of construction equipment.97
Falls are the most  
frequent cause of fatal 
injuries among construction 
workers in the united  
States.
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1971 The first oSHa standards are published in the Federal register on May 29, 1971, including 
those for construction. Safety and health standards for the construction industry are found 
in “Part 1926” under Title 29 of the Code of Federal regulations (CFr).98 
1973 The advisory Committee on Construction Safety and Health (aCCSH) is established to advise 
oSHa on setting construction standards and policy matters.99
1978 at the construction site for a power plant in Willow Island, West Virginia, scaffolding around 
the cooling tower collapses, killing 51 workers.98
1978 In Bridgeport, Connecticut, the collapse of the L’ambiance Plaza building, under construction, 
kills 28 workers.98
1982 oSHa formally announces the Voluntary Protection Program (VPP) to recognize workplaces 
with exemplary safety and health management systems and designates the first VPP site.100
1986 The International Standardization organization adopts its Quality Management 9000  
Series.81
1988 The International Labour organization (ILo) adopts its Safety and Health in Construction 
Convention (No. 167, 1988).82
1989 oSHa issues its voluntary guidelines for safety and health program management.101 
1990s Several major construction safety and health standards are finalized.98
1994 oSHa begins its focused inspection initiative for contractors who have established and fully 
implemented a corporate safety and health program and site-specific plans. 11
1996 The International Standardization organization adopts its Environmental Management 
14000 Series.81 
1998 oSHa proposes its occupational safety and health program rule (29 CFr 1900.1). The rule 
will be withdrawn in 2002.102
2001 The ILo adopts the International Guidelines for occupational Safety and Health Management 
Systems, known as ILo-oSH 2001.81 
2001 The World Trade Center attack results in a massive “worksite,” where intensive rescue  
efforts in the midst of unprecedented hazards are followed by more than eight months  
of demolition and cleanup, and eventually by reconstruction.98 
2002 oSHa launches its alliance Program, which brings oSHa together with businesses, trade  
or professional organizations, unions, and educational institutions.98
2005 The american National Standards Institute adopts an occupational safety and health  
management system consensus standard, known as aNSI Z-10. 80
2007 NIoSH establishes its national initiative, Prevention through Design (PtD) that focuses on  
designing out or minimizing occupational hazards and risks early in the design of technology.85
2007 on august 1, the I-35W Bridge in Minneapolis, Minnesota, collapses, killing 13 people and 
injuring 98. a construction worker was among those killed.98
2007-2008 Eleven construction workers die within 17 months in CityCenter and Cosmopolitan  
construction projects in Las Vegas.92 
2008-2009 Construction accounts for the largest number of work-related fatalities and ranks as the 
fourth highest for non-fatal serious injuries.
2010 oSHa issues a final rule on updating the standard for cranes and derricks in construction.75
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NIoSH estimates  
20,000 cancer deaths  
and 40,000 new cases  
of cancer per year  
can be attributed to  
exposures at work.  
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regulating Methylene Chloride: 
a Cautionary Tale about Setting Health Standards  
one Chemical at a Time 
Molly M. Jacobs, Joel Tickner, David Kriebel
on June 30, 2000 a 35-year-old female worker from a north Carolina cushion company was carried 
to the local emergency room because she could no longer walk without assistance.1 days before, 
headaches had progressed into severe numbness and burning sensations in her feet, legs, thighs, and 
lower back.1 
Her job at the cushion company was to glue foam cushion pieces together with a spray adhesive con-
taining 55 percent (by weight) 1-bromopropane, which had been introduced into the workplace not 
long before workers started to get sick.2 
one case of this neurological illness turned into many as similarly exposed and sick workers from 
other cushion manufacturing companies were reported.2 Months and years later, these workers’ neu-
rological symptoms still persist.1,3
the sad irony: the companies had switched to a 1-bromopropane-based adhesive in place of one 
containing methylene chloride in response to the occupational Safety and Health Administration’s new 
methylene chloride standard. 
How could a system of regulating toxic hazards to protect workers result in additional sick workers?
S
InCE THE EaRLIEST DayS oF THE 
occupational Safety and Health adminis-
tration (oSHa), the agency has realized 
the severe limitations of issuing regula-
tions substance by substance, and hazard 
by hazard. yet despite this understanding, oSHa 
regulates exposures to only a small fraction of the 
tens of thousands of chemicals on the market in 
the United States today. and the majority of exist-
ing health standards allow “acceptable” workplace 
exposures based on evidence from the 1950s, de-
spite scientific findings that reveal health effects at 
exposures well below current legal limits. 
 oSHa’s methylene chloride health standard is 
a success story: it is comprehensive in scope to 
protect workers, it survived legal challenges and a 
threatened Congressional review, and it is based 
on early signs of harm revealed by animal toxicol-
ogy studies. yet despite these successes, the methy-
lene chloride standard clearly reveals lessons 
learned about the politicization of science to 
delay regulation, the inherent dangers of a 
substance-by-substance system of regulating toxic 
hazards, and the missed opportunity for workplace 
health regulations to stimulate innovation of safer 
chemistries.
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oSHA’s standard setting: early attempts to 
remedy problems through substance-specific 
regulations
The primary mechanism that the 1970 occupa-
tional Safety and Health act (oSHact) established 
to protect workers was oSHa’s capacity to regulate 
through specific occupational health and safety 
standards. Section 6 (b)(5) of the oSHact specif-
ically addresses the need for oSHa, in regulating 
toxic materials or harmful physical agents, to pro-
mulgate the standard that “most adequately assures 
to the extent feasible, on the basis of the best avail-
able evidence, that no employee will suffer mate-
rial impairment of health or functional capacity 
even if such employee has regular exposure to the 
hazard dealt with by such standard for the period 
of his working life.”
 Those who drafted the law realized that if the 
oSHact was to effectively protect workers, it was 
imperative that oSHa quickly adopt existing na-
tional consensus limits or federal standards for 
exposures to chemical agents. Within one year of 
the oSHact’s passage, Permissible Exposure Lim-
its (PELs) for roughly 450 hazardous agents were 
established. These interim standards were based 
on assessments by a private professional organiza-
tion: the american Conference of Governmental 
Industrial Hygienists’ (aCGIH) 1968 threshold 
limit values (TLVs).4  Formal rulemaking ensued, 
and during the first years of oSHa, the agency 
devoted much of its resources to setting more 
comprehensive and permanent health standards 
for a number of occupational carcinogens, in-
cluding asbestos in 1972, vinyl chloride and a 
group of 14 other chemicals in 1974, coke oven 
emissions in 1976, and benzene, dibromochloro-
propane, inorganic arsenic, and acrylonitrile in 
1978.5  yet with a rate of roughly two final regula-
tions in the first nine years of the agency, oSHa 
quickly learned that issuing rules for hazardous 
chemicals one at a time could achieve only meager 
results in the context of the sheer number of 
chemicals to which workers were exposed.6 
Back in the day: oSHA tries (and fails) to regulate 
many carcinogens at once 
By the late 1970s, oSHa was under significant 
pressure by Congress, organized labor, and envi-
ronmental groups to speed up the standard-set-
ting process.7 With nearly a decade of experience, 
the agency had also reflected on the need to resolve 
and streamline decision-making for specific issues 
of science policy that were encountered repeatedly 
during public hearings for each proposed stan-
dard—and yet again in the courts as nearly every 
standard was subsequently challenged by industry.6 
Issues continually debated included, for example: 
(1) whether there is a threshold (no-effect) expo-
sure for carcinogenic effects of chemicals; (2) 
whether it’s possible to extrapolate from animal 
data to human risk; and (3) the importance of 
studies that demonstrate a health risk versus those 
that find no effect.6 as a result of these scientific 
challenges, oSHa issued its Generic Carcinogen 
Policy in 1980. 
 The preamble of the Generic Carcinogen Pol-
icy acknowledged that “to follow the past system 
and procedure for each and every individual sub-
stance and hazard would be, we believe, beyond 
the abilities of an agency, no matter how large a 
staff it may have.”8 To accelerate the rule-making 
process for carcinogens, the Generic Carcinogen 
Policy established binding scientific policy deter-
minations, regulatory procedures, and specific 
provisions that govern oSHa’s regulation of car-
cinogens.6 Priority was placed on issuing protective 
health regulations based on early evidence revealed 
through animal studies, rather than on waiting for 
conclusive epidemiologic studies documenting ef-
fects in humans. Moreover, positive study results 
(i.e., evidence demonstrating harm) were prioritized 
over negative results (i.e., evidence demonstrating 
no harm). Thus a key principle in the policy was 
prevention—an orientation consistent with oSHa’s 
highly protective mandate concerning worker 
health. as explained by oSHa, “To wait for years 
This case study examines our existing occupational health and safety system, which is meant to control and prevent exposures 
to hazardous substances on the job. We describe administrative and 
legal structures that have impeded oSHa’s attempt to expeditiously 
protect workers from exposures to chemicals, and we explore the 
agency’s methylene chloride standard to illustrate these lessons in 
more detail. 
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for science to provide further depth of under-
standing to the complex issues of cancer causation 
or cure, without having today some consistent and 
workable system for the reduction or prevention 
of human exposures to those toxic substances for 
which there is evidence of a carcinogenic potential 
to workers, would be inconsistent with oSHa’s 
statutory obligations and unacceptable to all.”9 
 The policy outlined a process for oSHa to 
screen candidate substances and to set priorities 
for regulation. For substances prioritized as high-
est-risk “Category 1 potential carcinogens,” a pri-
ority-setting mechanism was established whereby 
oSHa would select 10 substances for comprehen-
sive rule-making at any one time. For all Category 
I substances, oSHa would require the resulting 
permanent health standards to reduce exposure to 
the lowest feasible level.10 If there was a suitable 
substitute, no occupational exposure would be 
permitted.10 In 1980, oSHa issued a candidate 
list of 204 substances for further scientific review 
under the terms of the policy.10
threats to new and innovative chemicals policy:  
the uS Supreme Court’s Benzene decision and a 
new “deregulatory” philosophy
The Generic Carcinogen Policy had real potential 
to comprehensively address carcinogenic expo-
sures in workplaces and also to offer a prevention-
oriented model for accelerating standard setting 
for other toxic substances. It set in motion a gen-
eral policy that the only safe exposure to carcino-
gens was no exposure, and that the only factor that 
should limit efforts to reduce exposure was tech-
nological feasibility.
 However, the policy was weakened almost as 
soon as it began. a few months after the Generic 
Carcinogen Policy was established, the US Su-
preme Court issued what has become known as the 
Benzene Decision—a decision that dramatically 
affected oSHa’s ability to regulate hazards in the 
workplace. In this 1980 decision, the Supreme 
Court stated that before oSHa promulgates a 
permanent health standard, the Secretary of Labor 
is required to make a determination, first, that a 
workplace is unsafe due to the presence of a “sig-
nificant risk” to workers, and second, that this risk 
can be eliminated or lessened by the promulgation 
of a standard or a change in a standard.11 
 The Supreme Court offered general guidance 
for future oSHa rule-making by noting that the 
significant risk requirement is not meant to be a mathematical 
straightjacket and that responsibility fell on oSHa to 
determine what it considers to be a significant 
risk, based largely on policy considerations.11 The 
Court provided only one concrete example of sig-
nificant risk: “If the odds are one in a billion that 
a person will die from cancer by taking a drink of 
the	Generic	carcinogen	Policy	had	real	potential	
to	comprehensively	address	carcinogenic	exposures	
in	workplaces.	
chlorinated water, the risk clearly could not be 
considered significant. yet on the other hand, if 
the odds are one in a thousand that regular inhala-
tion of gasoline vapors that are two percent ben-
zene will be fatal, a reasonable person might well 
consider the risk significant and take appropriate 
steps to decrease or eliminate it.”11 With guidance 
to regulate risks somewhere in the range from one 
in one thousand to one in one billion, the Supreme 
Court gave oSHa broad discretion to determine 
how stringently to protect the health of workers 
from cancer risks considered significant. yet, sub-
sequent oSHa standards have tended to control 
exposures only to risks at the upper end of this 
range. What started with the new Reagan adminis-
tration’s interpretation of the Supreme Court 
ruling—that a significant occupational health risk 
is defined as one cancer death per 1,000 workers 
exposed to a specific agent over a lifetime—has 
defined oSHa’s own interpretation of acceptable 
risk levels ever since.12 
 Under the Generic Carcinogen Policy, signifi-
cant risk did not have to be demonstrated in order 
for oSHa’s Category I substances to be regulated 
to the lowest feasible PEL. However, the Benzene 
Decision opened the possibility that any subse-
quent rulemaking on these substances might be 
overturned by the courts. With a new Republican 
administration in the White House, the government 
decided not to pursue implementation of the 
policy and thereby risk legal challenge. 
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 In January 1981, oSHa published changes to 
the Generic Carcinogen Policy in response to the 
Benzene Decision.13 These changes modified the 
regulatory requirement for Category 1 substances 
such that exposure levels would be set on a sub-
stance-by-substance basis, considering the signif-
icance of the risk present and using all relevant 
evidence and statutory provisions. In 1983 oSHa 
issued a partial stay on the policy while it reviewed 
its criteria and process requirements for develop-
ing lists of chemicals considered candidates or 
priorities for regulation.14 oSHa announced its 
intent to revise the Generic Carcinogen Policy in 
1987, yet no substantive action was taken.15 Despite 
attempts by labor groups, industry groups, and 
the office of Management and Budget (oMB) to 
either revive or completely kill the policy, no ac-
tion was subsequently taken.7 oSHa still has the 
opportunity to revive this policy as an important 
model, moving the agency towards comprehen-
sively regulating known and suspected carcino-
gens. yet the requirements under the Benzene 
decision, despite attempts by oSHa to revise the 
policy accordingly, still remain one of the primary 
barriers.  
oSHA’s additional attempts to comprehensively and 
expeditiously regulate toxic chemical exposures
By the late 1980s, as oSHa approached its 20th 
birthday, the agency had established just 13 per-
manent standards covering 26 substances—efforts 
that significantly lagged behind progress by other 
organizations that evaluate health data and set ex-
posure limits. For example, by 1987 the aCGIH 
had set TLVs for 168 additional substances that 
were not regulated by oSHa.16 aCGIH also re-
vised downward 234 of the roughly 450 TLVs 
from the 1969 list that oSHa adopted into law in 
1971 based on more recent evidence of harm at 
lower exposure levels.16 
 Similarly, over this same period the national 
Institute for occupational Safety and Health 
(nIoSH) had developed and published Recom-
mended Exposure Limits (RELs) for 160 substanc-
es.16 Unfortunately, nIoSH is not a regulatory 
body and its standards are not legally enforceable. 
While the oSHact directs oSHa to use nIoSH 
recommendations in the promulgation of new 
or revised health and safety standards, oSHa has 
acted on only a handful of nIoSH’s recom- 
mendations.
 In 1989 oSHa issued the air Contaminants 
Standard, in which it promulgated 212 additional 
PELs and 164 updated PELs based for the most 
part on aCGIH’s TLVs.17 yet in 1992, the US 
11th Circuit Court of appeals vacated the standard 
because oSHa had failed to establish that each 
regulated substance posed a significant risk as re-
quired under the Supreme Court Benzene Deci-
sion and because oSHa did not meet its burden 
of establishing that the new PELs were either eco-
nomically or technologically feasible.18 oSHa’s 
request for a rehearing was denied, and a request 
for an appeal to the Supreme Court was rejected 
by the US Solicitor General.19 as a result, in June 
1993 oSHa revoked the updated PELs,19 and thus 
the PELs reverted back to the levels set prior to is-
suance of the air Contaminants Standard. 
 Despite oSHa’s efforts to regulate chemicals 
more broadly through the Generic Carcinogen 
Standard and the air Contaminants Standard, the 
majority of current workplace health standards 
remain woefully out of date and workers are being 
legally exposed to chemicals at levels known to 
cause harm. To date, oSHa has issued roughly 30 
permanent health standards for toxic substances, a 
small fraction of the chemicals used in commerce 
today. The last permanent health standard that 
delays in regulating 
methylene chloride 
meant continued expo-
sure for thousands of 
workers like these in 
the furniture industry.
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oSHa established was the hexavalent chromium 
standard in 2006. 
 at the end of a long regulatory battle, the PEL 
in the final hexavalent chromium rule was five 
times less protective than the limit oSHa had 
initially proposed. an examination into the in-
dustry-funded data that were used as the primary 
basis for the revised PEL suggests that the data were 
analyzed in such a way as to cover up evidence that 
very low levels of chromium can cause cancer.20 as 
a consequence, the final standard considered it 
“acceptable” that from one to nearly five workers 
for every 100 workers exposed to hexavalent chro-
mium at the new PEL over the course of their work-
ing life will die of lung cancer.20,21 While many 
occupational health experts argue that oSHa’s 
updated hexavalent chromium standard is one of 
the least protective health standards passed in re-
cent years, much can be learned about failures in 
our system of regulating worker exposures to toxic 
substances by examining what many consider a 
success story: the methylene chloride standard. 
the methylene chloride rule: delays and 
regrettable substitutions through substance-
by-substance, risk-based regulation 
over 60 years ago, methylene chloride (also 
known as dichloromethane) was introduced as a 
replacement for more toxic and flammable sol-
vents.22 Its non-flammability and strong solvent 
capability contributed to the broad use of methy-
lene chloride in a variety of products and process-
es. It was widely used in paint removers, degreasing 
agents, adhesives, and aerosol propellants. It was 
also used as a blowing agent in flexible urethane 
foams, as a process solvent in the manufacture of 
pharmaceuticals and food products, and as a fu-
migant for grains and fruits.23 While overall use of 
methylene chloride has declined in recent years, it 
is still used in most of these applications today.24 
 Like the vast majority of legal exposure limits, 
the exposure limit for methylene chloride was es-
tablished in 1971 based on a 1946 aCGIH thresh-
old limit value (500-ppm 8-hour time-weighted 
average, or TWa). This initial exposure limit was 
established to protect workers from methylene 
chloride’s ability to irritate the skin and eyes as 
well as to affect the central nervous system.25 By the 
mid-1970s scientific evidence revealed that levels 
of methylene chloride far below the 500-ppm 
limit produced levels of carboxyhemoglobin 
(CoHb) that robbed the blood of its ability to de-
liver oxygen, which in turn could cause heart dis-
ease or aggravate preexisting heart disease.26 Based 
on this evidence, in 1975 the aCGIH lowered the 
recommended threshold limit value to 100 ppm, 
and in 1976 the national Institute for occu- 
pational Safety and Health established a REL 
(8-hour time-weighted average) of 75 ppm.25,26 
yet oSHa did not update its own standard until 
pressure mounted based on even more troubling 
evidence of the chemical’s carcinogenicity from 
the national Toxicology Program (nTP). 
 In February 1985, nTP published its results 
from two animal carcinogenicity studies on meth-
ylene chloride.27 Based on its two-year inhalation 
study using rats, nTP found “some evidence” for 
males and “clear evidence” for females of the car-
cinogenicity of methylene chloride for mammary 
gland cancers.27 nTP’s second inhalation study 
examining effects in mice revealed “clear evi-
dence” of the carcinogenicity of methylene chlo-
ride for lung and liver cancers among both males 
and females.27 
Labor petitions and oSHA (finally) sets a standard 
The nTP toxicological studies prompted review 
and action on methylene chloride exposure across 
a number of federal regulatory agencies, including 
oSHa. yet oSHa’s response was not of its own 
accord, but rather was instigated by a petition 
from labor. In July 1985, The United auto Work-
ers (UaW) used the nTP study results to petition 
oSHa to issue a hazard alert and an emergency 
temporary standard for methylene chloride.25 The 
petition, which was subsequently joined by six 
other unions, also called for oSHa to begin work 
on a permanent standard requiring a radical re-
duction in allowable workplace exposure levels for 
methylene chloride.25 
 In april 1986, nIoSH published a Current Intel-
ligence Bulletin on methylene chloride in which it 
recommended methylene chloride be regarded as 
a “potential occupational carcinogen.”23 The fore-
word of the report stated, “although the potential 
for methylene chloride induced cancer in humans 
has not been determined, the probability of a 
population of exposed workers developing cancer 
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could be decreased by reducing exposure. There-
fore, nIoSH recommends that occupational ex-
posure to methylene chloride be controlled to the 
lowest feasible limit.”23 This recommendation 
mirrored the original oSHa Generic Carcinogen 
Standard that called for action before evidence of 
harm in humans. 
 Sixteen months after labor’s call for action and 
nIoSH’s recommendation to reduce exposures, 
oSHa denied the petition for an emergency stan-
dard, but agreed to launch a permanent standard-
setting process.25 a few days later, in november 
1986, oSHa announced its advanced notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking to revise the occupational 
health standard for methylene chloride.25 
 Since the Benzene Decision, and despite the 
Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of signifi-
cant risk—the threshold for implementing any 
regulatory action—oSHa has steadfastly inter-
preted significant risk as one extra case of cancer 
or other health consequence per 1,000 workers 
over the course of a working life (45 years).33 In 
the case of the methylene chloride standard, the 
residual lifetime risk of cancer at the new PEL was 
3.6 per 1,000 workers.34 Thus even after oSHa 
established more stringent exposure limits, a sig-
nificant number of deaths as a result of cancer 
caused by methylene chloride exposure were still 
to be expected. oSHa acknowledged in the rule 
itself that a significant risk remains at 25 ppm, but 
the PEL was considered what was currently “feasi-
ble” (an issue addressed further below).35 
 Thus, workers who assume that exposures at the 
new PEL are no longer dangerous are sadly mis- 
taken. oSHa’s residual cancer risks for workers 
are orders of magnitude greater than risks EPa 
“accepts” for the broader public. This essentially 
translates into acceptance of a large number of ill-
nesses and deaths among workers while society is 
willing and able to prevent these same outcomes 
among the general public.12 
Want to delay and derail worker health protections? 
debate the nuances of risk assessment
Delays in finalizing the methylene chloride stan-
dard came in many forms, but all were due in part 
to continued science policy debates that were dif-
ferent from those the 1981 Generic Carcinogen 
Policy sought to alleviate. The new debates were 
rooted in the requirement of the Benzene Deci-
sion to demonstrate the significance of methylene 
chloride’s risk to workers through risk assessment. 
 Risk assessment is a tool that uses modeling and 
prediction to evaluate the potential for exposure 
to a chemical hazard to cause disease. It requires 
numerous assumptions and judgments about ex-
posures, human behavior, and how a chemical moves 
through and is metabolized by the body to exert its 
toxic effect. Because of uncertainties in these as-
sumptions, risk assessments conducted by different 
scientific groups can result in widely different 
results.36 on top of this, political and financial 
interests can also influence the risk assessment 
process.37 
after	multiple	delays—and	12	years	after	ntP’s	
studies	sounded	the	alarm—osHa	finalized	its	
methylene	chloride	rule.
 after multiple delays—and 12 years after nTP’s 
studies sounded the alarm—oSHa finalized its 
methylene chloride rule. The standard, which 
went into effect april 10, 1997 for most indus-
tries, reduced the legal exposure limit from 500 
to 25 parts per million in air over an 8-hour 
workday and established a short-term exposure 
limit of 125 ppm for 15 minutes.28 It also estab-
lished requirements for exposure monitoring, 
worker training, engineering controls, designa-
tion of restricted areas, spill and leak prevention, 
and medical surveillance for high-risk employ-
ees.28 The standard made clear that if engineering 
controls and workplace practices did not reduce 
methylene chloride to an acceptable level, workers 
must use full face-piece supplied-air respirators 
because methylene chloride vapors penetrated 
standard filter cartridge respirators.28 The updated 
standard was based primarily on the nTP results 
showing the carcinogenic effect of methylene 
chloride in mice, with support from a variety of 
occupational epidemiologic studies demonstrat-
ing increased risk of cancers of the biliary tract/
liver, prostate gland, and brain, as well as sug- 
gestive evidence for an effect on cardiovascular 
mortality.29-32 
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 oSHa’s risk-assessment-based standard-set-
ting process also limits a comprehensive under-
standing of risks and prevention opportunities 
because the preventability of the exposure is rarely 
considered in establishing “acceptable” exposure 
levels. This one-chemical-at-a-time risk assessment 
doesn’t evaluate the possibility of cumulative or in-
teractive exposures or effects. Thus, as practiced, 
risk assessment uses highly uncertain data to arrive 
at a single estimate at the expense of a broader, 
more nuanced understanding of risk.38
 In developing the methylene chloride rule, 
there was extensive industry testimony and com-
ments on narrow technical issues like these: Which 
animal model is the most representative of methy-
lene chloride’s mode of action in humans? Is 
there a documented physiological mechanism or 
mechanism(s) that demonstrates methylene chlo-
ride’s carcinogenic effect? What pharmacokinetic 
model best represents how methylene chloride is 
metabolized in animals versus in humans? Exten-
sive resources and time were spent soliciting and 
responding to comments critiquing the validity of 
scientific knowledge and assumptions oSHa made 
in its final risk assessment.12 Then, in 1995, after 
oSHa had closed the record and proposed its up-
dated methylene chloride rule, the Halogenated 
Solvents Industry alliance introduced a handful 
of new studies that it had sponsored. 
 The studies were in effect, industry’s last-ditch 
effort to downgrade methylene chloride’s cancer 
risk. In summarizing the studies, the executive 
director of the Halogenated Solvent Industry alli-
ance stated that this new evidence showed that mice 
“are uniquely sensitive at high exposure levels to 
methylene chloride–induced lung and liver can-
cer, and . . . other species, including humans, are 
not at similar risk.”39 oSHa has a responsibility 
to examine and consider all available evidence to 
justify its decisions whether to regulate. as a con-
sequence, oSHa reopened the record to receive 
and respond to comments about the study. 
 The studies were found to have significant 
problems in design and conduct which limited the 
validity of the results.34 oSHa ultimately rejected 
these arguments and the proposed standard was 
left intact. yet more time had been lost and more 
workers had been exposed to a cancer-causing 
chemical. Given the high burden oSHa faces to 
Political	and	financial		
interests	can	also	influence	the	
risk	assessment	process.	
Methylene chloride 
is still used in  
paint stripping  
formulations.
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implement permanent health standards for chem-
icals, this strategy of “manufacturing uncertainty” 
has worked extremely well in delaying actions.37 
the primacy of engineering controls: technological 
feasibility trumps preventing hazards at their source
oSHa was also required to demonstrate that the 
methylene chloride standard could be met “to the 
extent feasible,” as defined in the oSHact. Feasi-
bility has two components: (1) technological feasi-
bility; and (2) economic feasibility. The analyses 
needed to demonstrate feasibility, along with the 
process of responding to public comments, are 
further reasons that it took so long to finalize the 
methylene chloride standard. For a standard to be 
considered “technologically feasible,” oSHa must 
demonstrate that industry can meet the PEL either 
through the application of existing control tech-
nology or through new and improved technolo-
gies not fully developed.40,41 
 Thus the courts saw a role for oSHa standards 
to stimulate innovation as a “technology-forcing” 
authority.42,43 The courts even noted that such 
technology forcing could adversely affect laggard 
companies that were not adopting technologies to 
appropriately protect  workers. These court deci-
sions were consistent with the industrial hygiene 
hierarchy of controls that places substitution as the 
most effective means to protect workers, followed 
by engineering controls, administrative controls 
and as a last resort, personal protective equip-
ment. But despite these health-protective inter-
pretations of technological feasibility, it is the more 
recent debates over economic feasibility that have 
stymied regulatory actions.
 While the agency could consider innovation as 
reducing long-term costs of compliance, oSHa is 
often constrained in examining economic feasi-
bility as a result of economic reviews conducted by 
oMB, and also by the Regulatory Flexibility act, 
the Paperwork Reduction act, and the Small Busi-
ness Regulatory Enforcement Fairness act. The 
latter act requires that oSHa convene and gather 
input from a Small Business advocacy Review 
Panel that comprises several Small Entity Repre-
sentatives, officials from the Small Business ad-
ministration’s office of advocacy, and officials from 
oMB’s office of Information and Regulatory 
affairs. oSHa officials noted that the agency “in-
creased flexibility of compliance in response to 
comments made by the Small Business adminis-
tration and small businesses, themselves—oSHa 
gave small employers more time to implement the 
standard’s requirements; eliminated a require-
ment for written compliance plans; and altered 
training requirements.” a report by the Center 
for Progressive Reform has found that the re-
quirement to comply with these laws significantly 
delays regulation without producing any clear 
benefits to industry or health.44
 as a result of these review requirements, oSHa 
interpreted its feasibility analysis with caution. This 
was in part to avoid costly challenges by industry 
that would require significant human and economic 
resources of an already resource-constrained agency. 
In the case of methylene chloride, rather than 
designing a regulation that stimulated research 
and technological innovation to eliminate the use 
of the chemical, the standard relied on less protec-
tive hazard control approaches, such as engineer-
ing controls (e.g., using ventilation equipment to 
remove the offending agent to the outdoors).45,28 
These controls are standard in most of our cur-
rent regulatory approaches that seek to manage 
risk—that is, reduce exposure to the chemical of 
concern rather than reduce the intrinsic hazard 
of the substance by investing in strategies that dis-
cover, design, and adopt safer alternatives. 
the unintended consequences of chemical- 
by- chemical, agency-by-agency approaches to  
chemicals management 
our failure to advance a worker health and safety 
system that incentivizes the development and de-
sign of safer chemistries can result in continued 
harm to workers when employers seek substi- 
tutes for regulated chemicals. although oSHa 
expected industries to use engineering controls 
to comply with its methylene chloride standard, 
in fact many companies abandoned the use of 
methylene chloride due to the perceived costs of 
these controls.46 
 oSHa was not the only federal agency that af-
fected employers’ use of methylene chloride. The 
Food and Drug administration (FDa), the Con-
sumer Product Safety Commission (CSPC), the 
Department of Housing and Urban Development 
(HUD), and the Environmental Protection agency 
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(EPa) all issued actions responding to the nTP 
studies and epidemiologic literature about methy-
lene chloride’s potential carcinogenicity. The 
FDa issued a final rule on June 29, 1989 banning 
methylene chloride in cosmetic products, primar-
ily hair sprays.47 The CPSC fell short of issuing a 
final rule regarding methylene chloride, but is-
sued a “statement of interpretation and enforce-
ment policy” requiring that by September 14, 1988, 
all manufacturers, importers, packagers, and pri-
vate labelers of consumer products must indicate 
on all products that inhalation of methylene chlo-
ride has produced cancer in laboratory animals 
and must specify relevant use precautions.48 HUD 
issued restrictions on using methylene chloride 
during residential de-leading. EPa undertook its 
own risk assessment of methylene chloride and in 
May 1985, determined that the chemical was a 
probable human carcinogen.25 
 EPa’s subsequent actions were primarily stim-
ulated by the 1990 Clean air act amendments 
(Caaa), and resulted in contradictory outcomes. 
one component of the Caaa required EPa to 
phase out ozone-depleting chemicals by 2000. In 
1994, EPa determined that methylene chloride 
was one of the many “acceptable” chemical substi-
tutes for a number of industrial applications, even 
though the agency acknowledged concerns about 
its toxicity.49 In the ensuing years, EPa also set re-
strictive air emissions through technology standards 
for dozens of hazardous air pollutants, including 
methylene chloride, as part of its regulatory obli-
gation under Title III of the Caaa. Thus, while 
EPa obligated industries to eliminate their use of 
ozone-depleting chemicals (which could involve 
switching to methylene chloride), the agency’s 
actions to reduce hazardous air pollutant emis-
sions sent another message to employers to reduce 
or eliminate methylene chloride use. 
 From the point of view of many employers, en-
gineering controls to reduce methylene chloride 
exposures were not a feasible means for regulatory 
compliance, given the array of federal agency ac-
tions. For example, employers could not simply 
vent methylene chloride vapors to the outside be-
cause of EPa’s new and more restrictive emission 
standards. If occupational health regulations re-
strict methylene chloride emissions inside where it 
affects workers, and environmental regulations 
restrict venting emissions outside because of air 
quality protections, a reasonable solution might 
be to replace methylene chloride altogether. 
 and that’s just what many companies did. In 
response to methylene chloride regulations as well 
there are tens of thousands 
of chemicals registered for 
use in united States today 
that lack comprehensive 
toxicity testing.
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as regulations associated with EPa’s ban on ozone- 
depleting chemicals, chemical companies and equip-
ment manufacturers identified a new market for a 
broad array of old and new alternatives, including 
substitute chemistries, mechanical and equipment 
innovations, as well as modernized manufacturing 
processes.50 
 There are many examples of companies that 
successfully transitioned to using safer alternatives 
to methylene chloride and often experienced finan-
cial benefits as a result.50 yet, there are also tragic 
cases of companies that fell prey to the opportu-
nistic marketing of replacement chemicals that 
were largely untested and unregulated—such as 
1-bromopropane. 
Substituting an untested chemical for a bad one:  
the tragic mistake called 1-bromopropane
In the early to mid-1990s, 1-bromopropane, also 
known as n-propyl bromide, was used primarily as 
an intermediate in the production of a range of 
chemicals. By the mid- to late 1990s, as EPa’s and 
oSHa’s methylene chloride regulations as well as 
bans on the use of specific ozone-depleting solvents 
began to take effect, 1-bromopropane blasted 
onto the scene as an alternative to methylene chlo-
ride. It was introduced and marketed as a non-
flammable, non-toxic, fast-drying and inexpensive 
solvent that was effective in a variety of applica-
tions, such as refrigeration, metal cleaning, and 
vapor and immersion degreasing applications, as 
well as in adhesive resins.1,51,52 1-bromopropane 
became a favored replacement solvent in some ap-
plications because it worked well, it was a quick, 
drop-in substitute, and there were no regulations 
governing workplace or environmental emissions and 
minimal toxicity testing to suggest any hazard.53,54 
 Despite some signals as early as 1981 that 1-bro-
mopropane was mutagenic, no comprehensive toxi-
city testing of the chemical had been conducted.2,55 
a broader literature on the hazards of 1-bromo-
propane began to emerge in 1998. That year, the 
first report of the neurotoxicity of 1-bromopro-
pane from animal studies was published.53 a year 
later, the first case report of neurotoxicity in a 
worker was published.56 In that case report, a 
19-year-old worker who used 1-bromopropane 
for metal degreasing and cleaning had developed 
progressive weakness in his legs and right hand, 
had difficulty swallowing, and at the time of ad-
mission to the hospital in February 1998 could no 
longer stand without assistance.56 
 one worker after another who used a 1-bro-
mopropane-based spray solvent in a job manufac-
turing cushions similarly experienced the neuro-
toxic effects of 1-bromopropane.1,3 For many of 
these workers, symptoms persisted for years, and 
some of these workers also experienced repro-
ductive effects, which unfortunately were some of 
the earliest signals of reproductive harm from the 
chemical.1,3,57,58 Many cushion-manufacturing em-
ployers had recently introduced 1-bromopropane 
as an alternative to methylene chloride.1,59
 Prompted by cases of sick workers, nIoSH 
launched a series of health hazard evaluations at a 
number of cushion-manufacturing workplaces 
that used 1-bromopropane during the period 
1998-2000, and recommended enhancing engi-
neering controls to reduce exposure levels.58,60,61 
In 2003, and on the basis of limited data, nTP’s 
Center for the Evaluation of Risks to Human Re-
production concluded that 1-bromopropane is 
toxic to the developmental and reproductive 
health of animals. 
 at the request of oSHa in 1999, nTP also 
studied the carcinogenicity of 1-bromopropane 
and found evidence of carcinogenicity.62,51 In an 
unpublished analysis by a former Director of 
Health Standards at oSHa, the nTP results reveal 
that 1-bromopropane is roughly four times as po-
tent a carcinogen as methylene chloride.63 
 yet to date, neither EPa nor oSHa has es- 
tablished regulations to minimize health risks 
from exposure to 1-bromopropane. In 2006, the 
aCGIH set a time-weighted average TLV for 
1-bromopropane at 10 ppm. as of late 2010, 
nIoSH is in the process of establishing a REL for 
1-bromopropane.
 on May 9, 2010, oSHa published its regula-
tory review of the methylene chloride standard. 
While none of the comments submitted highlighted 
the problems of substituting 1-bromopropane for 
methylene chloride, oSHa’s final report did ac-
knowledge potential health hazards with some 
substitutes: “The use of substitutes for MC [meth-
ylene chloride] has increased in certain industries. 
These substitutes may pose their own health hazards. 
Therefore, based on public comments, oSHa 
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will consider putting out guidance recommending 
that, before a substitute for MC is used, the toxic-
ity of that substitute should be checked on the EPa 
and nIoSH websites.”24 While such guidance 
would be a step forward, it remains to be seen 
whether oSHa will pursue these hazard commu-
nication efforts.
More than a decade to regulate one chemical?  
At what cost?
While oSHa finally prevailed in finalizing the 
methylene chloride rule, this accomplishment 
came at a cost to worker health due to regulatory 
delays and our substance-by-substance system of 
regulation. The high burden on oSHa to demon-
strate significant risk on a chemical-by-chemical 
basis opens the door for scientific challenges (with 
or without merit) that delay preventive actions. 
Regulation of one chemical without thinking 
about alternatives opens the door for unregulated 
chemicals to be used in substitution. 
 While substitution is the preferred approach to 
protect not only workers but also the broader pub-
lic from chemical hazards, it is dangerous to pick 
substitutes without a thorough overhaul of our 
system to manage the safety of chemicals in com-
merce. Designed correctly, chemical regulations 
can stimulate scientific research and technological 
innovation. 
 yet as things currently stand in the United 
States, employers are left to their own devices to 
find alternatives to newly regulated chemicals. 
Such employers can easily fall prey to chemical 
sales personnel who are eager to sell them a prom-
ising substitute that is considered “safe” simply 
because no testing has proven it hazardous. Given 
that complete basic toxicological screening data is 
available for only a small percentage of the tens of 
thousands of chemicals listed as being in com-
merce in the United States, stories like 1-bromo-
propane will be played out again and again until 
new approaches to comprehensively manage these 
hazards are identified.
 oSHa estimated that the permanent methy-
lene chloride standard would reduce exposure- 
related deaths by at least 97 percent for more than 
one-quarter of a million US workers, and prevent 
the deaths of 34 workers per year on average.64 
Thus the 12 years that it took to enact the stan-
dard (not including the additional time for small 
businesses to comply with the regulation) and the 
decision not to issue an emergency standard (as 
originally recommended by labor) inadvertently 
resulted in continued exposures to workers that 
caused or will cause an estimated 408 deaths. 
Moreover, by oSHa’s own estimates, for each 
year that the new standard was delayed, as many as 
30,000 to 54,000 workers may have suffered 
central nervous system and cardiovascular system 
damage.64 Clearly, lengthy rule-making processes 
are not healthy for workers.
…stories	like	1-bromopropane	will	be		 	
played		out	again	and	again	until	new	approaches	
to	comprehensively	manage	these	hazards	are		
identified.
the road not taken: toxics use reduction  
and a comprehensive chemicals policy
While oSHa debated the mechanisms of action 
of methylene chloride and their relevance to 
humans, agencies in Massachusetts were imple-
menting a pioneering new approach to reducing 
chemical hazards—toxics use reduction (TUR). 
Under the 1989 Toxics Use Reduction act, manu-
facturers using more than 10,000 pounds per 
year (less for chemicals of high concern) of some 
900 chemicals are required to undertake a yearly 
accounting of how those chemicals enter, are used 
in, and are released from their facility as waste 
(liquid or solids that are captured and transferred 
offsite) or emissions (e.g., releases to air, water or 
ground). Every two years, the firms are required to 
undertake a planning process to identify alter- 
natives to reduce or eliminate those chemicals. In 
reviewing alternatives, firms are required to include 
workers and consider environmental, consumer, 
and occupational health hazards to ensure that 
risks are not shifted. Firms pay a small fee on 
chemical use that funds the regulatory program 
but also funds voluntary, confidential technical 
assistance and training, and research support at 
the Toxics Use Reduction Institute at the Univer-
sity of Massachusetts Lowell. 
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 This model of regulatory requirements to un-
derstand chemical use and opportunities for pre-
vention (without any requirement to act), coupled 
with support to firms to institute changes, has led 
to significant results in just the first 10 years of 
the program: an 80 percent reduction in chemical 
emissions; a 67 percent reduction in chemical 
waste; and a 40 percent reduction in toxic chemi-
cal use, while saving firms millions of dollars.38 
 The TUR approach focuses on alternatives and 
solutions to toxic chemical concerns, even though 
perfect information is not available. For example, 
while the US EPa has struggled to finalize a risk 
assessment on trichloroethylene (TCE), a suspect 
carcinogen widely used in degreasing, Massachu-
setts has reduced the use of this chemical by 95 
percent in degreasing operations by testing alter-
natives, which have been evaluated for safety, to 
ensure they work as effectively as TCE. 
 one example of the success of the TUR approach 
took place at Crest Foam, a small polyurethane 
foam manufacturer. The company eliminated the 
use of 190,000 pounds per year of methylene 
chloride by installing a foaming process that uses 
carbon dioxide instead of trichlorofluoromethane 
(CFC-11) or methylene chloride. The alternative 
is not only more efficient and less costly than 
methylene chloride, but also saved the company 
tens of thousands of dollars in permitting and 
emission control equipment costs.65 
 While the TUR model demonstrates that a so-
lutions-based approach to chemical hazards can 
reduce risks and save money, it does not entirely 
eliminate the roadblock of quantitative risk assess-
ment. a lengthy debate about these challenges in 
the European Union led, in 2007, to an entirely 
new chemicals policy called REaCH—Regulation, 
Evaluation, and authorization of Chemicals. REaCH 
requires manufacturers and importers of chemicals 
to provide to authorities information on chemical 
toxicity, uses, and exposure; and to inform chem-
ical users of hazards and prevention measures. In 
addition, REaCH requires companies to seek 
permission to continue to use chemicals of high 
concern. While REaCH is still in the early years of 
implementation, it is an effort to address the chal-
lenges outlined in this paper, in order to more ef-
fectively understand and prevent chemical hazards. 
 Following the passage of REaCH, several US 
states have initiated their own comprehensive 
chemicals policies. While they differ in nature, 
they focus on prioritizing the universe of chemi-
cals into lists of higher and lower concern, requir-
ing or encouraging the shift to safer alternatives, 
and disclosing the chemical ingredients and toxic-
ity of products. 
 Indeed, many leading-edge firms are under-
taking their own efforts to prioritize chemicals of 
concern and find safer substitutes. While some 
firms are considering the lifecycle impacts (that is, 
including the impacts to workers, consumers and 
the environment of upstream production and down-
stream disposal) of substitutes, many others are 
still focused only on direct hazards to consumers.
 In 2009, the US EPa released principles for 
reforming the US federal toxics law, the 1976 
Toxics Substances Control act (TSCa), a law that 
was originally seen as a response to the limits of the 
oSHact for protecting workers from toxic expo-
sures. While TSCa has been criticized for the high 
burdens it places on EPa to gather hazard data and 
take action, for new chemicals the law authorizes 
EPa to collect data and prevent exposures when a 
substance “may present an unreasonable risk or 
substantial exposure”—even before that substance 
has been manufactured. This worker health provi-
sion has provided some added measure of protec-
tion for workers, though new chemicals on the 
market since 1980 represent less than 5 percent by 
volume of the total on the market today. 
 as Congress begins to debate the new Safe 
Chemicals act, introduced in the House in June 
2010, it is imperative that worker health consider-
ations be front and center. Indeed, while the law 
includes only some limited reference to substitu-
tion, there are several provisions that specifically 
address worker health. nonetheless, given the 
eight-year reform process in Europe leading to 
REaCH, and the six-year process that led to the 
original TSCa, it is unlikely that changes to fed-
eral chemicals policy will occur any time soon.
Many	leading-edge	firms	are	undertaking		
their	own	efforts	to	prioritize	chemicals	of	
concern	and	find	safer	alternatives.	
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L e S S o n S  L e a r n e d
Despite attempts by oSHa administrators in the early days of the agency, our regulatory system for protecting workers from toxic substances remains 
broken. oSHa’s current administrator, David Michaels, 
clearly recognizes these failures. as he stated in a July 
19, 2010 general memo, “oSHa’s process for issuing 
regulations is unworkable . . . we must develop ways to 
issue standards more quickly, but we must also explore 
alternatives to hazard-by-hazard standard setting. . . . We 
can not wait for a long-term solution to this long-stand-
ing problem: we must ensure the protection of workers 
currently exposed to well-recognized chemical hazards 
for which we have an inadequate or no PEL.”66
 The experience of the methylene chloride standard 
demonstrates several lessons that can inform future reg-
ulatory reforms designed to anticipate rather than react 
to harm from toxic hazards in the workplace. First, we 
need a system of regulating toxic substances in this coun-
try that is comprehensive—that gathers information on 
the toxicity and uses of all chemicals; that prioritizes 
chemicals of highest concern; and provides research and 
support to implement safer alternatives. as the example 
of 1-bromopropane demonstrates, some employers will 
seek out substitute chemicals for newly regulated ones 
(particularly if these are “drop-in” substitutes), and 
there is nothing to hinder them from choosing an un-
tested, unregulated alternative. 
 Rather than working around this problem by en-
couraging employers to reduce exposure levels through 
engineering controls, oSHa needs to tap into its tech-
nology-forcing authority to incentivize and support the in-
novation necessary to design, market, and install feasi-
ble, inherently safer alternatives. Real worker health 
protections require moving beyond our current model, 
which simply manages risk, and towards a model that 
more fundamentally reduces the potential for exposure 
to toxic chemicals through planning and design.
 The long history of the methylene chloride standard 
also shows us that it is possible to issue protective regu-
lations based on the weight of the evidence at any one 
time. oSHa relied on early warnings of harm from an-
imal studies and did not delay acting to protect workers 
until conclusive evidence from epidemiologic studies 
emerged. yet there were delays. It took oSHa over a 
decade to issue this one permanent health standard. 
Meanwhile tens of thousands of workers remained ex-
posed to levels of methylene chloride known to cause 
harm, and hundreds of workers will meet or have met 
an early death. Reasons for these delays are numerous 
and include manufactured uncertainties and a broad 
range of time-intensive obligations set forth by the 
oSHact, Congress, the courts and the Executive office 
of Management and Budget. 
 yet one obligation in particular, the requirement of 
the Supreme Court’s Benzene Decision to demonstrate 
the significance of methylene chloride’s risk to workers 
through risk assessment, offered a forum for the politi-
cization of science that continues to plague rule-mak-
ing processes to this day. While oSHa ultimately “won” 
the risk and economic assessment game in the case of 
methylene chloride and was able to meet its various legal 
and administrative obligations while keeping intact a 
rule to better protect workers, the extensive resources 
spent on dueling scientific and economic assessments 
could have been used to help small and medium-sized 
businesses identify and implement safer alternative 
chemicals—stimulating innovation and saving lives.
 It thus appears that the Benzene Decision stands 
firmly in the way of a more efficient and more effective 
rulemaking process on toxics in workplaces. or does it? 
The challenge facing occupational health policy is to 
think about toxic substances differently. We need to 
identify leverage points that better address the entire 
system of chemicals uses and alternatives, and so protect 
workers, consumers and the environment.
We	need	to	identify	leverage	points	that	better	address	the	entire	system	of	chemicals	
uses	and	alternatives,	and	so	protect	workers,	consumers	and	the	environment.
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CaSE  STUDy  5  —  t iMeL ine
y E a r E V E N T
1971 oSHa adopts aCGIH’s 8-hour time-weighted average (TWa) 500 ppm as the Permissible Exposure Limit 
(PEL) for methylene chloride (interim standard). The exposure limit was originally established in 1946. 
1975 aCGIH lowers its Threshold Limit Value (TLV) for methylene chloride from 500 ppm to 100 ppm.
1976 NIoSH recommends reducing the 8-hour TWa for methylene chloride from 500 ppm to 75 ppm.
1980 (January) oSHa issues its Generic Carcinogen Policy. 
1980 (July) The Supreme Court issues what is now known as the Benzene Decision, requiring oSHa to make a 
determination that a workplace is unsafe due to the presence of a “significant risk” to workers, and that 
this risk can be eliminated or lessened by the promulgation of a standard or change in a standard.
1981 oSHa revises its Generic Carcinogen Policy to be more consistent with the Supreme Court’s Benzene 
decision.
1983 oSHa issues a partial stay on its Generic Carcinogen Policy, which remains in effect today.
1985 (February) NTP reports bioassay results showing clear evidence of methylene chloride’s carcinogenicity  
in mice and rats.
1985 (May) EPa’s risk assessment on methylene chloride determines the chemical is a “probable human 
carcinogen.”
1985 (July) UaW and others petition oSHa to issue an emergency temporary standard, develop guidelines  
for handling methylene chloride, and initiate rulemaking, for a permanent standard.
1986 (april) NIoSH publishes its Current Intelligence Bulletin, classifies methylene chloride as potential  
occupational carcinogen and recommends control of exposures to the lowest feasible level.
1986 (November) oSHa denies petition for a current standard and days later initiates rulemaking on a  
permanent standard.
1988 CPSC issues a “statement of interpretation and enforcement policy” requiring hazard labeling for  
consumer products containing methylene chloride.
1987 oSHa issues its air Contaminants Standard updating and/or establishing PELs for nearly 400 chemicals.
1989 FDa issues final rule to ban methylene chloride in cosmetic products.
1992 US 11th Circuit Court of appeals vacates the air Contaminants Standard because oSHa failed to 
establish that each regulated substance posed a significant risk and that the new PELs were either  
economically or technologically feasible.
1994 EPa determines that methylene chloride is an acceptable chemical substitute for ozone-depleting  
chemicals targeted for phase-out. In the years that follow, EPa also sets restrictive air emission  
technology standards for methylene chloride. 
1997 oSHa’s final methylene chloride rule is issued, lowering the permissible exposure limit to 25 ppm  
and sets a short-term exposure limit is 125 ppm for 15 minutes. 
1998 oSHa’s methylene chloride rule is amended to support temporary medical removal protection benefits 
and start-up dates for compliance for specific applications. 
1998 First cases of neurological illness occur in workers using 1-bromopropane as a substitute for methylene 
chloride. 
1998–2000 NIoSH launches a series of health hazard evaluations in cushion manufacturing companies using  
1-bromopropane.
2003 NTP concludes that 1-bromopropane is toxic to the developmental and reproductive health of animals.
2009 NTP issues draft technical report demonstrating evidence of carcinogenicity of 1-bromopropane  
in mice and rats.
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The faster the  
production line moves,  
the greater the risk of 
injuries and of contami-
nated meat entering 
our food supply.
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CASe  S t udy  6
Safe Food from Safe Workplaces: 
Protecting Meat and Poultry Workers 
Molly M. Jacobs, David Kriebel, Joel Tickner
“the line is so fast there is no time to sharpen the knife. the knife gets dull and you have to cut hard-
er. that’s when it really starts to hurt, and that’s when you cut yourself. i cut my hand at the end of my 
shift, around 10:30 at night. . . . i went to the clinic the next day at 11:00 am. they gave me stitches 
and told me to come back at 2:30 before the start of my shift to check on the stitches. they told me 
to go back to work at 3:00. i never stopped working.”
—a pork processing plant worker at Tar Heel Plant in Bladen, NC, 20031
“We come in different sizes, but the hooks and the cutting table are the same for everybody. the short 
ones have to reach more, and they hurt their backs and shoulders. the tall ones have to stoop down 
more, so they hurt their backs and shoulders. everybody walks out of the plant hurting at the end of 
the shift.”
—a poultry processing plant worker in rogers, arkansas, 20031
“the difference i have found among working in multiple plants is the way we are treated by the super-
visors. they [the supervisors] do not train you to do the work, but they still expect you to work. When 
supervisors talk to you, they scream at you and insult you, using obscenities. there is no respect for 
the workers.” 
—a meatpacking worker in Nebraska, 20092
S
LaUGHTERInG anD PRoCESSInG 
beef, lamb, pork, and poultry for our food 
supply are inherently dangerous jobs.3 
Turning a 1,250-pound steer or a five-
pound chicken into cuts sold in the mar-
ketplace is physically demanding work undertaken 
in a difficult and hazardous work environment. 
Workers use sharp hooks and knives while standing 
on floors made slippery from blood, fat, fecal 
matter, and other bodily fluids. Unpredictable 
and violent reactions from animals before slaugh-
ter pose constant physical threats to workers. Heavy 
suspended carcasses of beef traveling along a fast-
moving automated line can slam a worker to the 
floor. Down the line, processing workers stand for 
long periods of time working closely together 
while making thousands of repetitive cuts each 
shift. The noise is deafening and temperatures in 
the plants range from hot and humid on the 
killing floors to near freezing in the processing 
rooms. Pathogens can infect workers, and chemi-
cals from decomposing animal waste, disinfectants, 
or gases such as ammonia used for refrigeration 
can prove deadly. 
 over a century ago, Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle 
used narrative rather than statistics to describe 
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injuries among meatpacking workers in the Chi-
cago stockyards, “of the butchers and floorsmen, 
the beef-boners and trimmers, and all those who 
used knives, you could scarcely find the person 
who had use of his thumb; time and time again the 
base of it had been slashed, till it was a mere lump 
of flesh.”4 Decades later, when the occupational 
Safety and Health act (oSHact) became law in 
1970, the meat and meat products industry was 
designated by the new occupational Safety and 
Health administration (oSHa) for priority at-
tention as part of the agency’s efforts to target 
those industries having the highest rates of occu-
pational injuries.5 The creation of oSHa in 1970, 
earlier trade union organizing in the 1930s, and 
creation of the national Labor Relations act in 
1935 brought improved conditions for meatpack-
ing workers for many years.1 These gains were lost, 
however, beginning in the 1980s with a variety of 
changes in the industry, and by 1991, nearly one 
out of every two workers was either injured or 
made ill by the work.6 
 Today, reported illness and injury rates in 
meatpacking workers are more than double that of 
U.S. manufacturing as a whole while rates among 
poultry processing workers are 30 percent higher.7,a 
However, known flaws in our occupational illness 
and injury surveillance methods make it difficult 
to know the extent of current health concerns 
among these workers.3
 Despite the inherent dangers of the work, inju-
ries and illness among workers engaged in animal 
slaughtering and meat processing tasks can be 
avoided. Comprehensive employee safety educa-
tion and training, safeguards on machines and 
equipment, personal protective equipment, reduc-
ing line and work speed, employee involvement in 
decisions that affect workplace health and safety, as 
well as prompt and appropriate medical manage-
ment to prevent smaller injuries from becoming 
more serious or chronic conditions, are just a few 
of the practices that, if implemented, can keep 
workers healthy on the job. 
A brief review of history: Have we come  
full circle and back to Sinclair’s The Jungle?
Failing to connect the dots: safe food comes   
from safe workplaces 
Upton Sinclair’s 1906 novel The Jungle exposed the 
dehumanizing labor conditions and unsanitary 
environment of the meatpacking industry.8 In 
horrific detail from the Chicago stockyards, Sin-
clair’s writings made clear the connections be-
tween unsafe working conditions and an unsafe 
food supply. The resulting public outrage and 
outcry to transform the industry resulted in in-
spections that confirmed Sinclair’s assertions: 
some packing establishments were continuously 
unsanitary; meat processing methods themselves 
were hazardous and unclean, producing meat 
products simply unfit for human consumption; 
workers had high rates of tuberculosis; and condi-
tions in the stockyard and in the plants were a 
significant public health threat to the largely 
immigrant population that worked there and 
lived nearby.9 
 Within months, President Teddy Roosevelt 
and Congress intervened with the passage of two 
consumer protection laws in 1906: the Pure Food 
and Drug act and the Meat Inspection act. To-
gether the laws sought to safeguard the meat supply 
for human consumption by increasing the US 
Hazards in the meat and poultry slaughter and processing indus-try are well known and predictable, and solutions to preventing 
these harms are feasible. Why then is this industry still beset by 
sickness and injuries? over the last decade historians, investigative 
journalists, government oversight committees, occupational health 
scientists, and human rights and labor organizations, among others, 
have examined this very problem. This case study provides an analy-
sis and synthesis of this body of work and reveals that solutions 
to protect the health and safety of meat and poultry production 
workers cannot be decoupled from the complex intersection of power 
relations on the plant floor, regulatory agencies with inadequate re-
sources and power, and the perverse economics of our industrial 
meat production system, in which narrow profit margins drive busi-
ness decisions that impact workers and consumers alike. 
ABou t  t H i S  C A S e  S t u dy
a Based on 2009 Bureau of Labor Statistics non-fatal injury and illness incidence data using the North American Industry Classification System (NAICS) codes: 31-33 
(manufacturing), 311611 (animal (except poultry) slaughtering), and 311615 (poultry processing).
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Department of agriculture’s (USDa) oversight 
and also prohibiting the sale of adulterated or 
fraudulently labeled food (and drugs)—an act con-
sidered punishable by fines and jail time.10 
 Despite Sinclair’s attempts to connect the health 
and safety of production workers with the integrity 
of the food landing on the public’s dinner table, 
no parallel reforms were enacted to improve work-
place conditions. years later, Sinclair expressed 
disappointment about the result: “I aimed at the 
public’s heart, and by accident, I hit it in the stom-
ach. . . . My main concern had been for the fate of 
the workers, and I realized with bitterness that I 
had been made into a ‘celebrity’, not because the 
public cared anything about the sufferings of these 
workers, but simply because the public did not 
want to eat turbercular beef.”11 
Shifting power on the plant floor: the labor move-
ment improves health and safety
Improvements for workers did arrive decades later 
due to the growing voice and power of the orga-
nized labor movement. Beginning in the 1930s, 
wages, working hours, and conditions for meat 
slaughter and processing workers started to im-
prove as a result of the unionization of their work-
places.12 While these jobs were still dangerous and 
difficult, master bargaining unit contracts helped 
to balance the power structure to ensure that work-
ers’ health and safety were better protected. 
Unionization helped to bring safety procedures 
and programs to curtail some workplace dangers: 
union stewards enforced the placement of safety 
devices on cutting equipment; the presence of 
shop stewards and a grievance system helped to 
slow production speed to decrease accidents; and 
union sick leave provisions allowed those injured 
in the course of work to take time off to prevent 
small injuries from turning more serious.12 
technological and corporate restructuring:  
new hazards and all too familiar injustices
as technological advances and changes in corpo-
rate structure and practices reshaped the nature of 
the meat slaughter and processing industry, con-
ditions for workers worsened. 
 Between the 1950s and 1970s, power tools and 
automated lines helped to mechanize and speed 
up some of the slaughtering and meat-cutting 
tasks. as a consequence, more workers were used 
further down the line in the processing depart-
ments, where job duties became simplified. 
 While improving productivity and reducing the 
hazards in some tasks, new machine pacing and a 
production line approach created more repetitive 
work tasks than had been typical of the industry in 
“I	aimed	at	the	public’s	heart,	and	by	accident,		
I	hit	it	in	the	stomach.”
prior years.12 Workers still used sharp knives, but 
rather than doing tasks that required making a num-
ber of different cuts at different angles, allowing 
the body to shift positions, processing workers 
were now making the same cut over and over again. 
 Together with technological restructuring of 
the industry, changes in corporate structure and 
practices transformed the industry into the one we 
see today. over the past 40 years, meat slaughterers 
“of the butchers and floorsmen, the beef-
boners and trimmers, and all those who used 
knives, you could scarcely find the person who 
had use of his thumb; time and time again the 
base of it had been slashed, till it was a mere 
lump of flesh.”  —Upton Sinclair, The Jungle
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Vulnerable immigrant workers often suffer in silence 
C aS E  S T UDy  6 :  Safe Food from Safe Workplaces
While their countries of origin have changed over the decades, immigrant workers still dominate the work-
force in many meat and poultry plants, as they did in the 
time of The Jungle.3 These workers hold a variety of immigra-
tion statuses, and some are undocumented and without 
current permission to work in the United States. Despite 
the fact that all immigrant workers—independent of im-
migration status—are protected by national workplace 
rights standards, many are afraid to voice concern about 
unsafe working conditions or prefer to avoid navigating 
what is often seen as a complex and costly array of proce-
dures to vindicate their rights when they are harmed.1 
 The acute risk of immediate deportation acts as a very 
strong disincentive for immigrant workers to raise con-
cerns about workplace hazards or personal injury. as one 
poultry worker told Human Rights Watch in 2003, “They 
have us under threat all the time. They know most of us 
are undocumented—probably two-thirds. all they care 
about is getting bodies into the plant. My supervisor said 
they say they’ll call the InS [Immigration and naturaliza-
tion Service] if we make trouble.”1 
 Similar fear is felt among immigrant workers and US-
born workers who are working legally. Most workers de-
pend on having a job to support their families, and some 
may also have undocumented relatives or friends whom 
they want to protect.1 as reported by nebraska appleseed 
in 2009, a survey of 455 workers on nebraska’s meat-
packing disassembly lines revealed that workers’ basic fear 
of losing their jobs—apart from immigration concerns—
was the main reason they refrained from reporting inju-
ries, and that less that half (44 percent) remembered 
receiving information about how to use the workers’ 
compensation system in the event of an injury.2
 Lack of job control and fear of job loss are easily ex-
ploitable circumstances. as a consequence, reports abound 
of abusive supervisors who scream, humiliate, and threat-
en employees in order to meet their productivity quo-
ta.1,2,16 If injured or concerned about mistreatment, these 
vulnerable and marginalized populations feel they have 
nowhere to turn, as immigrant workers often feel that an 
employer’s human resource and medical staff have only 
the company’s interest in mind. as stated by one nebras-
ka meatpacker, “It’s sad to not know who to complain to, 
because even the doctors and nurses are on the company’s 
side.”2 This is especially true in non-unionized plants, 
where immigrant worker centers are taking an increasingly 
important role in protecting the rights of these workers.
 Companies remain dependent on hiring workers who 
are more willing than many US residents to work for low 
pay in extremely difficult and hazardous conditions in an 
industry plagued with rapid employee turnover.17
Lack of job  
control and fear  
of job loss mean 
immigrant workers 
are especially  
vulnerable to ex-
ploitation in the 
food processing 
industry.
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and processers began consolidating and moving 
their slaughterhouses to more rural communi-
ties.13 The rules of efficiency had changed, and 
meat that was once further processed by wholesalers 
and retailers nearer to final markets was now pro-
cessed at the plant. Broken and boned carcasses 
were cut into primal and subprimal cuts, packaged 
in vacuum-packed plastic, and shipped in boxes.13 
With narrow margins, industry profits depended 
on maximizing the volume of animals that could 
be processed. Plant size increased and along with 
it, the speed of processing and thus the number of 
animals that could be processed each day. For 
example, Smithfield’s Tar Heel plant in north 
Carolina—now the largest hog-processing facility 
in the country—can slaughter, cut, pack, and ship 
more than 32,000 hogs a day.14 Tyson’s 54 poul-
try processing plants conduct similar operations 
for 42.5 million chickens per week.15 
 Industry consolidation meant that fewer inde-
pendent small firms were operating. according to 
the Government accountability office (Gao), in 
2005 the top four meatpacking companies slaugh-
tered, processed, and packaged roughly 80 per-
cent of the beef in the United States;b the top four 
pork producers controlled nearly 70 percent of 
the market; and the poultry industry was somewhat 
less concentrated, with the top five companies 
maintaining over 50 percent of the market share.3 
 Significant changes in the relations between or-
ganized labor and employers came along with this 
industry consolidation and the movement of pro-
cessing to rural locations away from union centers. 
By the end of the 1980s, union membership among 
meat workers had fallen to 21 percent, compared 
to 46 percent during the 1970s and 1980s.6 With 
the decline of union membership, wages declined 
and employee turnover increased.3 
 The flow of new labor—often to rural areas 
without a sufficient population to fully staff large 
processing plants—drew upon those with limited 
job options, who lacked either the skills or re-
sources to find more desirable jobs, or relied 
upon company recruitment of new immigrants.1,3 
By 1994, one-third of production and sanitation 
workers in meatpacking plants were foreign-born 
non-citizens—a proportion that would continue to 
increase in the coming years.3 While these workers 
were provided with jobs that paid more than those 
in their homelands, US employers benefited from 
a flow of low-wage workers, and consumers reaped 
the benefits of low prices. 
osHa	inspections	and	a	congressional	investiga-
tion	in	1987	revealed	that	official	government	
statistics	underestimated	the	severity	of	what	was	
really	happening	inside	these	facilities	as	a	result	
of	underreporting	by	employers.		
b In 2008 the Department of Justice and 16 states challenged the merger of JBS and the National Beef Packing Company, two of the top four beef packing companies in the  
United States. These actions led the companies to abandon the deal.
the extent of current injury, illnesses, and dangerous  
working conditions revealed
amidst the technological and corporate restruc-
turing that occurred within the meat and poultry 
industry, it is not surprising that injury and illness 
rates increased. Between 1981 and 1991, the injury 
and illness rate rose 45.5 percent.6,18 More concern-
ing though, was the rise in illness rates in particu-
lar: more than a five-fold increase from 1981 to 
1991.12 This increase was probably driven by 
work-related musculoskeletal disorders (MSDs) of 
the nerves and muscles in the wrist, arms, neck, 
and back. MSDs are counted as “illnesses” by the 
Bureau of Labor Statistics, but include a spectrum 
of overuse or repetitive strain injuries that result 
in often permanently debilitating conditions such 
as tendinitis and carpal tunnel syndrome. MSDs 
are an extremely frequent occurrence in the meat 
slaughter and processing industries. By the late 
1980s, MSDs occurred at a rate approximately 75 
times that for industry as a whole.19  
 oSHa inspections and a Congressional inves-
tigation in 1987 revealed that official government 
statistics underestimated the severity of what was 
really happening inside these facilities as a result of 
underreporting by employers. In 1987, oSHa 
levied an unprecedented fine on Iowa Beef Pro-
cessors, Inc. (IBP, now a subsidiary of Tyson Foods) 
of $2.59 million for what an oSHa official 
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described as “the worst example of under report-
ing injuries and illnesses ever encountered.”12  
 Testimony by representatives of the United Food 
and Commercial Workers International Union 
(UFCW) during Congressional hearings revealed 
that the IBP plant in Dakota City, nebraska, main-
tained two injury logs: one maintained by the 
plant nurse and another version reported to 
oSHa. Copies of the original logs revealed that 
during a three-month period in 1985, 1,800 
workplace injuries were recorded. yet the version 
submitted to oSHa for the same time period 
included only 160 injuries.20
 Testimony during these hearings provided dis-
turbing accounts regarding the deteriorating, dif-
ficult, and dangerous working conditions that 
meatpacking workers faced and also described how 
employers often turned their backs on workers if 
they became injured. Many of the dangers were 
unchanged from Upton Sinclair’s day:
In less than 10 years at the plant, my work on the kill floor 
left me with permanent hearing loss and four additional 
injuries. Three of these were knife cuts because they didn’t 
issue protective gloves to their workers back then. My 
fourth injury was due to the same slippery floors that con-
tinue to maim workers at the plant today—a meat cart 
slipped, causing a meat hook to grab me and rip my back 
open clear to the spine.21  
yet another frequent occurrence—also a throw-
back to the turn of the century—was evidence of 
disregard for workers’ health and wellness. Testi-
mony provided accounts of workers sent back to 
work while still injured, and foremen ignoring 
workplace dangers and using fear to manage em-
ployees who voiced dissent about hazardous work-
ing conditions or their health.20 as one worker 
commented: 
I was even instructed to run that machine, on occasion, 
when there was an ammonia leak in the area. When your 
eyes begin watering so badly you can’t see, then you know 
the job is unsafe. But the foreman would just say, “You will 
go back over there. You will run that machine, or you will 
be fired.”22
In the UFCW’s review of the 1,800 injury and ill-
ness reports, extensive MSDs caused by repetitive 
strain were identified: “scores of workers whose ill-
nesses are described as numbness in the left hand, 
locking and tingling of fingers, pain in shoulder 
going into fingers.”23 a survey by the UFCW esti-
mated that 70 percent of all plant employees dem-
onstrated symptoms consistent with MSDs.24 
 In 1988, IBP was fined another $3.1 million 
under the oSHact’s general duty clause for fail-
ing to keep the workplace safe from hazards asso-
ciated with repetitive motions.25
the emergence of ergonomic solutions
In 1988, IBP reached a settlement with oSHa and 
the UFCW which substantially reduced IBP’s com-
bined fines of more than $5 million in exchange 
for establishing long-term programs aimed at ad-
dressing the high rates of MSDs. Such an approach 
centered on using ergonomic controls: changes in 
the work environment such that work stations and 
tasks are designed to fit the worker, rather than the 
other way around. For the next three years at its 15 
C aS E  S T UDy  6 :  Safe Food from Safe Workplaces
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union and non-union plants, IBP agreed to: (1) 
identify workplace hazards; (2) prevent such haz-
ards using work station and tool redesign, work 
practice controls, personal protective equipment, 
and the implementation of administrative con-
trols; (3) use medical management to reduce the 
incidence and severity of MSDs through early 
identification and treatment; and (4) educate and 
train employees to actively participate in the pre-
vention of MSDs. 
 according to one UFCW health and safety 
representative, the work on ergonomic solutions 
that began with IBP during the late 1980s and 
A Worker’s Grueling day
by Franco Ordonez29
Celia Lopez felt lucky when she was hired at the House of Raeford Farms turkey plant in Raeford, north 
Carolina. But after six years, the 44-year-old mother of 
three said she feared the “hands that take care of my family” 
were ruined. at the [Charlotte] Observer’s request, Lopez 
recounted a typical day:
•	 6:45	a.m. – Lopez walks through the gate of the sprawl-
ing plant. She’s struck by the pungent smell of ammo-
nia. She punches her timecard and puts on her gear—
rubber boots, apron, hairnet and two pairs of gloves. 
She rushes to position. Workers must be at their posts 
before the production line starts. no excuses.
•	 7	a.m. – The line starts. Lopez begins by grabbing and 
placing turkey breasts on plates to be weighed. Each 
plate must weigh between 6 and 6-1/2 pounds. She 
grabs meat with her right hand and uses her left to hold 
the plate, then pushes the turkey along the line. She’ll 
repeat this process hundreds of times an hour.
•	 9:30	 a.m. – If Lopez needs a bathroom break, she 
must wait until a supervisor finds someone to replace 
her on the line. This can take minutes or hours—if 
approved at all. “Bathroom breaks are a privilege, not a 
necessity,” she said her bosses told her. If granted, she 
has 10 minutes to remove her gear, use the facilities 
and return.
•	 11	a.m. – Lunch.
•	 11:30	a.m. – Back on the line. She has processed hun-
dreds of pounds of meat. The line is moving fast; 
workers struggle to keep pace, she says. Conversation is 
minimal.
•	 2	p.m. – Break. She looks for a wall to press her back 
against and stretch her muscles.
•	 2:30	p.m. – The next two hours are the hardest—the 
piles of meat seem endless, she says. Her back cramps, 
pain spreading to her shoulders, arms and hands. She 
is exhausted from standing. Sometimes she feels dizzy.
•	 4	p.m. – She punches out. She changes out of her work 
clothes, washes her face and leaves.
•	 4:30	p.m. – She arrives home and takes a shower. “The 
meat smell gets stuck in your skin,” she says.
•	 about	7	p.m. – She helps cook dinner for her family. 
Grasping a spoon is hard, she says. She uses two hands 
to carry a dinner plate. Basic tasks take longer because 
of the pain. “It’s like ants crawling through my hands, 
up my arms,” she says.
•	 9	p.m. – She takes two ibuprofen pills before rubbing 
her hands with alcohol and lotion—a nightly routine.
•	 9:30	p.m. – She goes to bed.
•	 Midnight	to	2	a.m. – Lopez frequently wakes up, hands 
cramping. She squeezes her fists each time the pain is 
worse. She swallows more ibuprofen.
•	 5	 a.m. – Her alarm sounds. The line starts in two 
hours. “Sometimes I cry. I just pray to God that he will 
show me the way.”
— Reprinted with permission from the Charlotte observer
early 1990s greatly improved health and safety 
practices throughout the meat and poultry slaugh-
ter and processing industry.26 Greater automa-
tion, adjustable work stands, lower conveyer belts, 
and mechanical assists are now commonplace in 
most state-of-the-art plants. These design changes 
are a double win for industry: they not only pre-
vent MSDs, they improve employee productivity.26 
With less strain, workers can perform tasks with 
greater ease. When workers are free from suffering 
from an injury on a job, they can work more effi-
ciently. yet even among plants heralded as having 
model ergonomic programs, health researchers 
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continue to document an excess prevalence of an 
array of MSDs compared to that among other 
workers from the same community.27 
 The hazard control techniques mentioned above 
are simply one component of a multi-faceted er-
gonomic management program that includes the 
voluntary guidelines established by oSHa in 
1993.28 yet because in 2001 Congress and Presi-
dent George W. Bush repealed oSHa’s newly issued 
mandatory ergonomic standard, which would have 
legally required employers to implement specific 
ergonomic hazard control programs, an employer 
has discretion as to what elements of an ergonomic 
program to implement. Reduced line speed is 
rarely one of them.
 Workers often know when inspectors or visitors 
are at the plant, as revealed by multiple workers 
surveyed by nebraska appleseed. “When a visitor 
comes they slow it down and when they leave they 
speed it up.”2 “It would be good if they main-
tained an adequate number of workers on the 
line and the same line speed as when inspection 
visits take place.”2
	 Today, only USDa, not oSHa, specifically 
regulates line speed.3 But USDa assesses permis-
sible line speeds with respect to food safety con-
siderations, not worker safety.3 as long as USDa 
inspectors can certify that the meat product is un-
contaminated, line speed can increase with no 
concern for effects on worker health and safety. 
When line speeds are fast due to production pres-
sures, the probability of human error or accidental 
contamination greatly increases. 
 USDa’s own procedures to correct contamina-
tion include reducing line speed so that employees 
can exercise better caution and have the time nec-
essary to sanitize tools.30 yet contaminated meat 
and poultry sicken thousands of people each year. 
 Based on the latest data from the Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention, in 2007, 691 in-
dividuals became sick after eating contaminated 
chicken and 667 individuals were sickened by eat-
ing contaminated beef.31 yet the degree of under-
reporting is known to be significant—an estimated 
38-fold in the case of Salmonella, and 20-fold for 
E.coli 0157:H7.32 Meat recalls are a common occur-
rence these days. In the first six months of 2010, 
multiple incidents resulted in the recall of over 6.1 
million pounds of beef due to E. coli O157:H7 con-
tamination.33 
 now the list of virulent E. coli strains is expand-
ing. In august 2010, 8,500 pounds of hamburger 
were recalled after three people were made vio-
lently ill by consuming meat that was traced to 
Cargill and to a specific production lot.34 Investi-
gators tracked the likely source of the illnesses to 
E. coli 026, a strain that is legally allowed in beef 
sold to the public.34 USDa and industry officials 
will undoubtedly debate the merits of giving this 
new bacterial strain “illegal” status, but will a focus 
on these downstream effects really correct the 
upstream causes at the point of slaughter and pro-
duction that are affecting workers and consu- 
mers alike? 
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today,	only	usda,	not	osHa,	specifically		
regulates	line	speed.	But	usda	assesses	permis-
sible	line	speeds	with	respect	to	food	safety		
considerations,	not	worker	safety.	
Line speed: pain for workers, contaminated meat  
for consumers, and profit for employers
Line speed, in combination with staffing levels on 
the line and the rotation (or non-rotation) of 
workers during their shifts, is directly related to 
the number of repeat motions workers make in a 
day. In 2009, the non-profit law and policy cen-
ter nebraska appleseed issued a report revealing 
that among a representative sample of nebraska 
meatpackers, line speed and having an adequate 
number of staff on the line were the biggest con-
cerns for workers: 73 percent stated that line speed 
had increased in the past year.2 
 Why quicken the speed of the line? Line speed 
is directly related to profits. The faster the line, 
the more product produced, and the greater the 
profits. as a 2004 Human Rights Watch report 
stated, “Profit margins per chicken or per cut 
of meat are very low, often a few pennies a pound, 
so competitive advantage rests on squeezing out 
the highest volume of production in the shortest 
possible time.”1 Managers tell workers that the 
plant loses money every second the line is slowed 
or stopped.1   
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 In 1996, the Pathogen Reduction act was passed, 
allowing USDa to issue a new “risk-based” system 
of inspection that made the slaughter and process-
ing industry, rather than USDa inspectors, re-
sponsible for identifying and fixing food safety 
hazards—the Hazard analysis and Critical Control 
Point (HaCCP) system. HaCCP is considered a 
vast improvement over USDa’s former “poke and 
sniff” inspectional system in which inspectors re-
lied on their sense of sight, smell and touch to 
identify contaminated meat and thus were unable 
to identify invisible bacteria or infection. yet under 
the HaCCP system, the role of USDa inspectors 
was changed to providing oversight over industry’s 
own inspectors. 
 Slowing or stopping production is a disincen-
tive for addressing problems of potentially contam-
inated meat. HaCCP also prescribes methods for 
the decontamination of meat using expensive tech-
nologies (e.g., carcass rinsing, ozonation, and irra-
diation among others) rather than fixing problems 
at the source. In 2001, a Gao report reviewed the 
effectiveness of this inspection system during a 
pilot stage and surveyed USDa inspectors and vet-
erinarians working at poultry and meat slaughter 
and processing establishments. Sixty percent of 
those surveyed stated that line speed was too fast to 
ensure product safety.35 While USDa inspectors 
still provide oversight, they are discouraged from 
stopping production lines when they suspect con-
tamination. a USDa memo in 2002 stated that 
inspectors would be held responsible for halting 
production unless there was clearcut evidence of 
product contamination.36 
 It’s unclear whether this USDa internal policy 
still holds true today. nevertheless, if action is not 
taken when an inspector suspects a problem, the 
odds are greatly increased that one piece of con-
taminated meat can contaminate machinery and 
other products.36
Coming full circle: attempts to fix food   
safety neglect worker health 
as a result of the public’s growing concern over 
food recalls and associated illness outbreaks, in 
2009 President obama vowed to “upgrade our 
food system for the 21st century.”37 While such 
food system reforms are crucially needed, the 
focus of these efforts is consumer health—once 
again, neglecting the health of workers, just as in 
the day of Sinclair Lewis’s The Jungle. Ironically, the 
President even referred to the time of The Jungle, 
noting that many of the nation’s food-safety laws 
“have not been updated since they were written in 
the time of Teddy Roosevelt.”37 yet, only when we 
succeed in making the connection that healthy 
food is produced by healthy workers will we find 
ourselves with a safer, healthier food system. 
improving coordination between  
uSdA and oSHA
USDa inspectors have a daily presence at many meat 
and poultry slaughter and processing facilities. With 
proper cross-training and agency coordination, 
these federal safety inspectors could help to im-
A meat cutter in 
a packing plant in 
Baltimore, Maryland. 
© 2010 Earl Dotter
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prove workplace safety as part of their duties to 
protect consumer safety. 
 The first step in such an approach has already 
been taken, although it took a terrible tragedy to 
compel the agencies to act. In 1991, a fire claimed 
the lives of 25 poultry plant workers in Hamlet, 
north Carolina, many of whom could not escape 
because the owner locked the plant doors based on 
a suspicion that workers were stealing product.38 
While a USDa poultry inspector knew of the rou-
tinely locked doors and reported to the owner that 
his actions were in violation of safety codes, he did 
not report the incident(s) to oSHa.3 Lives likely 
would have been spared if only the USDa inspec-
tor had reported this violation. 
 In response to this accident, USDa and oSHa 
revised an existing memorandum of understand-
ing (MoU) between the two agencies in 1994.3 
The MoU established a process and framework 
for: (1) training USDa meat and poultry inspec-
tion personnel to improve their ability to recog-
nize serious hazards within the meat and poultry 
industry; (2) reinforcing procedures for meat and 
poultry inspection personnel to report unsafe and 
spectors, only one such training has occurred. The 
2005 report revealed that over an 11-year period 
since the MoU was signed, USDa inspectors made 
31 referrals to oSHa, 26 of which resulted in an 
oSHa inspection.3 However, 31 referrals in hun-
dreds of facilities where inspectors are often pres-
ent each and every day indicates an underutilized 
system of coordination. 
 The Gao report revealed that USDa officials 
cited three primary reasons for the failure of the 
referral system: (1) workplace hazards are not the 
focus of their inspections; (2) inspectors often 
deal with hazards by working directly with plant 
management; and (3) USDa inspectors don’t 
want to be a part of any resulting inspection—
which might put them at risk of being cited for 
violations, such as not wearing their personal 
protective equipment.3  
 oSHa could accomplish more effective enforce-
ment of critical safety and health standards with 
more routine USDa signaling of the need for 
inspections. It’s clear that better coordination 
between these two federal agencies is still badly 
needed and represents a major opportunity.
improving prevention: new approaches  
beyond enforcement are needed 
as the current oSHa administrator David Michaels 
has described, enforcing compliance with oSHa 
regulations is intended to have a strong preventive 
purpose. “The credible threat of enforcement 
makes most employers think twice about cutting 
back on preventive maintenance, training or in-
vestments in safer working conditions. The fear of 
a serious citation and heavy fine should make em-
ployers consider the consequences of cutting cor-
ners on safety to meet a deadline. and the threat 
of strong enforcement can encourage employers 
to seek out a safety consultant or use the free ser-
vices of our on-Site Consultation Program.”40 
 While employers are required to comply with 
oSHa rules, they do not have to demonstrate 
compliance unless they are inspected. In 2009, 
oSHa inspected 97 poultry plants and 139 meat-
packing plants. These inspection rates correspond 
roughly to inspecting one out of six poultry plants 
and one out of eleven meatpacking plants.c,41,42 
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unhealthy working conditions to which workers 
are exposed; (3) instituting new procedures for 
USDa’s meat and poultry inspection personnel to 
refer serious workplace hazards affecting plant 
employees to oSHa; and (4) coordinating possi-
ble inconsistencies between oSHa’s job safety and 
health standards and USDa’s sanitation and health 
standards.39 Through the MoU, USDa inspectors 
are not expected to replace oSHa inspectors. 
With improved training and a clear referral system, 
USDa inspectors are to be able to recognize seri-
ous workplace hazards and report them to oSHa 
and to plant management. 
 according to a 2005 Gao report, while oSHa 
has put together training materials for USDa in-
osHa	could	have	more	effective	enforcement		
if	usda	inspectors	routinely	alerted	osHa		
to	potential	safety	hazards.		
c Rates derived from OSHA inspection data and US Census county business pattern data for NAICS codes 311611 and 311615.
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 Limited resources are an endemic problem 
confronting oSHa’s system of enforcement. among 
the criteria oSHa uses to identify high-priority 
plants for the limited number of inspections it can 
conduct each year are high rates of injury and illness 
and the severity of injuries or illnesses. yet, just as 
in 1987, it is still difficult for oSHa to rely on the 
available data to set these priorities because of 
their questionable reliability.3,43 
underreporting of injury and illness data:  
a continued problem 
From 1991 to 2001 the reported injury and illness 
rates in the meat and poultry slaughter and pro-
cessing industry fell by 50 percent.44 More recent 
trends from 2003 through 2009 also show steady 
declines (see Figure 1). In 2009, non-fatal injury 
or illnesses impacted roughly one in 14 workers in 
the meat and poultry slaughter and processing in-
dustries (6.9 percentd).7 While lower than in years 
prior, this injury and illness rate is still 60 percent 
higher than that for all manufacturing industries 
combined.7 In addition, 2009 Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) data reveal that the slaughtering 
and processing of meat (excluding poultry) had 
the highest incidence rate of severe cases—those 
that resulted in days away from work, restricted 
work activity, or job transfer.45,e 
 Industry representatives describe the trends of 
declining workplace injury and illness rates as evi-
dence that their operations are safer for workers.44 
It is likely that plants which have successfully insti-
tuted voluntary multi-faceted ergonomic programs 
have experienced improvements in some areas. yet, 
just as Congressional hearings in 1987 revealed 
underreporting of injuries and illnesses, today’s 
investigators find evidence of similar problems. 
 Investigative journalists from The Charlotte Observer 
reported in 2008 that while the House of Rae-
ford’s poultry slaughter and processing plant in 
Greenville, South Carolina, claimed a five-year 
safety streak with no lost-time accidents, multiple 
cases were identified in which injured workers 
were brought back to work hours after surgery, or 
supervisors and/or plant nursing staff dismissed 
employees’ requests to see physicians when their 
pain became too much to bear.46 By getting workers 
back to work even though they are still injured and 
in pain, an installation the size of the Greenville 
plant can save hundreds of thousands of dollars in 
workers’ compensations costs.47 In addition, the 
plant is more likely to avoid an oSHa inspection 
because with no lost-time accidents it appears as 
though injuries are of the less severe variety. 
 In another House of Raeford plant in West 
Columbia, South Carolina, the company reported 
zero MSDs from July 2003 to april 2007. How-
ever, journalists from The Charlotte Observer found 12 
employees who worked at the plant during the 
same time who said they suffered pain brought on 
by MSDs; indeed, two of them reported having 
surgery for carpal tunnel syndrome at company 
expense.46 This company reports some of the in-
dustry’s lowest illness rates and thus as of 2008 was 
rarely inspected by oSHa.46 
 While company officials dispute allegations of 
underreporting or mistreating ill or injured 
workers, a 2009 Gao report substantiates con-
cern for the underreporting of work-related inju-
ries and illnesses in meat and poultry industries.43 
The report stated that many employers did not 
d NAICS code 31161 (animal slaughtering and processing).
e NAICS code 311611 (animal (except poultry) slaughtering).
Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table 1—Incidence Rates—Detailed Industry Level, 2003–2009.  
Available at: http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshsum.htm. Accessed: October 29, 2010.
F iGure  1
reported rates of nonfatal occupational injuries and illness in meat 
and poultry slaughter and processing industries, 2003–2009.
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report workplace injuries and illnesses for fear of 
increasing their workers’ compensation costs or 
hurting their chances of winning contracts. The 
report also revealed that workers stated they did 
not report job-related injures for fear of being 
fired or disciplined, or for fear of jeopardizing 
rewards based on having low injury and illness rates. 
 UFCW recently compared injury and illness 
data among its unionized meat and poultry plants 
to BLS data overall and showed that rates among 
unionized plants were consistently higher.26 These 
data support what the Gao report and other 
health and safety experts contend: when workers 
are less fearful about employer retaliation if they 
report their workplace injury or illness, they are 
more likely to report. 
 yet oSHa’s own recordkeeping policies are 
also part of the problem of underreporting. In 
January 2002, oSHa’s revised injury and illness 
recordkeeping rule went into effect.48 This new 
rule changed definitions and recording criteria. 
While these changes are nuanced and subtle, they 
greatly affected how data are collected and how 
trends are interpreted—data after 2002 are not 
comparable to data from earlier periods.12,48-51 For 
example, the column for recording “repeated 
trauma” was deleted from the workplace injury 
and illness log. While the original revised record-
keeping rule contained a section that added a spe-
cific illness column for MSDs, it never became effec-
tive and in 2003 the MSD column was officially 
eliminated.52 
 While reporting of MSDs is still required, there 
are no specialized recording criteria for these 
conditions, and thus enumerating the extent and 
nature of specific MSDs is impaired.48 In addi-
tion, exacerbation of a preexisting MSD may go 
unrecorded given how the revised recordkeeping 
rule defines a new case.49 oSHa’s summary of the 
new rules specifies that “aggravation of a cause 
where signs or symptoms have not resolved is a 
continuation of the original case” and therefore 
not considered recordable.49,53 oSHa’s record-
keeping handbook further explains, “If the worker 
has not fully recovered and no new event or expo-
sure has occurred in the workplace, the case is 
considered a continuation of the previous injury 
or illness and is not recordable.”48 
 Therefore, if a poultry worker’s pre-existing 
work-related tendinitis is once again exacerbated, 
it’s likely that such a case will go unrecorded—a re-
sult easily justified under oSHa’s own rule. Re-
searchers as well as oSHa officials have reported 
that such recordkeeping changes have only con-
tributed to the apparent downward trend of injury 
and illness rates.12,49,50 
recordkeeping policies: is change on the horizon? 
Changes to enforce accurate injury and illness 
reporting may be on the horizon. academic re-
searchers have estimated that the magnitude of the 
underreporting across all industries may be exten-
sive.54-57 For example, one study that surveyed data 
from six states revealed that the BLS injury and 
illness statistics missed almost 340,000 lost-time 
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injuries during the years 1998-2002 and at a 
minimum, the reported statistics missed 24 per-
cent of injury cases.55 as a result of these academic 
studies and the investigative journalism of The Charlotte 
Observer, a Gao investigation was launched and 
legislative hearings on the underreporting of work-
place injuries and illnesses were held.46,58,43 Con-
gress has subsequently directed oSHa to begin an 
enforcement initiative on recordkeeping. 
 Effective February 19, 2010, oSHa launched 
its Recordkeeping national Emphasis Program.59 
The aim of the program is to ascertain whether, 
and to what extent, employers are underrecording 
workplace injuries and illnesses. Meatpacking and 
poultry processing industries are targeted for this 
initiative. The program will also assess injury and 
illness among cleaning and sanitation workers— 
who are not employed directly by the plants in most 
cases—an issue that the Gao’s 2005 report stated 
was a key contributor to the problem of incomplete 
data. Special procedures for assessing the scope of 
musculoskeletal disorders will be included. 
 In addition to its Recordkeeping national Em-
phasis Program, oSHa also held hearings in 2010 
to discuss its proposed revisions to illness and 
injury reporting requirements. as proposed, MSDs 
will once again be specified on the work-related 
injuries and illness form and the total number of 
MSDs each year will be summarized. 
 Without accurate surveillance data, oSHa is 
unable to evaluate whether its hazard prevention 
policies and programs are being effective. While 
oSHa’s new focus on improving recordkeeping is 
a step in the right direction, it is too soon to tell 
whether new actions will be taken or new policies 
will be issued to redress underreporting. yet 
oSHa’s enhanced actions are serving to put 
employers on notice to a degree not seen for over 
a decade.26 
Fines for violations: signs of improvement?
If oSHa’s deterrence-based system of levying 
penalties on non-compliant employers is to oper-
ate effectively, the economic consequences of vio-
lations must be considerably higher than the costs 
of avoiding compliance in the first place. yet the 
oSHact itself limits the size of fines the agency can 
impose. For “serious” violations, there is a $7,000 
maximum. If oSHa can determine that a company’s 
violation is “willful,” far stiffer fines can be levied, 
up to $70,000 per violation. Penalties can be re-
duced based on the discretion of oSHa officials 
and Department of Labor attorneys after informal 
discussions with companies or if the cited employer 
challenges the citation and enters into settlement 
negotiations with the agency. More often than 
not, oSHa chooses to settle cases because it lacks 
the resources to litigate.60   
Without	accurate	surveillance	data,	osHa	is		
unable	to	evaluate	whether	its	hazard	prevention	
policies	and	programs	are	being	effective.	
 as reported by the investigative journalism team 
at The Charlotte Observer, from 1997 to 2007 roughly 
three-quarters of oSHa fines against poultry 
companies were lowered or eliminated. For exam-
ple, in 2001, oSHa inspections at Tyson Foods in 
Wilkesboro, north Carolina, found more than 30 
violations that involved hazards that could result in 
amputations, factures, or falls. The $13,000 pro-
posed fine was dropped to less than $1,800. When 
The Charlotte Observer examined this issue further in 
its 2008 series, the average starting fine to the 
poultry industry was roughly $2,300 and fines 
were reduced to an average level of $1,100. The 
problem with such minimal fines is the perverse 
message they send to employers: the financial cost 
of ignoring the law is much lower than assuring 
compliance with oSHa standards.60
 yet very recently, there are signs that oSHa 
may be moving towards higher penalties and more 
frequent use of findings of “willful” violations. In 
2010, oSHa levied its highest-ever fine on a 
poultry plant run by allen Family Foods in Mary-
land. The $1.03 million fine was issued based on 
51 violations, 15 of which were considered “will-
ful.” also in 2010, oSHa fined the Wisconsin-
based meatpacking company VPP Group LLC 
$369,500 for 38 violations, four of which were 
considered “willful.” Time will tell whether these 
fines will have a ripple effect on the industry as a 
whole of making the cost of hazard prevention 
lower than the cost of noncompliance. 
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There remains a significant gap between the frighten-ing evidence of injury and illness revealed by aca-demic researchers, journalists, labor and human 
rights organizations, on the one hand, and the unreli-
able official injury and illness statistics on the other. 
Questionable surveillance data cannot serve the purpose 
of effectively targeting limited resources to remedy work-
place safety and health hazards. While oSHa’s Record-
keeping national Emphasis Program and its efforts to 
include MSDs on workplace injury and illness log forms 
are important recent advances, it is unlikely that our ex-
isting illness and injury reporting system can completely 
capture the true injury and illness experience of workers 
without a major overhaul. 
 Second, oSHa’s enforcement system will never have 
the resources necessary to reach all establishments. Thus, 
the recent trend towards increased fines for violations is 
crucial for oSHa’s deterrence-based system of compli-
ance to operate effectively. In addition, the MoU be-
tween USDa and oSHa, last revised in 1991, provides 
great potential to tap the presence of USDa inspectors to 
enhance protections in the meat and poultry slaughter 
and processing industries. yet over the last 20 years, re-
sults from this interagency agreement are meager and 
warrant reexamination. 
 Third, real improvements in the health and safety 
of meat and poultry slaughter and processing workers 
can be realized only when the unequal power dynamics 
on the plant floor are remedied. Workers’ lack of job 
control and fear of job loss, especially among immigrant 
workers, are easily exploitable circumstances. new pro-
cedures and practices are needed to improve the capacity 
of workers to identify, report, and prevent workplace 
hazards. 
 oSHa has taken preliminary steps towards rulemaking 
efforts requiring a workplace safety and health preven-
tion program, the Injury and Illness Prevention Program 
(I2P2), which has real potential for protecting all workers, 
including those that are most vulnerable. yet where 
there are serious imbalances of power between manag-
ers and workers—such as in some meatpacking and 
poultry processing facilities and especially among 
non-unionized plants—simply establishing a pro forma 
workplace health and safety committee or a worker 
complaint system may not be enough to guarantee real 
employee empowerment and real protections. There-
fore, another critical component of addressing these 
power imbalances to establish safer conditions lies in 
workers’ right to organize unions, effective union rep-
resentation, and workers’ centers. 
 Lastly, the disconnect between the health of meat 
and poultry slaughter and processing workers and the 
safety of the meat landing on the public’s table must be 
addressed. In the absence of an oSHa ergonomics 
standard, oSHa or its research partner, the national 
Institute for occupational Health and Safety (nIoSH) 
should have more influence in the evolution of food 
safety decisions by USDa that are having an impact on 
workers, such as limits on line speed. 
 Through oSHa as well, speed of work should be 
specifically addressed, slowed, and regulated. Protec-
tion of workers in the meat and poultry slaughter and 
processing industries requires slowing down produc-
tion—as well as improving the capacity of workers to be 
active participants in comprehensive workplace health 
and safety processes to address workplace dangers, when 
they arise. In order to protect workers where health and 
safety interventions such as slowing line speed may im-
pact productivity and profits, increased regulation may 
be the only way to level the playing field and ensure that 
all establishments operate similarly and safely for both 
workers and consumers. 
 only when we embrace the notion that healthy food 
comes from healthy workers will we achieve a safer, 
healthier food system.
only	when	we	embrace	the	notion	that	healthy	food	comes	from	
healthy	workers	will	we	achieve	a	safer,	healthier	food	system.
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CaSE  STUDy  6  —  t iMeL ine
y E a r E V E N T
1906 Upton Sinclair’s novel The Jungle exposes worker health and food safety hazards in the 
meatpacking industry in Chicago.
1906 US government passes the Pure Food and Drug act and the Meat Inspection act—laws to  
safeguard the public from adulterated meat.
1943 US Department of Labor finds that injuries and accidents are causing absence from work in  
the meatpacking industry at a rate double the national average for manufacturing. 
1943 Labor organizations secure their first national contracts.
1950s–
1970s
automation and mechanization transform most meat slaughter and processing plants.
1960s–
1980s
Iowa Beef Processors, Inc. (IBP), begins a corporate transformation that changes the face of the 
entire industry. The meat slaughter and processing industry becomes consolidated. Plants move 
to more rural communities and the size of individual establishments dramatically increases. 
Late 1980s Union membership in meat slaughter and processing plants falls to 21 percent compared to  
an average membership rate of 46 percent during the 1970s and 1980s.
1987 Inspections by oSHa and a Congressional hearing find significant underreporting of workplace 
injuries and illness by IBP. Testimony by members of the UFCW reveals that original injury and 
illness logs during a three-month period in 1985 report 1,800 cases, yet only 160 were reported 
to oSHa. UFCW estimates that 70 percent of workers in this plant have symptoms consistent 
with MSDs. The company is fined $2.59 million. 
1990 oSHa issues its ergonomic program management guidelines for the meatpacking industry. 
1991 Injury and illness rate among meat slaughter and processing workers reaches 45.5 percent— 
a 40 percent increase compared to the 1981 rate. There is a five-fold increase in the illness  
rate in particular between 1981 and 1991.
1991 a fire claims the lives of 25 poultry plant workers, many of whom could not escape because 
the plant door was locked by the employer. USDa inspectors knew of the locked door, and this 
prompts a new MoU between oSHa and USDa to improve worker health and safety training 
among USDa inspectors and to establish a clear referral system to oSHa to follow up on  
specific concerns.
1996 USDa codifies the Pathogen reduction act and its Hazard analysis and Critical Control Point 
(HaCCP) system, allowing the majority of product safety inspections to be conducted by industry  
inspectors, rather than USDa. 
2001 The US Government accountability office reviews a pilot HaCCP system and finds that 60  
percent of USDa inspectors and veterinarians surveyed by the Gao believe that line speed  
is too fast to ensure product safety. 
2001 Congress and President George W. Bush repeal oSHa’s ergonomic standard.
2001 reported injury and illness rates for meat and poultry slaughter and processing workers fall  
by 50 percent between 1991 and 2001.
2002 oSHa implements revisions to its injury and illness recordkeeping rule. 
2003 oSHa officially deletes the MSD column from its injury and illness reporting log.
2004 Human rights Watch publishes an influential report, Blood, Sweat, and Fear: Worker’ Rights in U.S. 
Meat and Poultry Plants, detailing conditions and vulnerabilities in meat and poultry industries 
that violate workplace health and safety regulations and principles of human rights.
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y E a r E V E N T
2005 Gao issues a report on the meatpacking industry and finds that more effort is needed to protect 
the health of these workers and that true injury rates are likely higher than reported rates. The 
report finds that efforts are needed to improve the validity of injury and illness statistics.
2008 The Charlotte Observer publishes its series, “The Cruelest Cuts,” detailing human rights and 
worker health and safety abuses in the poultry industry. The series, in combination with evidence 
from academic studies, prompts a Gao investigation and legislative hearing about underreporting 
of workplace injuries and illnesses—statistics that help to target oSHa’s inspections. 
2009 Nebraska appleseed publishes its notable report, The Speed Kills You, which documents meat-
packing safety and workplace conditions from the perspective of workers in one of the country’s 
largest meat processing states.
2009 oSHa inspects roughly one in six poultry slaughter and processing plants and roughly one in 11 
meat slaughter and processing plants. 
2009 oSHa launches its recordkeeping National Emphasis Program to improve the reporting of injury 
and illness. The meat and poultry slaughter and processing industry is a target for the program.
2010 oSHa holds hearings on the agency’s proposal to reinstate MSDs on injury and illness log forms.
2010 oSHa’s highest-ever fine to a poultry slaughter and processing plant for 51 violations, 15 of 
which were considered “willful,” is issued for $1.03 million. 
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Synthesis and recommendations 
APriL 5, 2010
Explosion at Upper Branch Mine  
in West Virginia kills 29 coal miners
APriL 20, 2010
Eleven men dead on Deep Horizon  
BP oil rig in Gulf of Mexico
JuLy 14, 2010
oven at U.S. Steel plant near  
Pittsburgh explodes, injuring 15 
workers, at least two critically
T
HE SUFFERInG oF WoRkERS SEEMS 
to be front-page news nearly every day. yet 
for all the disasters that appear in the 
headlines, far more workers die or are in-
jured without making the headlines. and 
these incidents not only affect the injured work-
ers, but greatly impact their families and commu-
nities. Every day, fourteen workers die, and each 
year, more than 4 million are seriously injured or 
are sickened by exposure to toxic agents.1 Real 
change to the nation’s approach to workplace safety 
and health is desperately needed. 
 But what kinds of changes? There is a risk that 
the eagerness to fix ineffective worker safety and 
health protections will lead to quick, reactive efforts 
to undo the failings of earlier administrations, 
without sufficient thought about the deeper limi-
tations of the regulatory approach that was devel-
oped in the late 1960s and is still largely intact.  
 The quick response approach has three po-
tential pitfalls: (1) it precludes broader system-level 
changes to occupational and environmental health; 
(2) it inhibits broad coalition-building that could 
reduce the compartmentalization of worker health, 
consumer health, and environmental health; and 
(3) it could inadvertently shift risks from one sec-
tor of society to another in the search for a solu-
tion to a problem too narrowly defined. 
 To fully understand the limits of our current 
federal worker safety and health policies and iden-
tify long-term solutions that are both viable and 
effective, we must step back and view broadly the sys-
tems of production within which work environments 
function. More inspections and more standards 
alone will not cure structural flaws in occupational 
safety and health regulations in the United States. 
In addition, agencies other than the occupational 
Safety and Health administration (oSHa) are also 
responsible for worker protections—for example, 
the Mine Safety and Health administration, in the 
case of mine workers, and the Environmental 
Protection agency (EPa) in the case of farm work-
ers exposed to pesticides. 
 our research has led to the conclusion that the 
most effective reforms will come through preven-
tive redesign of workplaces, work processes, and 
products and not simply tighter regulation of the 
current way of doing business. Further, reforms to 
oSHa regulations need to be coupled with a new 
research agenda—through the national Institute 
for occupational Safety and Health (nIoSH) and 
other science agencies—focused on more preven-
tion-oriented research. To begin to move this 
process forward, we undertook the task of research-
ing and writing a set of stories demonstrating why 
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and how our occupational safety and health sys-
tems are broken and identifying lessons learned 
that we hope can provide insights on how to fix 
those systems.
Six case studies: revealing where we went 
wrong in our systems to protect workers
The Lowell Center for Sustainable Production at 
the University of Massachusetts Lowell sought to use 
the rich history of actions and inactions regarding 
selected workplace safety and health policies and 
practices in the United States to reveal compelling 
evidence for national policy reforms that will lead 
to stronger, more effective, prevention-focused 
worker safety and health protections. The result-
ing six case studies illustrate a range of current 
failures in our approach to workplace safety and 
health.
Floor finishers, lacquer sealers and fires:  
safer product alternatives are the solution. 
Three Vietnamese floor finishers were killed in 
two separate fires in Massachusetts in 2004–2005. 
In each case, highly flammable lacquer sealer vapors 
ignited and flashed almost instantly across a newly 
varnished floor, causing a deadly inferno. Fatal 
fires like these, as well as less dramatic but also 
serious neurological damage and other adverse health 
effects from floor finishing chemicals, illustrate 
the dangers faced by small entrepreneurial busi-
nesses staffed by immigrant laborers. Despite the 
challenges to creating protections for these work-
ers, this case study has a hopeful ending. It dem-
onstrates the power of connecting the health 
struggles of immigrant workers with community 
organizing efforts that resulted in landmark legis-
lation in Massachusetts prohibiting highly flam-
mable floor finishing chemicals. The story shows 
how grassroots organizing can lead to practices 
that protect workers—in this case, replacing dan-
gerous products with safer alternatives.
When my job breaks my back: shouldering the  
burden of work-related musculoskeletal disorders.	
Work-related musculoskeletal disorders are a seri-
ous public health concern. our case study on back 
injuries and other musculoskeletal disorders 
among health care workers, hotel housekeepers, 
and poultry processing workers illustrates how 
badly ergonomic injuries can disable us and affect 
our everyday well-being both at work and outside 
our work. Despite overwhelming scientific evidence 
on the risks and the economic costs of failure to 
control ergonomic hazards, oSHa was prevented 
from mandating comprehensive solutions. In the 
first months of 2001, oSHa’s Ergonomics Stan-
dard was repealed with the first use and thus far the 
only use of the Congressional Review act—a move 
made possible by a Republican Congress and the 
newly elected President George W. Bush. yet a 
decade later, musculoskeletal disorders remain 
one of the leading causes of lost work time and an 
extremely burdensome “cost of doing business” 
with impacts felt throughout the economy and the 
health care system. 
 Successful initiatives in several states are high-
lighting at least one way forward: programs that 
focus first on reducing injuries in high-risk tasks 
such as manual patient handling and transfer in 
the health care and social assistance sectors, and 
then on tackling particularly hazardous occupa-
tions, and finally entire industries. Further, occupa-
tional safety and health management systems based 
on real worker participation and leadership com-
mitment will help address ergonomic risks in those 
industries where the burden is heaviest.
© 2010 Earl Dotter
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the poison that smells like butter:  
diacetyl and popcorn workers’ lung disease.
In 2000, a cluster of disabling and potentially fatal 
lung disease among workers was identified in a 
microwave popcorn plant in Jasper, Missouri. a 
few years later, additional cases were identified 
among workers exposed to butter flavoring chemi-
cals while working at their food flavoring manu-
facturing jobs. This shocking case study raises a 
troubling question: how could a chemical that can 
destroy a worker’s lungs in just a few months evade 
our system of chemical regulation? Workers were 
once again the “canary in the coal mine” for the 
general public whose lungs are also being damaged 
by the artificial butter flavoring chemical, diacetyl. 
 This case points out the challenges of chemical-
by-chemical regulation spanning multiple agency 
jurisdictions, and highlights the essential role 
played by occupational and environmental health 
specialists on the front lines, detecting and mini-
mizing harm to workers. It also illustrates the need 
for national comprehensive chemicals policy re-
form leading to safer chemicals and ensuring that 
risks are not transferred among workers, commu-
nities, and the environment.
injuries are not accidents: construction  
will be safe when it’s designed to be safe.
Every day in the United States, approximately three 
workers die in construction accidents.a and for 
every worker who is killed, more than 100 more 
suffer injuries that result in lost work time, lost 
wages, and a drag on productivity.b Investigations 
of construction accidents invariably find a com-
plicated web of causal factors involved in these tragic, 
yet avoidable events. To manage these complex 
occupational hazards and protect workers ade-
quately, the construction sector needs a more com-
prehensive approach than mere compliance with 
government standards or the sporadic application 
of control measures following a serious accident. 
a Based on the US Bureau of Labor Statistics’ total fatality cases (975)  
in construction, in 2008.  
b  Based on the US Bureau of Labor Statistics’ total non-fatal cases (120,240)  
in construction, in 2008.
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 This case study shows the importance of imple-
menting an occupational safety and health man-
agement system on the worksite. a commitment to 
a comprehensive occupational safety and health 
management system can break through bad habits, 
careless thinking, and the inertia that prevents 
managers and workers from making real changes 
in safety procedures. Further, this case study shows 
how vital training and community-based safety 
and health strategies are for the immigrant workers 
who are increasingly employed in this sector. 
Journalists have a role to play, too. When a work-
place disaster happens, the reporting too often 
frames the problem as a tragic and inevitable ac-
cident rather than as the result of an avoidable 
failure in managing a dangerous human activity.2 
By redesigning workplaces to avoid hazards in the 
first place, we can use innovation and ingenuity to 
ensure workers are protected.
regulating methylene chloride: a cautionary 
tale about setting health standards one chemical 
at a time. 
oSHa’s chemical-by-chemical risk-based standard 
setting process is so slow that years can go by be-
tween the time that it is clear that workers are being 
dangerously over exposed and the time that effec-
tive controls are put into place. The tortured path 
to oSHa’s methylene chloride standard is a potent 
illustration of the limits of the current standard-
setting process. The methylene chloride standard 
took more than a decade to establish. and, under 
the standard that was finally set, the legal exposure 
limit continues to allow workers to be exposed to 
this cancer-causing chemical at a level hundreds to 
thousands of times higher than is permitted for 
the general public.  
 By focusing the debate on the narrow question 
of exactly how risky a specific exposure level might 
be, oSHa and its risk-based standard setting pro-
cess distracts attention from the more important 
question: do we need this chemical at all? are 
there safer alternatives? In the case of methylene 
chloride, the risk debate allowed some employers 
to shift from methylene chloride to an untested, 
unregulated substitute chemical—1-bromopropane— 
which turned out to be a neurotoxicant, a repro-
ductive toxicant, and possibly a more potent car-
cinogen than methylene chloride.  
Safe food from safe workplaces:  
protecting meat and poultry processing workers.  
over a century ago, Upton Sinclair’s novel The 
Jungle exposed the dehumanizing labor conditions 
and unsanitary environment of the meatpacking 
industry. Slaughtering and processing of meat and 
poultry for our food supply are inherently dan-
gerous jobs. These hazards are well known and 
predictable, and solutions to preventing harms are 
feasible. yet since Sinclair’s time, rates of injuries 
and illnesses in the meatpacking industry have 
been notoriously high. 
 The long history of the meat and poultry 
slaughter and processing industry shows how solu-
tions to protect the safety and health of workers 
cannot be addressed in isolation; eliminating haz-
ards on the production line, providing dignity 
and job satisfaction to line workers, and ensuring 
a safe and ecologically sound food supply are all 
CoNC LUS I oNS :  regulating Methylene Chloride
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components of the same food systems approach to 
this industry. The roadblocks to effective food 
safety practices and to healthy jobs are the same: 
workers with little control over their jobs on the 
plant floor, regulatory agencies with inadequate 
resources and powers, and the perverse economics 
of our industrial meat and food production sys-
tem in which narrow profit margins drive business 
decisions with insufficient commitment to either 
working conditions or food quality. 
From individual tragedy to broad understanding: 
some lessons learned
as we dissected these stories, each with its own long 
history of problem identification, scientific evidence, 
policy prescriptions, and often frustrating delays 
and setbacks, we saw some common themes. These 
lessons learned should lead to solutions, to fresh 
approaches, and to new commitments. 
 Important lessons for preventing workplace in-
jury and illness:
• Both employers and employees have essential 
roles in making workplaces healthy. 
• Clear and comprehensive laws and regulations 
are critical elements of worker health protec-
tions, but can be more effective when combined 
with other strategies such as incentives to inno-
vate with inherently safe technologies, and cam-
paigns that link improvement in worker health 
to goals like environmental protection and 
energy efficiency. 
• adequate resources are needed to ensure the 
deterrent effect of enforcement, but there is also 
a clear need for sufficient technical resources to 
help firms more effectively protect workers and 
communities, as well as resources to promote 
research and application of safer production 
systems and products. 
• It is impractical to rely solely on federal inspec-
tors, working to ensure compliance with hun-
dreds of specific rules, as the primary solution 
to our occupational health crisis: this approach 
is either too expensive (if enough inspectors 
could be hired) or ineffective (with the current 
numbers of inspectors).  
• Workplace health and safety and environmental 
protection should be viewed as two aspects of 
the design of sustainable systems of production. 
Economically, this can create efficiencies, and 
politically, it can help forge alliances among 
traditionally contentious interests.
• Globalization has not only sent many hazard-
ous jobs overseas, it has also led to the concen-
tration of marginalized immigrant workers in 
those dangerous and exhausting jobs that re-
main in the United States. Immigrant rights 
and occupational health are increasingly linked. 
• occupational and environmental health poli-
cies that focus upstream—on prevention at the 
source of the hazards—are not only feasible, but 
also protect workers’ health and save money for 
companies and government agencies.
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“the	whole	system	is	clogged	up	like	I-15.	there	are	traffic	jams,	so	that	makes	you		
less	productive	and	makes	you	nervous.	then	you	hurry	up	because	you’re	trying	to	be		
a	productive	employee.	Just	like	how	when	you	speed	on	a	freeway	you	have	less	time		
to	react,	when	you	hurry	on	the	job	you	have	less	time	to	correct	that	mistake.”
—		an	iron	worker	employed	on	one	of	the	two	major	construction	projects	in	las	Vegas	where	nearly		
	 a	dozen	construction	workers	died	in	a	period	of	less	than	17	months
Solutions: promising directions to improve 
worker safety and health                                              
We have identified seven high-priority strategies 
that could have important impacts on making work-
places safer. The first three are policy changes 
within the traditional boundaries of oSHa’s acti-
vities, while the remaining four involve changes in 
other agencies and organizations.
1. establish a Workplace Safety and Health  
Program rule that emphasizes injury and illness  
primary prevention and worker participation. 
Several of the case studies concluded that a key 
solution for preventing injury and illnesses is to 
improve the capacity of both employees and em-
ployers to identify and prevent workplace hazards. 
In response to nearly a dozen fatalities on a job site 
in Las Vegas, one iron worker for example identifies 
factors contributing to the accidents, “The whole 
system is clogged up like I-15. There are traffic 
jams, so that makes you less productive and makes 
you nervous. Then you hurry up because you’re 
trying to be a productive employee. Just like how 
when you speed on a freeway you have less time to 
react, when you hurry on the job you have less time 
to correct that mistake.”3 
 oSHa could issue a rule similar to those al-
ready in place in states such as California, requir-
ing each employer to develop, implement and 
continuously evaluate a workplace safety and health 
prevention program. This standard has the poten-
tial to comprehensively address a range of hazards 
present in workplaces without establishing specific 
rules for each. Each employer’s plan would in-
clude a set of core practices fundamental to worker 
safety and health to fill significant gaps in hazard 
prevention. These core practices—with measurable 
performance targets—include: 
• procedures for management commitment and 
employee involvement (and also community 
involvement, where applicable) in all facets of 
planning, implementing, evaluating, and deci-
sion-making about the program; 
• clear requirements for worksite analysis to iden-
tify and assess all hazards and their root causes; 
• hazard prevention and control, including re-
quirements to evaluate hazards and assess safer 
alternatives; 
• requirements for employee, manager, and super-
visor safety and health education and training and 
• requirements for medical surveillance. 
Workplace safety and health prevention plans should 
include subcontractors’ employees, who often make 
up a significant fraction of the workers in an es-
tablishment. 
 In May 2010, oSHa took preliminary steps 
towards rulemaking efforts requiring workplace 
safety and health prevention programs, the Injury 
and Illness Prevention Program (I2P2). This ap-
pears to be a promising prevention-oriented pol-
icy solution to better protect workers. 
2. revamp oSHA’s enforcement system by leveraging 
existing agency inspectional systems, as well as 
cross-training of inspectors, to support greater  
regulatory compliance by employers.
Establishing a workplace safety and health pro-
gram could fill an important gap in motivating 
and maintaining healthy and safe workplaces, as it 
is clear that the threat of inspections and fines 
alone is simply inadequate. yet enforcement re-
CoNC LUS I oNS :  regulating Methylene Chloride
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mains an important element of workplace protec-
tions. While oSHa has prioritized enhancing 
its enforcement efforts by hiring new compliance 
officers to inspect more facilities, and also by 
changing how penalties are calculated to increase 
employer fines where appropriate, there are still 
too many workplaces for any realistic inspection 
force to cover. 
 However, enforcement can be enhanced by le-
veraging the capacity and the presence of other 
public and private public health auditing and/or 
inspectional services. Whether it’s the US Depart-
ment of agriculture’s (USDa) Food Safety and 
Inspection Service inspectors in the case of meat 
and poultry facilities, the Joint Commission on 
accreditation of Healthcare organizations’ (Joint 
Commission) surveyors in the case of health care 
facilities, or the EPa Risk Management Program 
auditors in the case of establishments that have 
large volumes of toxic chemicals on site, the pres-
ence of services like these in a broad range of 
other agencies provides an opportunity to inte-
grate occupational health into existing activities 
with a public health focus. 
 Many workplaces targeted by current environ-
mental/public health inspectional and auditing 
programs are reached only infrequently by oSHa. 
Thus, leveraging the capacity of existing inspec-
tional and auditing programs provides the oppor-
tunity for oSHa to ensure that more facilities are 
complying with its regulations. as the USDa’s, the 
Joint Commission’s and EPa’s inspectors, survey-
ors, and auditors are already skilled in public health 
protections, probably only minor cross-training 
on issues specific to occupational health is needed 
to allow these programs to serve as additional sets 
of eyes for oSHa. Further, a more coordinated 
approach that engages teams of inspectors, or calls 
for whole-facility multi-media inspections, would 
help ensure that hazards are not shifted from in-
side the plant to outside and could focus on facility-
level prevention opportunities. Finally, many states 
have pollution prevention and manufacturing ex-
tension offices that could provide engineering 
support for workplace and facility design in the 
course of inspections. 
 While only oSHa has the jurisdiction to issue 
citations for violations, these additional inspec-
tional/auditing services can serve as important 
referral sources for oSHa inspections. The USDa 
already has a memorandum of understanding 
(MoU) with oSHa to carry out these services.4 
yet more effort is needed to realize the potential 
of this MoU and to establish similar MoUs with 
other public and private agencies.
3. expand occupational safety and health  
surveillance and enable rapid interventions  
when hazards are detected.
accurate, comprehensive, and informative surveil-
lance data are essential for ensuring that resources 
to protect the safety and health of workers are tar-
geting the most at-risk workers and for evaluating 
whether hazard prevention policies and programs 
are effective. as discussed in the majority of case 
studies, statistics on injuries and illness collected 
by the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) woefully 
undercount injuries and illnesses that are occur-
ring in workplaces.5,6 
 oSHa is currently pursuing two important 
efforts to improve surveillance data: (1) its Re-
cordkeeping national Emphasis Program will pre-
sumably help rectify deliberate underreporting 
by certain employers; and (2) current efforts to 
include musculoskeletal disorders as a reportable 
illness category will help reveal the true extent of 
these injuries. yet beyond these activities, major 
surveillance gaps will still remain—gaps that severely 
impede not only oSHa’s regulatory enforcement 
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and compliance assistance activities, but also non-
regulatory hazard and disease prevention efforts 
by nIoSH and state occupational health pro-
grams. BLS data should be supplemented by new 
annual national surveillance surveys or similar 
tools to capture data that current BLS surveillance 
tools were not designed to collect. additional sur-
veillance data collection efforts should include ill-
nesses with long latencies such as cancer, addi-
tional injury and illness types not specified on data 
collection forms used by BLS (oSHa 300 logs), 
and the experience of workers employed by some 
small businesses.  
 also of crucial importance is the need to expand 
the capacity of state and federal occupational 
health programs to intervene rapidly to prevent 
additional cases of injury or illness when hazards 
are identified. according to a survey by the Coun-
cil of State and Territorial Epidemiologists, 34 of 
50 US states have minimal to no surveillance or 
epidemiology capacity in occupational health.7 
and those that have the staff capacity have neither 
the real-time injury or illness data nor hazard 
surveillance tools to support occupational health 
officials in meeting their responsibility to identify 
and warn workers who are at risk, or to identify 
early-stage cases of disease. 
 Hazard surveillance tools should include a 
central repository of chemical use information. 
This need was clearly revealed in the diacetyl case 
study: the California Department of Health Ser-
vices’ Hazard Evaluation System and Information 
Services (HESIS) unit could not appropriately 
warn workers of hazards associated with diacetyl, as 
it had no way of finding out which workplaces used 
butter flavorings.8  
4. implement comprehensive chemicals policy  
reform, including both occupational and environ- 
mental hazards.
at present, the United States has roughly 15 federal 
agencies and many more state agencies responsible 
for chemicals management. as seen in the pop-
corn workers’ lung and methylene chloride case 
studies, this disjointed collection of overlapping 
jurisdictions for managing chemicals—a system 
that tends to treat chemical hazards as “safe until 
proven hazardous”—is harming workers. This harm 
was poignantly described by Eric Peoples, a pop-
corn plant worker, “I played by the rules. I worked 
to support my family. This unregulated industry 
virtually destroyed my life. Don’t let it destroy the 
lives of others. These chemicals that are used on 
food in large scale production must be tested and 
proper instructions and labeling supplied with 
their sale.”9 nor is our chemicals management 
system protecting the general public or the envi-
ronment.  
 a comprehensive approach to regulating work-
ers’ exposure to chemicals needs to move beyond 
oSHa’s risk-based health standards—a substance-
by-substance process that every oSHa adminis-
trator has recognized cannot keep pace with the 
rapid pace of technological change in the american 
workplace. Moreover, the risk of unintended con-
sequences of regulating one chemical at a time was 
clearly revealed in the methylene chloride case study—
some employers responded to the methylene chlo-
ride standard by switching to 1-bromopropane, an 
unregulated chemical that testing has now revealed 
may be four times more potent in causing cancer 
than methylene chloride.10
“I	played	by	the	rules.	I	worked	to	support	my	family.	this	unregulated	industry		
virtually	destroyed	my	life.	don’t	let	it	destroy	the	lives	of	others.	these	chemicals	that	
are	used	on	food	in	large	scale	production	must	be	tested	and	proper	instructions		
and	labeling	supplied	with	their	sale.”
— Eric Peoples, microwave popcorn plant worker who was diagnosed with a form of fixed, obstructive 
 lung disease resulting from workplace exposure to artificial butter flavoring chemicals
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 an important model for the chemicals man-
agement system needed in the United States is the 
European Union’s policy called REaCH—regis-
tration, evaluation, and authorization of chem-
icals. This policy requires that manufacturers and 
importers of chemicals assess chemical hazards, 
communicate these hazards through supply chains, 
and ensure safe use of chemicals rather than plac-
ing the burden on government to show that each 
substance is harmful before action can be taken to 
regulate it. Some key components are: 
• Manufacturers must provide hazard, exposure, 
and use data on all chemicals, not only new ones, 
before they can be used in commerce.
• Companies have the responsibility to provide 
information on health and environmental effects 
of the chemicals they use.
• Hazard information must be communicated 
both up and down the supply chain.
• Substances of “very high concern” need explicit 
authorization for use, and a plan to substitute 
safer alternatives.
While efforts are underway to reform the 30-year-
old US Toxic Substances Control act, many US 
companies already recognize the need to under-
stand what chemicals are in their products and to 
undertake necessary testing and evaluation. Several 
US states are also undertaking broad chemicals re-
forms to rapidly prioritize chemicals into higher 
and lower hazard categories and require safer alter-
natives to chemicals of concern. Proposed regu-
lations in California, for example, will require the 
state to prioritize chemicals and products of con-
cern and require that retailers and distributors 
evaluate safer alternatives to those substances. But 
none of these developments, including REaCH, 
includes the full range of components of a Com-
prehensive Chemicals Policy that considers all chem-
icals, across all uses and jurisdictions, with the goal 
of promoting safer chemicals and not simply con-
trolling the hazardous ones.  
5. Promote “Prevention through design” (Ptd) to 
make jobs, products, and materials inherently safe.
For decades, chemists, engineers, and architects 
designed the materials and production processes 
that fuel our economy with little or no regard for 
the safety and health of workers. From avoidable 
falls among construction workers, preventable 
back injuries to health care workers, and neuropa-
thy among workers exposed to 1-bromopropane, 
the case studies again and again reveal entirely 
avoidable harms if only our chemicals, production 
processes, and technologies were designed differ-
ently. across the life cycle—from manufacture and 
construction to operation, maintenance, and dis-
posal—fatalities, illnesses, and injuries result from 
hazards inherent in the way things were designed. 
Given that these problematic materials and pro-
cesses were designed and created by humans, 
solutions can be also—and one of the best ways to 
protect workers is to design out those hazards.  
 nIoSH has a dedicated Prevention through 
Design (PtD) initiative whose mission is to “re-
duce the risk of occupational injury and illness by 
integrating decisions affecting safety and health in 
all stages of the design process.” With current in-
terest in greening the economy and in getting 
people back to work, successful implementation of 
PtD concepts holds great promise for breaking 
free of the false dichotomy of safety versus profit—
it doesn’t have to be a trade-off. Tools to imple-
ment PtD, including alternatives assessment and 
toxics use reduction planning, can be integrated 
into decision-making by both businesses and reg-
ulatory agencies to reduce hazards at their sources 
© 2010 Earl Dotter
128  |  Lowell Center for Sustainable Production  |  University of Massachusetts Lowell Lessons Learned: Solutions for Workplace Safety and Health  |  129
rather than simply managing downstream risks. 
PtD application at the firm level can be combined 
with coordinated federal agency research to iden-
tify design-oriented solutions for workplace haz-
ards that optimize worker and environmental health. 
The training of chemists, engineers, designers, 
and business and finance professionals could in-
clude PtD as well. Federal research programs could 
be used to stimulate innovative research on the most 
cost-effective ways to design out hazards through-
out the economy.
6. expand labor/migrant labor safety and health  
protections. Support immigrant worker centers  
to develop expertise in assisting workers. 
The globalization of systems of production has two 
distinct aspects. The export of hazardous indus-
tries is perhaps the better understood aspect. But 
we can see that when a hazardous and exhausting 
job can’t be exported—construction, janitorial ser-
vices, personal care, health care—these trades are 
increasingly carried out by immigrants, which cre-
ates special challenges for those who try to help 
them protect themselves. 
 new immigrant workers experience communi-
cation, legal, and cultural barriers to understand-
ing and exercising their workplace rights.  In some 
sectors, trade unions have been successful at orga-
nizing these marginalized workers, and this can be 
an important step in providing them with basic 
protections. yet in many situations, unionization 
has been very difficult. as described in the con-
struction case study, only 11 percent of Hispanic 
construction workers belong to a union. They also 
suffer far more fatal and non-fatal injuries and 
are 48 percent less likely to receive payment for 
medical costs from workers’ compensation than 
their non-Hispanic white co-workers.12 Similar needs 
were also revealed in the case study of meat and 
poultry workers. For example, less than half (44 
percent) of the predominantly immigrant work-
force on nebraska’s meatpacking disassembly lines 
remembered receiving information about workers’ 
compensation, according to a survey by nebraska 
appleseed.11 as described by one meatpacking 
employee, these populations often feel that their 
employer’s human resources and medical staff 
only have the company’s interest in mind, “It’s sad 
to not know who to complain to, because even the 
doctors and nurses are on the company’s side.”11  
 Safety and health training, information, and 
other support can be offered through immigrant 
worker centers and other community initiatives to 
reach out to these populations. and oSHa could 
strengthen its ability to communicate with immi-
grant workers and their communities through out-
reach activities and additional resources devoted 
to working with non-English speakers. However, 
information alone will not be sufficient to protect 
workers. It must be coupled with policies and en-
forcement and compliance programs that ensure 
that the most vulnerable workers are protected 
from workplace hazards (considering the cumula-
tive impacts of workplace and community hazards 
and stressors). By protecting those most vulnera-
ble, all workers will be better protected. 
7. Strengthen occupational and environmental  
health expertise and related clinical initiatives that 
are created by health care reform legislation. 
Health care reform debates have opened many 
opportunities to improve health care focused on 
the hazards of work. If it were not for astute physi-
cians, such as Dr. alan Parmet in kansas City and 
Dr. Phil  Harber in Los angeles, who diagnosed 
the first cases of lung disease in workers exposed to 
butter flavoring chemicals, the epidemic would 
have lasted longer and more workers and consum-
ers would have been sickened. 
 When physicians are trained in occupational 
health and when effective occupational health 
surveillance systems are in place, workers’ lives 
are better protected. yet the Institute of Medicine 
has declared that there is a “critical shortage” of 
specialty-trained occupational and environmental 
physicians in communities, in academic medical 
centers, and in public health and related agen-
cies.13 Public health and medical curricula should 
“It’s	sad	to	not	know	who	to	complain	to,		
because	even	the	doctors	and	nurses	are	on		
the	company’s	side.”
— an anonymous nebraska meat packing worker
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require a minimum level of competence in recog-
nizing occupational injury and illness to enhance 
the capacity of future professionals. Some states, 
such as Massachusetts, are implementing programs 
to integrate occupational health into existing pub-
lic health, clinical care, and worksite wellness 
programs.14 Focusing these initiatives in commu-
nity health centers makes sense because the low-
income patients who use these centers often find 
themselves in the most hazardous jobs. 
taking the next steps
The challenges of protecting workers’ safety and 
health are great, but the opportunities for broad 
solutions that can improve the health of workers, 
communities, and the environment while stimu-
lating innovation are even greater. The case stud-
ies in this report explore multiple overlapping 
factors that lead to workplace injury and illness. 
Using these case studies, we have identified con-
crete steps for systems-level changes that can pre-
vent injury and illness. none of the proposed 
recommendations is sufficient in and of itself.  It 
will take multiple efforts with the engagement of a 
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wide range of parties to effect fundamental change. 
Resources for participating in this ongoing dialog 
are available at our website: www.sustainableproduction.
org, along with the six case studies and resources for 
going deeper into each of these topics.
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Going	to	work	should	not	be	a	
choice	between	feeding	your	family	
and	protecting	your	health.
Every day, 14 workers die on the job, and each year more than 
4 million are seriously injured or sickened by exposures to toxic 
agents. Real change to the nation’s approach to workplace safety and 
health is desperately needed. This report includes six case studies 
of systemic failures in protecting workers from injury and illness. 
Each case documents the history of selected workplace health and 
safety policies and practices and reveals lessons learned to inform 
more effective prevention-focused worker health and safety pro-
tections. The Synthesis and Recommendations section of the re-
port uses these lessons learned to outline a series of strategies for 
real change—approaches that can protect workers while stimulating 
innovation in safer forms of production that can also protect the 
communities in which we all live.
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